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"The Invasion of the 
City of Washington" 

A Disagreeable Study in and 
of Military Unpreparedness 



To be prepared for war is one of the most 
effectual means of preserving peace.— George 
Washington, President of the United States, 
to the first Congress of the United States, 
January 8, 1790. 



By 

JOHN M. STAHL, 

Author of 

The Real Farmer; Just Stories; The Story 

of Ed; The Battle of Plattsburg, Etc. 



THE VAN TRUMP COMPANY 
Publishers 



\ 3$£g 






Copyright, 1918. 
By John M. Stahl 



JUN 28 1318 
.:.£. 01132 



To 

The Daughters of 1812, 

The Society of the War of 1812, 

and 

All that Love Liberty and Democracy, 

Honor the Brave, 

and 

Glory in the Star Spangled Banner. 



1. 



THIS BOOK HAS BEEN WRITTEN BECAUSE 

very many indeed of the American people believe that 
the soldiers of the United States opposed to the Brit- 
ish forces that accomplished "the Invasion of the City 
of Washington" (as the event was most often called 
at the time) were cowardly, and fled without firing 
scarcely a shot. This belief is founded on a vile libel 
of the dead as well as of the living — some severely 
wounded — that we cannot fasten on the British sol- 
diers, for those that wrote of the fighting paid just 
tribute to our forces ; but which had its origin in a 
weak and "whitewashing" report of the subservient 
congressional committee that, while it did not directly 
accuse our soldiers, gave the cue and an excuse to the 
group of American writers that persistently libelled 
our soldiers of the War of 1812. This lie about our 
brave soldiers has been allowed to live too long. 

Why many of the Americans that wrote of our 
"Second War of Independence" chose to belittle the 
achievements of our soldiers in that war and actually 



to libel them, taking from both the living and the dead 
that fair fame which it is most cruel to lose and most 
despicable to take, has been explained in the author's 
"The Battle of Plattsburg," and need not be repeated 
here. 

The truth about "The Invasion of the City of 
Washington" is only justice to the brave, patriotic sol- 
diers that fought well at Bladensburg to defend the 
national capital. To recall the truth about those sol- 
diers is never less nor more than a patriotic duty, and 
one of compelling timeliness when war and peril 
should make every heart burn and pulsate with pride 
in and love of country and the insistent desire to do 
the utmost to make secure for ourselves and others 
that liberty and government for which our brave 
countrymen before us twice fought a War of Inde- 
pendence. 

But the welfare of the living is beyond and above 
even the good repute of the dead. The second reason, 
and the better reason, for the writing of this book is 
that "The Invasion of the City of Washington" fur- 
nishes the best example in the history of the United 
States of the inevitable results of the unmitigated 
foolishness and positive national crime of military un- 
preparedness. 

Sad to say, it is only slightly the best among a 
humiliating number of such examples. 

All good and true Americans abhor war, while 

8 



believing that there are times when not to fight, and 
fight well, is dishonorable and criminal. We believe 
in honorable peace; as did a certain Virginia gentle- 
man, who had gained wisdom in both peace and war, 
and who said in a speech to Congress, January 8, 1790 : 

"To be prepared for war is one of the most effec- 
tual means of preserving peace." 

George Washington knew that the nation not 
prepared effectually to defend itself will invite attack 
as long as human nature is not fundamentally changed ; 
until men are made into saints. He knew that un- 
trained patriots, not lacking the least in bravery and 
fighting remarkably well for men put to strange work 
about which they know nothing and in which they 
have not had any experience, cannot be depended on, 
cannot reasonably be expected to be victorious over 
trained, seasoned fighters. He knew that the un- 
trained soldiers cannot protect their country from at- 
tack by putting wholesome doubt or fear into the 
trained soldiers of another country. Washington had 
had experience with soldiers equipped with a full sup- 
ply of patriotism, but, as soldiers, untrained and inex- 
perienced ; and February 10, 1776, he wrote frankly 
and confidentially to his friend, Joseph Reed : 

"The party sent to Bunker Hill had some good 
and some bad men engaged in it. One or two courts 
have been held on the conduct of part of them. To be 
plain, these people are not to be depended upon if 



exposed ; and any man will fight well if he thinks him- 
self in no danger. I do not apply this only to these 
people. I suppose it to be the case with all raw and 
undisciplined troops." 

This is somewhat, but far from altogether, unjust 
to the troops. Three years later, even one year later, 
Washington would have written differently. He would 
have written differently in February, 1776, had he not 
been discouraged, disheartened. In this same letter 
to Reed he wrote : 

"I know that much is expected of me; I know, 
that without men, without arms, without ammunition, 
without anything fit for the accommodation of a sol- 
dier, little is to be done. * * * * So far from my 
having an army of twenty thousand men well armed, 
I have been here with less than one-half of that num- 
ber, including sick, furloughed, and on command, and 
those neither armed nor clothed, as they should be. 
In short, my situation has been such, that I have been 
obliged to use art to conceal it from my own officers/ 

Truly Washington could speak as one having 
knowledge when he spoke of military unpreparedness 
and its consequences. His sad, disheartening experi- 
ence of it did not end in Massachusetts. 

But the American people soon forget the disas- 
trous results of military unpreparedness as they also 
forgot the words of Washington, who, in that most 
remarkable — most intimate, solemn and wise — state 

10 



paper, his "Farewell Address," said : 

"Remembering that timely disbursements to pre- 
pare for danger frequently prevent much greater dis- 
bursements to repel it." 

His countrymen, whom he so solemnly addressed, 
had not remembered, and when war was declared 
against Great Britain in June, 1812, although we had 
been moving toward it surely for years, the United 
States had neither a navy nor a standing army worthy 
of the name. And during all the period of the War 
adequate preparations and measures to conduct the 
War successfully were hindered, and generally pre- 
vented, by that same fear of liberal expenditure and 
of vigorous execution that exists even in this hour of 
war and peril and by its existence now, though feeble, 
warns us that it will grow into dangerous strength as 
soon as the war ends. During all the period of the 
War of 1812 there were those that opposed — some 
openly and many more subtly and covertly — the ut- 
nost vigor of action to obtain the measures and means 
o secure that military preparedness that is the best 
imbassador to negotiate peace. For Stephen A. Doug- 
as voiced a truth when he said in his great address 
o the Illinois legislature, April 25, 1861 : 

"When hostile armies are marching under rude 
nd obvious banners against the government of our 
ountry, the shortest way to peace is the most stupend- 
ous and unanimous preparation for war. The great- 

11 



er the unanimity the less blood will be shed. The 
more prompt and energetic is the movement, and the 
more important it is in numbers, the shorter will be 
the struggle." 

But the American people had paid little heed in- 
deed to the words of Washington ; and some failed to 
see the truth Douglas so well expressed half a century 
later; while those that did perceive it were held fast 
by their own timidity or the timidity and influence of 
others; and as a result, when the enemy, after more 
than two years of war, and after more than a year's 
incursions into and occupancy of the nearby territory, 
with ample warning approached our national capital, 
there were yet no adequate means or measures to re- 
pel the hostile army. 

Major George Peter, one of the most intelligent, 
efficient and fair minded soldiers this country has ever 
produced, wrote of the battle of Bladensburg — the un- 
fortunate result of which permitted "The Invasion of 
the City of Washington :" 

"A want of military experience was the ground 
work of all the errors committed in the military oper- 
ations of that day * * * The great defect was 
the want of military experience." 

Major Peter was in position to speak knowingly 
of the battle of Bladensburg. He could say truthfully, 
as he did in his illuminating account of the battle, "J 
was the first to meet the enemy, and the last piece of 

12 



artillery fired at the battle of Bladensburg was from 
my battery, after I had received an order to retreat." 

It is well to repeat here that the American troops 
that participated in the battle of Bladensburg were 
not lacking in bravery. When we consider all the con- 
ditions we are surprised, not that they did not do bet- 
ter, but that they did as well as they did. Not they, 
but the failure of the national administration to take 
adequate measures for national defense, and the fail- 
ure of the state authorities as well to do their part, 
were responsible for the result at Bladensburg, and 
make it true that — 

'The Invasion of the City of Washington" Aug- 
ust 24, 1814, is as forcible and convincing an event as 
could well occur to demonstrate the catastrophe and 
humiliation that may come to any people as foolish 
and blind about their defense as a nation as were the 
American people in the years — and days — previous to 
August 24, 1814; and as they have been in all too many 
years since that day of shame and panic. 

Even today — a day of dire national peril as well 
as obtruding national duty — when it is our disgrace, 
as it has been more than once before, to be unprepared 
to defend our people, our rights, and the right; and 
when it may easily be our peril and loss and humilia- 
tion as it has been before, thus to be unprepared: 
there are many that yet doubt the wisdom and down- 
right necessity of military preparedness at all times, 

13 



and there are some that actually oppose that universal 
military training on which adequate national defense 
must rest as its foundation. There are those that can- 
not or will not see that which is made plain and al- 
ways has been made plain as time unfolds events : 
that to be defenseless invites attack ; that the military 
training of citizens for defense is not an irrevocable 
commitment of a nation to a large standing army or 
to "militarism," or a commitment of any kind to any- 
thing except the ability and readiness to do our part 
as a nation to make right and the rights of a free peo- 
ple secure, within our borders and beyond our bor- 
ders ; and that this ability and readiness to wage war 
successfully is the best guarantee of peace — and for 
others as well as ourselves when less than war on our 
part would be disgrace because less than war would 
be shirking our duty as a nation. 

Even now we need to be awakened and as with 
a blow that stings and hurts, to the inevitable loss and 
humiliation of a nation that cannot fight — efficiently 
and fiercely; a loss and humiliation inevitable as long 
as men are men. 



14 



2. 



A FOOL'S PARADISE 

is a phrase disagreeably uncomplimentary and harsh 
to apply to a state of mind of one's countrymen, but 
it must be confessed that we people of this "greatest 
and most glorious country on the globe" are prone to 
give lightly and to receive seriously that which is flat- 
tery ; and there are conditions, mental and material, 
that not only warrant, but demand plain speaking. 

Somewhat more than a century ago the American 
people were foolish — that is the only word to use — 
about the national defense. One would say that they 
were incredibly foolish were it not that certain events, 
notably "The Invasion of the City of Washington," 
prove that foolishness ; and were it not that this fool- 
ishness has persisted, to greater or less degree, to more 
or less extent to this day ! While we are hurrying, 
with all the confusion and waste of hurry, and all the 
inefficiency of workmen at a strange task, to put our- 
selves in position to fight — at this very hour — there 
are those that boldly proclaim that this waste and con- 

15 



fusion — and the infinitely worse results that must 
come from it — loss of limb and sight and life — are bet- 
ter than to have been prepared ! And there is abund- 
ant evidence that as soon as the present war is over 
there will be many indeed to lull and persuade and ca- 
jole and push us into the old dangerous, disgraceful 
condition of inability to defend ourselves or protect 
others. 

There is real need that we be told and reminded 
of and be warned by the loss and disgrace of "The 
Invasion of the City of Washington." Also, it is time 
indeed that the truth about that event and the events 
leading up to it, be told, fearlessly, that plain justice, 
and justice only, be done to the brave soldiers and 
sailors that fought, and fought well — for untrained 
soldiers fought almost incredibly well — but with the 
only result to be expected from military unprepared- 
ness and inexperience. 

As a people we have been indeed unwise in our 
indisposition to be prepared for war in times of peace 
because, for one thing, we have followed false proph- 
ets and blind leaders, so sure that they were very wise 
and so insistent that they were, that they have made 
all too many of our people to believe in their wisdom ; 
whereas events, which, without malice, but none the 
less cruelly, strip fools and show them to be what they 
are, have shown that these soi-disant wise people that 
have been so sure that the world has grown too good /l 

16 



to wage war and that the nation that does right is se- 
cure from attack, are all of them foolish, and well- 
nigh as hurtful to the people they mislead as if they 
were selfish and traitorous. 

The American people have been unwise about na- 
tional defense because, for another thing, they have 
not realized that all other peoples are not as happily 
circumstanced and as happy as themselves. We have 
thought — if we thought about it at all — that other peo- 
ples were as fortunately situated, as well fed, as pros- 
perous and as good, as ourselves. Having "a place in 
the sun" and a much larger place than we have needed 
or could utilize, we have not realized that many, many 
millions have no adequate place in the sun. Having 
no need of, and therefore no desire for, more room, we 
have not realized that many millions have that most 
urgent call of the stomach not well filled and of the 
soul that feels hard circumstances bearing down on it 
cruelly day after day, and therefore have a desire that 
will not be forever denied for more room that both 
the material and the spiritual may be fed and minis- 
tered unto- -a desire so strong, so propulsive, so in- 
sistent, that it leads even those weakened and fearful 
in body and mind by years and years of cruel condi- 
tions, to fight and kill; fight and kill with that wild 
fury that, while it shames the beasts in its excesses, 
almost glorifies those enslaved fighting for freedom of 
the body, mind and soul. Being well provided with 

17 



the good things of this world, and being safe and se- 
cure, we have been too comfortable ourselves to think 
as with conviction that to many millions there is no 
meal time that comes at any certain hour ; that many 
millions eat, not when the stomach, accustomed to a 
schedule, calls for food — or unaccustomed to any sched- 
ule, calls for food — but when a little food, say a handful 
of rice or a piece of unpalatable bread, or a soup of 
some vegetable of far greater bulk than nutrition, can 
be had ; not thinking, also, that of these many millions 
often hungry and who have no regular and sure meal 
time, many indeed are to be found in those "civilized" 
and "rich" nations of which the few have so very 
much. Being generally well filled ourselves, we have 
actually shut our eyes to that which history has hung 
aloft in the sky to those that having eyes will to see — 
when the head is well nigh empty and the stomach is 
altogether empty, it is easy to fill the heart with hate. 
Not having even those kings that should be put to 
some useful employment because they are figureheads 
and as kings are useless, we have not realized that 
there are kings with kingly ambitions (for that which 
is in truth kingly is always selfish and crafty) ; with 
kingly lack of morality and pity ; with kingly contempt 
of those not kings; with the fierce, fanatical, fearful 
and selfish kingly belief in the divine right of kings 
to have millions of common people suffer agony and 
death, to have nations drink to the dregs the cup of 

18 



poverty, suffering and hopelessness, to make these 
kings more powerful and oppressive — at the least, to 
keep a throne under them. Having the peace of the 
full stomach and the head that lies secure on a soft 
pillow, we have not realized that other peoples must 
not only keep the door locked always, but must con- 
tinually stand guard with weapon in hand, and that 
while the man thus stands guard he often hears his 
children cry for bread ; a condition that, because of 
the unwisdom of one or the ill temper of another very 
little fraction of the people, may lead to war, and very 
often war that spreads to neighbors, relatives and 
friends. Finally, we have had such a vast, vast, vast 
new country to occupy and conquer; that by Us riches 
continually called to us, tempted us, tantaU .<*d ue ; 
i that enlarged always and pushed out farther and far 
ther, as if they marked the horizon, its borders of hope 
and aspiration and opportunity and achievement; so 
that in the work of forest and mine and field and forge 
and store we have been so very busy of head and hand 
that we have not found time to think of war, and the 
things that bring war. We have found it more agree- 
able to think of an era of universal peace as if it had 
really come. Having generally well filled and regular- 
ly filled stomachs, sufficient apparel for comfort and 
often for vanity, and an amplitude of good shelter, it 
has been easy and comfortable for us to be friendly 
in thought towards other nations, to exercise those 

19 



Christian virtues of forbearance and tolerance and 
even generosity that make one disposed to be peacea- 
ble and therefore easily persuaded that war is sadly 
out of date and that all that go to war are cruel and 
criminal. 

History repeats itself. The ideas, utterances, and 
inaction in regard to military preparedness of the 
American people during the first years of the twenti- 
eth century have a disquieting similitude to their ideas, 
utterances and inaction in regard to the same matter 
during the first yeafs of the nineteenth century. Before 
Aug. 24, 1814, we had been at war, actual war, and with 
the great British Kingdom for our enemy, for more 
than two years ; we had been making, through all of 
that time, a great show of stupendous preparation for 
a large and efficient and well equipped army and navy ; 
our statesmen and highest officials had relieved them- 
selves of many lofty utterances, and the lackeys and 
claquers of the national administration regularly called 
attention to its godlike diplomatic ability and almost 
devilish diplomatic astuteness as shown in state pa- 
pers and public addresses as well as conferences and 
negotiations. The creation of armies on paper by 
requisitions on those that had neither men nor muni- 
tions, the defenses created in imagination by wordy 
proclamations and pronouncements, were surpassed 
only by the inefficiency, confusion and conflict of ef- 
fort in the departments of the national government. 

20 



The nation, somewhat disquieted by failure in the war, 
was yet reassured by the complacent confidence of 
the national administration and congress, and the 
many newspapers that found it more convenient and 
profitable, and may have believed it more patriotic, to 
hide the truth than to expose incompetency and dan- 
ger. One of the results was the burning of the na- 
tional capitol. A week; yes, a day before the battle 
of Bladensburg, which allowed the British to "violate 
the metropolis" of Washington the day following, and 
compelled the President and other public officials to 
flee to escape capture, not one person in a hundred 
among the people of the United States had the least 
thought that such an event was possible ! The people 
of this country now are no more certain in their belief 
that no catastrophe and humiliation can come to us 
now, and they have no less reason for such certainty 
of belief, than the people of this country were certain 
in their belief in 1812, or even 1813, or even later, that 
there was not the least possibility of that which did 
occur — "The Invasion of the City of Washington." 
In 1814 our foe dwelt three thousand miles away. And 
he had only sailing vessels. 



21 



3. 



MILITARY UNPREPAREDNESS 

and it alone, for with it went military inexperience 
and incompetency, was responsible for "The Invasion 
of the City of Washington ;" and as well for the events 
of the War of 1812 that lengthened that War and in- 
creased its cost of property and lives; and for a con- 
clusion of the War that did not secure the objects for 
which it was begun, or results at all commensurate 
with the loss and suffering. 

As has been already said, history has a way of re- 
peating itself — and at times this is a very disagreeable 
performance. 

Even after war had waged in Europe for five 
months of 1914 and all of 1915, the people of the Unit- 
ed States were content with their state of very com- 
plete military unpreparedness. The nation was as ill 
prepared, was as incapable of defending itself, of as- 
serting its rights and protecting its citizens, of aiding 
its friends or upholding right and liberty, as it was 
in 1812. 

22 



In January, 1916, Woodrow Wilson, President of 
the United States, made a series of notable addresses, 
to warn the people of this country about its military 
unpreparedness, to arouse the people to the weakness 
of the nation as a military force and to the danger in 
which this placed them, and to point out our rights 
and obligations. He said : 

"There are certain obligations which every Amer- 
ican knows that we have undertaken. The first and 
primary obligation is the maintainance of the integ- 
rity of our own sovereignty — which goes as of course. 
There is also the maintainance of our liberty to devel- 
op our political institutions without hindrance, and, 
last of all, there is the obligation to stand as the strong 
brother of all those in this hemisphere who will main- 
tain the same principles and follow the same ideals of 
liberty. 

"We stand in the midst of a world which we did 
not ourselves make and many of the forces of which 
are only too jealous of those things which we cherish. 

"We cannot alter that world overnight. We can- 
not hold it at arm's length by merely holding up our 
hands in disapproval and declaring our separation in 
sympathy and purpose from it. We cannot make it 
respect us by ignoring it. The hard, ugly fact is that 
it will heed us only if it certainly knows that our ob- 
ligation to ourselves and our ideals can and will be 
met to the utmost and without delay should any one 
seek to embarrass their fulfillment or to make it im- 
possible * * * * 

"But there is something that the American people 
love better than they love peace. They love the prin- 
ciples upon which their political life is founded. They 

23 



are ready at any time to fight for the vindication of 
their character and their honor. 

"They will at no time seek a contest, but they will 
at no time cravenly avoid it. Because if there is one 
thing that the country ought to fight for, and that ev- 
ery nation ought to fight for, it is the integrity of its 
own convictions. 

"We can not surrender our convictions. I would 
rather surrender territory than surrender those ideals 
which are the staff of life for the soul itself * * * 

"There are two sides to the question of prepara- 
tion. There is not merely the military side — there is 
the industrial side. And the ideal which I have in 
mind is this, gentlemen: We ought to have in this 
country a great system of industrial and vocational 
education, under Federal guidance and with Federal 
aid, in which a very large percentage of the youth of 
this country will be given training in the skillful use 
and application of the principles of science in maneu- 
ver and business. And it will be perfectly feasible 
and highly desirable to add to that and combine with 
it such a training in the mechanism and use and care 
of arms, in the sanitation of camp, in the simpler forms 
of maneuver and organization, as will make these 
same men industrially efficient and individually ser- 
viceable for national defense. 

"The point about such a system will be that its 
emphasis will lie on the industrial and civil side of life, 
and that, like all the rest of America, the use of force 
will only be in the background and as the last resort. 
So that men will think first of their families and their 
daily work, of their service in the economic fields of 
the country, and only last of all of their serviceability 
to the nation as soldiers and men-at-arms. That is the 

24 



ideal of America. But, gentlemen, you cannot 
create such a system overnight. You cannot create 
such a system rapidly. It has got to be built up, and 
I hope it will be built up, by slow and effective stages. 
And there is something to be done in the meantime. 
We must see to it that a sufficient body of citizens is 
given the kind of training which will make them effi- 
cient for call into the field in case of necessity." 

Here we have the statement of some plain facts, 
the proof of which is written on almost every page of 
human history. By the events of the past we must 
forecast the future. The slow change in the human 
race makes it plain that it will, at the earliest, be cen- 
turies before wars will cease — be centuries before 
might exercised in some great way or other will not 
be needed to protect and uphold and preserve the 
right. Until human nature is so fundamentally and 
wholly changed that the change cannot be expected 
for centuries, physical force must be exerted; and at 
times it will inevitably be on a national scale. Man 
must be a fighting animal— to live— as long as he con- 
tinues to exist; when he is no longer a fighting animal 
he will become extinct; and as long as he is a fighting 
animal he will fight— to live; for a place in the sun; 
to protect his offspring; to secure and hold that op- 
portunity and liberty that man above a certain plane 
counts of more worth than mere life itself. 

Here we have, also, in President Wilson's ad- 
dress, an exceedingly gentle statement of a very mod- 

25 



est plan and purpose of military preparedness. Not 
all our citizens, but only "a sufficient body of citizens," 
is to be given military training. This program is cer- 
tainly little enough; for a "sufficient" body of citizens 
to be trained is indefinite enough to be inoffensive. 
Yet even this not only encountered much opposition, 
but awakened much opposition. President Wilson 
deserves no small credit for the less than enough that 
he urged ; for considering the public opinion on mili- 
tary preparedness in January, 1916, he was really bold 
and radical in his utterances. And he deserves credit 
for another reason : like Lincoln, he knows that he 
that will be a true leader of the people, he that will 
succeed in leading the people, must not put himself 
so far ahead of them that they will not understand him 
when he calls to them, and must not seek to lead them 
too fast. Month after month Lincoln was scolded be- 
cause he did not advocate more, did not insist on more, 
and because he was so slow. We know now that in 
his head and heart he was far in advance of his words ; 
and that he was wise and patriotic enough to be mis- 
understood because if his words had been as his 
thoughts and wishes, he could not have led the people 
at all. At this writing Russia shows only too well the 
results of such radical attempts to lead, far in advance 
of the people, that does not lead them except to disas- 
ter. Abraham Lincoln is so exalted in the regard of 
the writer of this that he hesitates even to suggest that 

26 



any man has in any way the wisdom and far-sighted- 
ness and patience of Lincoln. Yet in that most effec- 
tive leadership that keeps, not far, but only a little, 
and always, in the lead, Woodrow Wilson is strangely 
not unlike Abraham Lincoln. They are strangely not 
unlike in the contradictions in their public utterances ; 
and doubtless the one is ready to confess, as the other 
more than once confessed, that clearer vision and surer 
knowledge have come with unfolding experience, and 
that growth of mind and of spirit has not been denied 
or repelled. 

But it must be confessed that some might com- 
pare James Madison and Woodrow Wilson and find 
much in common, especially as regards the subject in 
hand; for Madison's tongue was not dumb nor his pen 
idle, and they put forth brave words for military pre- 
paredness. 

It will not be amiss to be vigilant against such 
things as were done by members of the national ad- 
ministration, and other friends of the President, dur- 
ing the War of 1812, because of political expediency 
— and which, for example, were clearly responsible for 
"The Invasion of the City of Washington." There is 
enough in the past to put wise citizens on the alert, on 
guard; that these things of political expediency that 
persisted through the administration of James Madi- 
son may not be recorded by the historian of the admin- 
istration of Woodrow Wilson as having persisted 

27 



through his administration, with like results during 
the war, and relapse into military unpreparedness 
after the war.* 

But whatever may be the characteristics, faults, 
virtues, weakness or strength of this President or that, 
and of his satellites, the fact remains that there is need 
of the true friends of this nation being alert and active 
to secure for this time and for future years that mili- 
tary preparedness that is the most economical and 
surest guarantee of peace and to avoid that military 
unpreparedness that the War of 1812 showed to be 
so extravagant, wasteful, and disastrous. 

The greatest reason for the writing of history is 
the benefit, as citizens, of those that read it. The er- 
rors ot the dead are recorded that the living may read 
and be warned. The wise deeds and the brave deeds 
of the dead are put in the printed page that the living, 
reading that page, may be stirred to emulation. That 



*The writer is pleased to say that while Madison was a 
truly great man, a statesman of the first rank, and a pure 
patriot, as a vigorous believer in war for certain high ob- 
jects, and as an administrator to secure the vigorous prose- 
cution of war for those objects, Wilson now appears to be 
head and shoulders above Madison. The progress made 
by the United States in getting ready to fight during the 
first year of the present war, though marked by mistakes, 
confusion, waste and stubborn adhesion to inefficient men 
and methods — much of which could not reasonably be oth- 
erwise than expected — is nevertheless in striking and grat- 
ifying contrast in some particulars to the events as well as 
in disquieting resemblance to others of the like period of 
the War of 1812. 



28 



history which does not connect the events of which 
it writes with the events of the present, to influence 
the events of the future, misses no small part of its 
usefulness. It is believed to be not only allowable, 
but obligatory, that a history of the event of the War 
of 1812 most humiliating to the American people — 
an event due to military unpreparedness — should 
make plain the probable, the inevitable, events that 
will come from military unpreparedness at any time 
in the future. 

In his address quoted in this chapter, President 
Wilson, in admirably terse language, has happily stat- 
ed a military preparedness remarkable and indeed 
commendable in its breadth and depth, but lacking in 
length — it does not go far enough, for only universal 
military training will give that complete military pre- 
paredness that is safe and will escape the inequalities 
and favoritism that are antagonistic to a democracy. 
President Wilson's conception of military prepared- 
ness is indeed admirable in that it recognizes that the 
proper preparation includes far more than that which 
is required on the battlefield itself — that to make war 
in the best way is now an exceedingly complex under- 
taking; and in that it recognizes that one of the cer- 
tain, and chief, results of proper preparation for war 
is the effect on the people entirely distinct from any- 
thing connected with war. One fraction of this effect 
is that the youth given the right military training is 

29 



benefitted individually in several ways, and to such 
extent that it is not exaggeration to say that in many 
cases the character is transformed. 

Doubtless war reacts for peace. A people tires of 
war — but the next generation fights. The doors of the 
temple of Jarrus are not often moved. It is pleasant 
to dream of and it is noble to work for, a court of na- 
tions or a league for peace that will not permit war; 
but war can be prevented only by force, and the exer- 
cise of force, if it is not war from the beginning, will 
lead to war ! The only safety, and, as pointed out by 
Washington, the true economy, is in being ready to 
fight. We must not longer be misled by those that 
see only evil in an army and a navy, no matter what 
conditions may exist. We must not after the close of 
the present war allow the American nation to be de- 
fenseless, as it was a hundred years ago, as it was 
scarce a year ago. We must not delude ourselves that 
all other nations are kind and benevolent; that they 
all have, not only all the room in the sun that they 
need, but all that they want ; and that there is not 
among them, nor will there be, men of ambition that 
would gain power and make a name by even the hor- 
rors of war. We know that human nature has not 
much changed for the better in the last hundred years ; 
that where in one nation men have gone up and for- 
ward a little, in others they have slipped down and 
back. If we are wise and honest with the events of 

30 



history we will act as if men will not much change 
for the better during the next hundred years. And 
therefore we will, as patriots, and as good friends of 
the weak or oppressed everywhere, avoid that military 
unpreparedness that invited, and will always invite, 
such humiliating events as "The Invasion of the City 
of Washington." 



31 



4. 



MADISON AND FOUR OTHERS 

The battle near Bladensburg, a few miles from 
Washington, was the only battle of "The Invasion of 
the City of Washington." On the American side it 
was so notably a contest among public officials and a 
conflict of officers, rather than a fight by soldiers, that 
to understand it we must, first of all, know something 
about certain of the officials and officers that had 
much to do with that battle. 

First of all is to be considered James Madison, 
President of the United States and Commander-in- 
Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States. 

It was unfortunate for Madison and much more 
unfortunate for his country, that his heart was never 
in the War. He was a man of peace. He was 24 years 
of age when the farmers assembled at Concord fired 
the shot heard round the world, but the sound of it 
did not reach his ears as a call to arms, and at no time 
did he serve in the Continental army in any capacity. 

32 



His choice of employment during the War of the Rev- 
olution was doubtless a wise one, for he was fitted to 
serve the colonies much better in civil than in military 
employment ; and during the eight years of war he 
was indeed able, industrious and helpful. Our quarrel 
is not with him because during the Revolution he was 
not a soldier, but with the fate that made him Presi- 
dent during "The Second War of Independence." 

In "The Battle of Plattsburg" the author has this 
to say of Madison : 

"Madison was a man of irreproachable character. 
He was a patriot. He was a man of profound thought 
and great scholarship. He had been a Federalist. He 
wrote twenty-nine of the eighty-five numbers of "The 
Federalist" — Jay contributed only five numbers, and 
Hamilton the rest. When he graduated from Prince- 
ton he remained a year longer to study Hebrew. He 
was justly renowned as a thinker and writer on gov- 
ernment ; but his liking for theology was fully as 
strong as for the science of government, and had he 
been born at a different time he would probably have 
been a professor of theology and then president of 
Princeton, or some other college, in which he would 
have been also professor of Hebrew or theology or 
government. He was a man of very great ability. 
That the national constitution was accepted by the 
states was probably due more to him than to any one 
else. He broke with old friends and had bitter ene- 

33 



mies, but his honesty or virtue was never questione 
Naturally enough, the dominant element in his a 
ministration was, in its own estimation, at least, sch 
lastic and philosophical ; and it had the characte 
istics of the soi-disant scholarly 'statesman' of the 
time — and later dates — who was pleased not to be 
'practical.' There was indeed one prominent excep- 
tion — the commonsense, positive, bold Monroe. If, 
before the destruction of the capitol he had been sec- 
retary of war instead of secretary of state, the course 
of the War would have been different. Madison ha 
argued for universal military training and for a stand- 
ing army and a navy sufficient for defense. He di< 
this when eloquently endeavoring to secure the adop 
tion of the national constitution. This required re; 
moral courage, for the people of that time gr 
feared, and were bitterly opposed to, a standing ; 
'How could a readiness for war in time of peae 
safely prohibited, unless we could prohibit, in 
manner, the preparations and establishments of e T 
hostile nation?' he asked in The Federalist. 'If,' 
continued, 'one nation maintains constantly a d 
plined army, ready for the service of ambition c 
venge, it obliges the most pacific nations, who m; ; 
within the reach of its enterprises, to take corresp 

ing precautions The veteran legio* ^ 

Rome were an overmatch for the undisciplined 
of all other nations, and rendered her mistres f 
world.' 4- 

34 



"That was written in 1788. Immediately follow- 
ing what has just been quoted he wrote : 'Not the less 
'rue is it that the liberties of Rome proved the final 
victim of her military triumphs; and that the liberties 
' of Europe, as far as they ever existed, have, with few 
exceptions, been the price of her military establish- 
ments. A standing force, therefore, is dangerous.' 

"This view grew more and more in his mind, to 
the exclusion of the need of military preparedness for 
national defense. His genius was for scholarship and 
vheology and literature and philosophy rather than 
practical statesmanship and wise administration. He 
was by nature antagonistic to war, to force. Jeffer- 
S3n, his warmest admirer and friend, said of him that 
\ nature and method were 'soothing always the feel- 
is of his adversaries by civilities and softness of 
ression.' He was, in early life, exceedingly diffi- 
nt ; almost timid. Few have reached higher planes 
thought or spiritual or patriotic expression; but, 
ith Britain and France not only at war already in- 
iving or threatening to involve all nations that could 
1 ly fight, he was content with embargo and 'non- 
ircourse' and beautifully worded remonstrances, 
I no effective effort was made to get, equip and 
in soldiers or to build up a navy. 'What has 
"r. ght on other nations those immense debts,' he 
l 'under the pressure of which many of them la- 
. ot the expenses of their government, but war.' 

35 



He was opposed to war. He entered into war reluct- 
antly. Doubtless he never forgot that in allying him- 
self with the war party he had parted from his early 
political friends — the Federalists. Doubtless his heart 
was not in the war ; but he was by birth of the section 
that favored the war, and he went with his section. 
And though his heart had been in the war, his admin- 
istration would probably not have been more success- 
ful in the prosecution of the war. He became stub- 
bornly deaf to advice. 

"Inevitably a President is pressed around by 
subtly intrusive selfish or silly sycophants who know 
the power of flattery. A President is continually told, 
if he will listen to it, if he will not positively refuse to 
listen to it — and unfortunately it is not characteristic 
of human beings to dread 'praise, not blame' — that he 
is the greatest statesman and ablest administrator that 
ever occupied his exalted position ; and unless he is 
quite exceptional, he comes to believe some or much 
of this and to less or greater degree refuses to listen 
to criticism, resents advice, constantly seeks greater 
power, is more and more in sympathy with men and 
measures that take from the liberties of the people, 
and undertakes more and more the direction of that 
for the proper direction of which he lacks ability or 
energy, or both. He is content with inefficient officials 
and aids, for, he having chosen them, they must be 
the best that can be had! The War of 1812 was pro- 

36 



longed and its conclusion was unsatisfactory, lives were 
sacrificed, hardships were put upon the people, be- 
cause the national administration attempted what was, 
for it, impossible ; would not supplant the inefficient of 
men and methods with the efficient ; and at times was 
successful in accomplishing the astoundingly inoppor- 
tune and inadvisable, if not actually criminal. 

"Yet time has been kinder to Madison than it 
has been to his critics, and for this we may all well 
be content. It has preserved a remembrance of his 
good qualities rather than of his shortcomings. Be- 
fore he became President, even before he became Jeff- 
erson's Secretary of State, he had given to his country 
a vast service that required the highest and greatest 
and most varied of talents coupled with true patriot- 
ism and prodigious industry. If he had never been 
President he would nevertheless merit very nearly 
as much praise and gratitude from the American peo- 
ple as any one in all our history. Possibly the Presi- 
dency took from his high fame rather than added to 
it. And it is certain that of those that criticised him 
during the War, a good many would better have kept 
silent. Some there were who criticised with wisdom 
from patriotic motives ; and it would have been better 
for Madison and the country he loved if he had list- 
ened to these critics. He was not perfect. He was ill- 
suited to be a war President. But he was patriotic. So 
were some of his critics. But not all — not some of 
the loudest, that sought most to hector and hinder." 

37 



As already stated, Madison was a university grad- 
uate, but never a soldier. James Monroe, born in 1758, 
left William and Mary College in 1776 to enter the Rev- 
olutionary Army as a cadet. He was descended from 
Captain Monroe, an officer in the army of Charles I. 
Monroe was in the army only a short time when he 
was made a lieutenant. He was active and showed 
real military ability during the campaign on the Hud- 
son, and in the battle at Trenton he led a small de- 
tachment that captured a British battery — receiving 
as a result a ball in the shoulder and a captain's com- 
mission. He was soon made a major and as aide-de- 
camp to Lord Sterling he served brilliantly in the cam- 
paigns of 1777 and 1778, showing undoubted bravery 
and unusual energy and resource and military talent in 
the battles of Brandywine, Germantown and 
Monmouth. But by taking the position of aide- 
de-camp to Lord Sterling he had lost his 
rank in the regular line, and as he was nev- 
er given to flattery or intrigue and would not 
practice the ''diplomacy" of those days, he was de- 
nied entrance into the army as a commissioned officer. 
As a result, he began the study of law under the di- 
rection of Jefferson, at that time governor of Virginia. 
But in a short time he was organizing the militia of 
the lower counties of his state and Jefferson sent him 
as military commissioner to the army in South Caro- 
lina. All his life he had a liking for the military and 
when, during the War of 1812, he was addressed as 

38 



"Colonel" Monroe, he was greatly pleased; and those 
that write of that War, especially if military men, 
most often speak of him as Colonel Monroe, although 
the highest military rank he had ever had was that of 
Major, while he had held very high civil positions and 
at the time was Secretary of State. 

In 1782 he was elected to the Virginia assembly, 
and by that body he was appointed a member of the ex- 
ecutive council although he was only 23 years of age. 
In 1783 he was elected to Congress for three years. 
He was ineligible for re-election for three years, else 
he would undoubtedly have succeeded himself. In 
1787 he was re-elected to the Virginia assembly, and 
the next year he was chosen a delegate to the Vir- 
ginia convention to act on the adoption of the federal 
constitution. There was an especial appropriateness 
in this, for — and this should never be forgotten by the 
people of the United States — while a member of con- 
gress he became convinced that the old articles of 
confederation must always prove lame, ineffective and 
incompetent, and in 1785 he advocated an extension 
of the powers of congress and introduced a resolution 
to give congress authority to regulate trade between 
the States. This resolution was referred to a com- 
mittee of which he was chairman. It was favorably 
reported, and it was this which led to the convention 
at Annapolis, and later to the federal constitution. 

However, when the federal constitution was sub- 
mitted to the Virginia convention, Monroe was one 

39 



of the minority that felt compelled to oppose it, be- 
lieving that it gave too much power to the federal 
government. The majority of the people of Virginia 
supported the minority and Monroe was elected Unit- 
ed States Senator in 1790. In 1794 he was appointed 
minister to France. He was exceedingly popular in 
that country, but his attitude towards Great Britain 
led to his recall in 1796. From 1799 to 1802 he was 
governor of Virginia. At the close of his term he was 
appointed envoy extraordinary to the French govern- 
ment to negotiate for the purchase of Louisiana, and 
in this undertaking he was able and successful. As 
soon as this purchase was accomplished he was sent 
as minister plenipotentiary to England, but soon was 
sent to Madrid as minister extraordinary and pleni- 
potentiary. In 1806 he was returned to England as 
minister extraordinary. He was not successful at 
either Madrid or London. Possibly no one could have 
been. But Monroe had little patience with the ways 
of diplomacy of that period. He was the first one to 
practice "shirt sleeve diplomacy." His blunt an- 
nouncement of what is known as the "Monroe Doc- 
trine" is a good example of his methods and language. 
That doctrine may have suited the purposes of Great 
Britain, but to say, as is frequently done nowadays, 
that Monroe announced this doctrine at the sugges- 
tion of Great Britain, is as silly as it is untruthful, and 
it is the limit of both. Monroe had no love or respect 
for Great Britain and while the men in the government 

40 



of the British Kingdom in those years were dense and 
often stupid and foolish, they were not so stupid as to 
think that if they suggested anything to Monroe it 
would, on that account, be regarded favorably by him, 
or by the people of the United States. They knew 
that the effect would be the contrary. 

In 1808, Monroe was the choice of many, possibly 
a majority, of the Republican party for President, but 
President Jefferson favored Madison, and this made 
Madison President. In 1810 Monroe was elected for 
the third time to the Virginia assembly and the next 
year he was again elected governor of the state. In 
the same year he became Madison's Secretary of State, 
and he was holding that office at the time of "The 
Invasion of the City of Washington." From the be- 
ginning of Madison's administration he was an 
avowed candidate for the Presidency as Madison's 
successor, as was, for some time before "The Inva- 
sion of the City of Washington," John Armstrong, the 
Secretary of War ; and to the political maneuvering of 
Monroe and Armstrong and their friends, having in 
view the Presidential election of 1816, were due many 
of the military moves during that fateful year of 1814. 
We can not have an intelligent understanding of the 
events of the War of 1812, we can not understand 
aright, or pass a correct judgment on, the event of 
"The Invasion of the City of Washington," if we do 
not know of and consider the partisan political forces, 
the ambition for office, and the fierce feeling and bitter 

41 



rivalry between the two political parties of that per- 
iod, and especially the maneuvers and plottings of and 
for the two principal candidates for the next nomina- 
tion for the Presidency by the Republican party. 

This rivalry for the nomination for the Presidency 
led to certain events just preceding and after the 
battle near Bladensburg that would be amusing were 
they not so tragic. An example is Armstrong's leav- 
ing his office in Washington, where he was needed, 
to "go into the field" and from there sending others to 
report to him on the enemy's movements ; and Mon- 
roe, not to be outdone by the Secretary of War, "going 
him one better" and actually heading a scouting 
party! More of this in subsequent pages. 

We may be sure, however, that Monroe never 
did anything that he had the least thought would be 
injurious to his country. He was ambitious — nobly 
ambitious ; he wished to be President— and surely that 
was neither a weakness nor a crime; but he was al- 
ways a patriot, whose honesty and sincerity could not 
be doubted. If ever the history of our country is 
studied in our schools and homes as it should be, the 
fame of Monroe will be greater and brighter than it 
is now, and few indeed among our public men will 
have more of the respect and gratitude of the Ameri- 
can people. It was no accident that his administration 
was such that it soon ushered in "The Era of Good 
Feeling," in which party lines were almost effaced 
and in which party feeling almost died out. It was no 

42 



accident that when he traveled extensively among the 
people while he was President, he was received every- 
where, by all the people, with profound respect and 
real affection. 

John Armstrong, the Secretary of War, had par- 
ticipated actively in the War of the Revolution. Born 
in 1758, he entered the Revolutionary army as a vol- 
unteer when 18 years of age. He was one of General 
Mercer's aids at the battle of Princeton and when that 
general was mortally wounded, it was Armstrong that 
bore him from the field. Later Armstrong joined the 
army of General Gates and became a great favorite of 
that general, and served under him, with the rank of 
major, until the end of the war. He was a brave and 
capable soldier. The reputation he gained as a soldier 
in the war of the Revolution was very creditable — al- 
though this reputation was dimmed for a time by 
"the Newburg correspondence," it was soon seen that 
his part in this affair was dictated by good motives 
and it added to, rather than detracted from, the high 
esteem in which he was held in military circles. 

While the Revolutionary Army was encamped at 
Newburg, N. Y., in the winter of 1782-3, the arrear- 
ages of pay, which had become really serious, occas- 
ioned, and reasonably enough, great anxiety among 
both the private soldiers and the officers. Application 
for relief was made to congress, but without success. 
As a result, a meeting of officers for March 11, 1783, 
to discuss their grievances, was anonymously called 

43 



In an anonymous address, the writer of it called on his 
comrades in arms, in strong language, to refuse to per- 
form further military duty during the war, and at the 
conclusion of the war to refuse to lay down their arms 
until their just demands were satisfied. At once 
Washington issued a call for a like meeting, for the 
15th of the same month. Washington, in his call, 
promised a free discussion of all claims and demands. 
Immediately another anonymous address was issued, 
from the same source as the first, in which it was made 
to appear, to the satisfaction of the author of the ad- 
dress, that the action of Washington was an approval 
of the first address. At the meeting on the 15th 
Washington addressed the officers, with unusual 
warmth for him and showing great feeling. He as- 
sured the officers that he wished to aid them in every 
proper way to secure satisfaction of all their just de- 
mands, that he would do all that he could to secure 
that satisfaction, and he begged them not to take the 
dangerous and extreme action advocated in the anony- 
mous addresses. His plea to the officers was acknowl- 
edged by all to be very earnest and well framed, and 
very eloquent — and so true was this that he gained all 
that he asked of the officers; and shortly afterwards 
he obtained from congress action that redressed the 
grievances of the soldiers, both privates and officers. 
It was soon known that it was Armstrong that 
had written these anonymous addresses. While it 
was equally well known that he had written the ad- 

44 



dresses on the request of a large number of his fellow 
officers, all the blame was put on him. He was very 
severely blamed. Some did not hesitate to say that 
what he had done, and what he had advocated, were 
highly treasonable. Even the mildest and friendliest 
of his critics pointed out that what he had done and 
what he had advocated were dangerous insubordination 
in an army, doubly culpable during a time of actual 
war. Among his severest critics for a time was Wash- 
ington himself. One can readily understand that 
Washington would regard these addresses with ex- 
treme disfavor. But that illustrious man was first of 
all just, and in time, when he fully understood all the 
conditions and circumstances, and had time for care- 
ful consideration, he changed altogether in his attitude 
towards Armstrong and was his friend. 

It was not on account of his military achieve- 
ments or experience, however, that Armstrong was 
appointed Secretary of War. It would have been too 
much to expect of the Madison administration that, 
for this very responsible place when the nation was 
in the midst of war with the powerful British King- 
dom, it would select the man best fitted for the place. 
The Madison administration — and in this it is not 
singular among the national administrations of the 
early decades of our national existence or far removed 
from certain national administrations of our later his- 
tory — always had in view partisan political conditions, 
considerations and results. Back of the selection of 

45 



Armstrong were political conditions, and Armstrong 
was made Secretary of War, not because of any espe- 
cial qualifications for that place, but because his ap- 
pointment might win political support to the national 
administration, and also give it aid in naming its favor- 
ite for President in 1816; especially in two states of 
much influence in which it needed friends and a friend- 
ly sentiment — Pennsylvania and New York. Arm- 
strong was a native of one and a prominent citizen of 
the other. 

There was a further reason for the selection of 
Armstrong, political in its nature — as already re- 
marked, a reason of this nature was reasonably to be 
expected of the Madison administration ; the War was 
unpopular in Pennsylvania and New York and the 
national administration was equally unpopular in 
those states, and Madison and his advisers believed 
that by appointing Armstrong the War could be and 
would be made more popular in both of these import- 
ant states. Unfortunately, the Madison administra- 
tion had not learned that the way to make a war — 
and a national administration conducting the 
war — popular with the people of the United 
States, is to put in all positions of direction 
or command the men best fitted for these positions 
and that will most ably, energetically and successfully 
prosecute the war, regardless of all political consider- 
ations. For the conduct of the nation's affairs during 

46 



a war or time of great events, the politicians are too 
knowing to be wise, too shrewd and cunning to have 
that foresight which is essential to the greatest suc- 
cess. 

To understand fully the political reasons for Arm- 
strong's appointment, we must know a little of his per- 
sonal history. He was born at Carlisle, Pa. He was 
a citizen of that state during the war of the Revolu- 
tion, and subsequently was elected Secretary of State 
of Pennsylvania and later was a member of the old 
congress from that state. In November, 1800, he was 
chosen U. S. Senator from New York. In 1804 he was 
sent as minister to France and he also acted as minis- 
ter to Spain. His position in Paris was difficult, and 
he filled it with real ability. At the outbreak of the 
War of 1812 he was made a brigadier-general and giv- 
en command of the important military district which 
included the city of New York. In 1813 he was ap- 
pointed Secretary of War. Of his work in that de- 
partment we are interested in only that which is di- 
rectly connected with ''The Invasion of the City of 
Washington," and that properly belongs to subse- 
quent chapters. As a result of the burning of the na- 
tional capitol, Armstrong was severely censured ; and 
because he believed that censure unjust, and because 
Madison, whom he believed should have acted to re- 
move that censure, did rather the contrary, he re- 
signed as Secretary of War not long after "The In- 
vasion of the City of Washington." During his after 

47 



years he made diligent use of his pen. He was much 
and directly interested in rural pursuits and he wrote 
two treatises, and excellent ones, on farming and 
gardening. He wrote a history of the War of 1812, of 
real value but inevitably showing no small bias. He 
wrote a very animated criticism of Wilkinson's Me- 
moirs, a number of biographical sketches, and also 
partly prepared a history of the War of the Revolu- 
tion. He died at Red Hook, New York, in 1843. 

It will be seen that his selection, by an adminis- 
tration that always regarded political conditions, was 
logical. Wishing never to do any injustice to the hon- 
est and patriotic, and also able and justly renowned 
Madison, I wish to say again that because he and his 
advisers put partisan political advantage so often at 
the head of the things to be considered, we must not 
judge him or them as harshly as we properly would 
had they lived and acted at a later date. Partisan 
feeling and prejudice and maneuvering were far more 
highly regarded then than now. Further, the greatest 
consideration for partisan success might be, at that 
time, compatible with the purest patriotism— that in- 
tense desire for political success that led to acts which 
would now be condemned was then often, and un- 
doubtedly in the case of Madison was, the result of 
pure and ardent patriotism. Different modes and de- 
grees of self government were yet experimental and 
therefore subjects of academic discussion; and aca- 
demic discussion always becomes heated and engen- 

48 



ders intense feeling rather than the calm considera- 
tion of facts. The members of the two political par- 
ties, and which parties were founded on honest, but 
diverse, beliefs in the capacity of the people to govern 
themselves, firmly, and often fiercely, believed that the 
future of the government and of the welfare of the 
people, depended on the triumph of their party. With 
the most patriotic impulses and ardor the opposing 
party was feared and fought. At the distance of more 
than a hundred years it is easy to see that Madison 
was too much of a politician and partisan to be a great 
President; and it is equally clear that he and most of 
his friends and advisers were partisans because they 
were patriots — they believed beyond doubt that the 
success of their party and that for which it stood, was 
essential to the security, prosperity and happiness of 
the people ; and to the firm continuance, and wise dis- 
tribution of powers, of the national and state govern- 
ments. 

Armstrong was ill-adapted to any executive office. 
While he was not at all inclined to protracted work, he 
was yet less disposed to leave details to others. But 
as an executive officer he failed most because of his ill 
temper and excessive egotism. He resented sugges- 
tions from anyone. In most cases the fact that a cer- 
tain measure was recommended by some one else was 
to him sufficient reason to oppose it. Apparently he 
found very little pleasure in life, and of that very little 
much the greater part came from being churlish and 

49 



exceedingly discourteous to those that had business to 
transact with him. His only argument was that the 
other party was more than mistaken — what he said he 
knew to be untrue. The few that saw, during July and 
August, 1814, what was about to occur and, urged on 
by patriotic concern, sought to warn Armstrong and, 
in some cases, to suggest measures of adequate de- 
fense, had for sole reward contemptuous or abusive 
words. Because of these unfortunate traits of charac- 
ter and faults of conduct, it was easy to create public 
opinion against Armstrong and to have accepted as 
true the pronouncements of committees and individual 
members of congress, of newspapers, and of the horde 
of small public officials, that took the blame for "The 
Invasion of the City of Washington" away from Mad- 
ison and Monroe and their lackeys and satellites — 
where some of it belonged — and put some of it on 
Armstrong — where some did belong — and on Win- 
der — where a very little of it may have belonged — and 
most of it on the common soldiers — where none of it 
belonged. 

I have consulted several dictionaries and as a re- 
sult have been forced to the conclusion that the Amer- 
icans did not have an army at Bladensburg. If the 
lexicographers are men competent for their work, four 
things are required to make an army: 

First, a considerable number of men. 

Second, these men armed for war. 

50 



Third, these men organized into several classes of 
divisions. 

Fourth, these men under proper officers. 

At Bladensburg the Americans had assembled a 
considerable number of men, but it is not altogether 
true that they were armed for war and they certainly 
were not organized as an army must be to be an army, 
and there is no doubt that they were not under proper 
officers. 

But if the Americans lacked an army, they had 
four commanders on the field! And all of these four 
commanders acted independently, each gave orders 
without consulting the others, and they gave orders 
direct to the troops, and not through another of the 
four or the one of the four that had been designated as 
having the immediate command. If anything has been 
well settled in matters military, it is that more than one 
commander is a superfluity plus. Four commanders 
has yet to be given a name or class in the chapter of 
"Military Afflictions that are Inevitably Fatal." 

The four commanders at Bladensburg were : 

James Madison, Commander-in-Chief of the Army 
and Navy of the United States. 

"Colonel" Monroe, Secretary of State, and on oc- 
casion head of a scouting party. 

John Armstrong, who stated himself to be "late a 
major-general in the Army of the United States, and 
Secretary of War." 

51 



W. H. Winder, brigadier-general, supposed to be 
the general in command of the army. 

As has been previously remarked, it would be ex- 
pecting too much of the Madison administration to ex- 
pect it to appoint to the command of the soldiers as- 
sembled for the defense of Washington, the man best 
fitted for the place because of his military training, 
ability and achievement. That administration regard- 
ed everything, even military affairs, from the politi- 
cian's point of view ; and even in the critical days when 
the national capital was threatened, political expedi- 
ency was put above military merit in selecting the 
commander of the American forces ; and, as in the ap- 
pointment of Armstrong as Secretary of War, the ap- 
pointment of Winder was made because it was be- 
lieved that the first consideration was to make the 
W T ar (and the national administration) popular, and 
that the best way to do this was, not to fight the war 
to a successful conclusion with all the speed that effi- 
ciency and energy would secure, but to appoint to im- 
portant commands men closely associated with power- 
ful politicians or popular in certain states. 

Up to the time Winder was appointed to the com- 
mand of the newly created military district that in- 
cluded the City of Washington — a district so created 
that the plain task of its commander was to assemble, 
organize, equip and command, with the co-operation 
of the national administration, an army for the defense 
of the national capitol — his military experience had 

52 



been limited, his military achievements had been hard- 
ly creditable, and he had given no evidence of any ex- 
traordinary ability as a commander. He had recently 
returned from "a long imprisonment in Canada, the 
consequence of his capture by the enemy during a 
night attack on our troops under General Chandler at 
Stony Creek on the 3rd of June, 1813." There were 
some peculiar features about this capture, and of them 
some were never explained. Apparently all the facts 
about this capture were never revealed. Winder's 
senior in command, General Chandler, was captured at 
the same time. In the official letter to the command- 
ing general that reports this occurrence, it is spoken of 
as "the unfortunate capture of Brigadier-generals 
Chandler and Winder, who were taken in the action, 
unknown to any part of the army, and hurried into the 
enemy's lines." Just how these two generals could be 
captured "unknown to any part of the army" was nev- 
er explained. In his report to the Secretary of War, 
General Dearborn called the capture "a strange fatal- 
ity." Major-general Morgan Lewis, who succeeded 
Dearborn, made it appear in a later communication to 
the War Department that no censure properly rested 
on General Winder. 

Previous to his appointment as commander of the 
forces to oppose the British near Washington, Gener- 
al Winder had never had any important command or 
an independent command. Not his military experi- 

53 



ence or ability, but, as already stated, the expediency 
of politicians, was responsible for his selection. 

As shown in "The Battle of Plattsburg," the War 
was unpopular in Maryland — very unpopular among 
the most intelligent and able people of that state. This 
included those prominent in political affairs; and we 
may be sure that this would give deep concern to the 
Madison administration. The chief, but, of course, not 
the only reason for the opposition to the War in Mary- 
land were the efforts, sometimes brutal and nearly al- 
ways unnecessary, to suppress free speech and a free 
press. The first blood shed in the War of 1812, as in 
the Civil War, was American blood shed by Ameri- 
cans in the city of Baltimore. In the case of the War 
of 1812, this blood was shed in the effort, by mob 
methods, to destroy a free press. This occurrence 
aroused a sentiment that was made bitter by the un- 
necessary and silly, and at times offensive and treas- 
onable, measures of officers of the national govern- 
ment to prohibit free speech and destroy a free press- 
treasonable because such measures struck directly at 
those rights and liberties that the people and their an- 
cestors had fought to obtain and preserve, and on 
which the government so lately achieved rested as on 
a foundation. Prosecuting attorneys, full of the fanat- 
ical zeal of small minds and petty tyrants, and a zeal 
assumed by spies and traitors, took upon themselves 
the powers of judges. Judges of like character abused 
and ridiculed those brought to trial and, reversing the 

54 



maxim that the accused is to be considered innocent 
until proved to be guilty, heaped opprobrium upon the 
accused as if already convicted and at times acted as 
judge, jury and prosecuting attorney. Sheriffs and 
constables arrested citizens without warrants, on sus- 
picion, and put themselves with the judges and prose- 
cutors among lawbreakers by treating with contempt 
the articles of legal procedure that are among the 
things essential to make the citizen secure in "life, lib- 
erty and the pursuit of happiness." The result was 
that bitter feeling — all the more bitter because its ex- 
pression was so ruthlessly suppressed — that such pro- 
cedure must inevitably produce among a vigorous, lib- 
erty loving people descended from those that had 
formulated the Magna Charta and had promulgated 
the Declaration of Independence. 

It is only justice to the Madison administration to 
say that it had often good reason to curb the ut- 
terances of public speakers and writers. Violently se- 
ditious and actually treasonable utterances were not 
rare. Further, when the nation is at war because of 
the action, according to the national constitution, of 
the designated officials, war must be taken as the de- 
liberate act of the nation, and whatever may be the 
opinion of the individual, his duty as a citizen is plain 
and it is to refrain from criticism of the decision made 
to go to war, and to do his share to bring the victory 
to his nation. The Madison administration may be 
justly criticised because it confounded the conduct of 

55 



the War by the national government with the War it- 
self and at times prosecuted, and persecuted by illegal 
methods, those that did not oppose the War or meas- 
ures to advance it, but criticised the inefficiency and 
incapacity of the administration in the conduct of the 
War. What made this all the more effective in arous- 
ing resentment was the strange leniency of the admin- 
istration at times which took no notice of really sedi- 
tious utterances or actions. The Madison administra- 
tion often permitted greater freedom of speech and of 
the press than is permitted now. It did not imprison 
any one for any criticism of the physical appearance of 
any public official. Among the faults of its attitude 
toward free speech and a free press were vacillation 
and inconsistency; and because of this the public re- 
sentment was all the greater. Also, in those days the 
people were more jealous of free speech and a free 
press than they are today. 

The generally unnecessary and sometimes gross- 
ly illegal measures to suppress free speech and a free 
press, were more resented in Maryland than in any 
other part of the country. The feeling that existed in 
Maryland was shown by the preamble and resolutions 
adopted by the Maryland legislature, and quoted in 
The Battle of Plattsburg. 

In the opinion of the national administration, the 
first step — and the shrewd step of the politician — to 
protect Washington was to placate the Marylanders 
by appointing to the command of the army that was 

56 



to defend Washington, a Marylander and a relative of 
the governor of Maryland and bearing the same name ! 
Hence Winder. 

As regards the appointment of Winder, General 
Armstrong was undoubtedly right* when he wrote in 
his "Notices" (in two volumes) : 

"The error of first occurrence in this campaign be- 
longs exclusively to the administration, and will be 
found in the selection made of a commanding general, 
not on the ground of distinguished professional ser- 
vice or knowledge, but simply on a presumption that, 
'being a native of Maryland, and a relative of the-gov- 
ernor, Brigadier-general Winder would be useful in 
mitigating the opposition to the War, and in giving in- 
creased efficiency to the national measures within the 
limits of the state ;' an opinion which, though some- 
what plausible, was wholly unsustained by the event." 
More will be said of General Winder in subse- 
quent chapters. It may properly, and justly, be ob- 
served here that the task put on him was very diffi- 
cult; and, with James Madison for President and Mon- 
roe and Armstrong occupying the offices they did, it 
was impossible. Winder was not without military 
ability ; he was energetic, earnest and exceedingly in- 
dustrious ; and he was patriotic. If he had been a Ma- 
comb or a Jackson, and — even more important — could 
have done something similar to Dewey's cutting the 

*See Annals of Congress, 1st and 2nd sessions of the 
14th Congress. 

57 



cable, and thus have rid himself of the interference and 
contrary purposes of Madison, Monroe and Arm- 
strong, he would not only have defeated the British 
army that fought at Bladensburg, but would have an- 
nihilated or captured it. 

Possibly the reader will be surprised that space 
be given here to General James Wilkinson. He was 
not in command of any part of the forces assembled 
for the defense of Washington. In fact, during July 
and August, 1814, he was under arrest and awaiting 
trial by court-martial. Before this he had been ac- 
cused of treason, had been tried, and acquitted, and 
then given command of all the armies of the United 
States. The expedition he had commanded on the 
northern frontier during the War had been a failure ; 
but if every one in command of forces on the northern 
frontier that had not been victorious, had been court- 
martialed, there would have been real need of the War 
Department doing what it did without need when 
Wilkinson was court-martialed ; go beyond the law 
and appoint an assistant prosecutor — rather, an acting 
principal prosecutor — whose appointment was illegal. 
But Madison's administration has probably not been 
the only one some of the officials of which have come 
to believe themselves so wise and exalted that they 
were far above the laws of their country. Notwith- 
standing that he had been accused of drunkenness, of 
obscenity, of insubordination, and of inefficiency, when 
in a highly important position of command, and was 

58 



under arrest, it is certain that both Madison and Arm- 
strong consulted Wilkinson when the capital was 
threatened — and gave no heed to his advice ; yet on 
account of his aggressive character as well as his high 
reputation as a military man, his recommendations in- 
fluenced others, including officers in the army assem- 
bled to defend Washington, and both before and after 
"The Invasion of the City of Washington," he had, in 
shaping events and moulding public opinion, as much 
real influence as Armstrong and much more than Win- 
der. Doubtless one reason why in the summer of 1814 
he was not, at the least, ignored by Madison and the 
administration, was that he was a Marylander, and 
had influential family and political connections. He 
was born in Calvert county, Maryland. He declared 
his great satisfaction, gratitude and pride in "the acci- 
dental circumstance of birth" having been, in his case, 
in "the urbane, loyal, generous, gallant state of Mary- 
land!" His birthplace was about three miles from 
"the decayed village" of Benedict, made prominent in 
connection with the destruction of Washington by the 
debarkation of the British detachment under com- 
mand of Major-general Ross which fought at Bladens- 
burg and burned the national capitol. He was justi- 
fied in claiming that his family was "ancient and re- 
spectable." His ancestors were all English and the 
earliest of them to come to America reached Maryland 
in the sixteenth century. His mother was a noble- 
minded woman that he fervently loved and deeply re- 

59 



vered. When twelve years of age he made his first 
notable journey "to the town of Baltimore, for the pur- 
pose of being inoculated for the smallpox. This dis- 
ease in the natural way, was as frightful in those days 
as the plague in London in the year 1665, and inocula- 
tion was considered an occult art, professed at that 
period in the Southern states by a Doctor Stevenson 
only, who by his success acquired great celebrity." He 
"read the Latin classics, and studied the inferior 
branches of mathematics" under a private tutor. He 
was "put to the study of medicine" under an eminent 
physician who had served during the war of 1756, and 
delighted to recount the defeat of Braddock at Pitts- 
burg and Wolfe's victory on the Plains of Abraham. 
In his seventeenth year he was sent to the medical 
school in Philadelphia. He had begun the practice of 
medicine in Maryland when "the abortive enterprise 
of General Gage against the town of Concord in Mass- 
achusetts, on the 19th of April," caused him to shoul- 
der "a firelock in Georgetown, Potomack" — now the 
District of Columbia. He was a member of "an inde- 
pendent company, commanded by Captain Thomas 
Richardson, a Quaker, from Rhode Island." He re- 
sided "thirty miles from the place of parade, but was 
punctual to the rendezvous" — the company was drilled 
once a week. 

The foregoing is given space, because at the time 
of the Chesapeake expedition General Wilkinson was, 
as already indicated, a man of such consequence, had 

60 



such a place in the public eye, and his criticisms had 
such consideration, that we may well know this much 
of his family, education and early attainments. But at 
least as strong a reason for giving space to these facts 
about him, are the glimpses they give of the conditions 
of life and popular thought and feeling at that period. 
For example, consider that the independent company 
to which the young Doctor Wilkinson attached him- 
self was commanded and drilled by a Quaker, and 
from Rhode Island! What was it that put into the 
hearts of all real men the fierce desire to fight that 
would not be denied? At that time liberty meant 
much less and also much more to the plain people than 
it means today. It meant enough to overcome the most 
intense and fanatical religious beliefs, the beliefs of 
martyrs. The Mennonite ancestors of the author were 
hunted like wild beasts, were murdered and tortured 
and starved and driven into the mountain refuges of 
Switzerland, because they would not bear arms. In 
war they could see only wholesale murder — a violation 
of the command, "Thou shalt not kill." They preferred 
torture, starvation and death to that eternal hell fire 
that was the inevitable reward of the murderer. Yet 
when they had come to America and the news came of 
Lexington and Concord, they changed their opinion 
about war and hell fire. Did something tell them that 
to fight and die for liberty for their children and neigh- 
bors on earth might be an exceedingly good argument 
with St. Peter for admission to heaven? At any rate, 

61 



everyone of them, some boys and some old men, 
fought for the Revolution ; and the younger ones of 
them, if yet alive, fought again in the War of 1812. 
What was true of them was true of thousands ; and 
this must be considered — not a few in the forces of 
the War of 1812 were veterans of the War of the Rev- 
olution. They were not cowards. They fought with 
their sons and the sons of brave soldiers of the Rev- 
olution. These sons were not cowards. That ardor 
for Opportunity and Liberty that made the Quaker 
and the Mennonite into soldiers, and soldiers that im- 
printed their unconquerable devotion with the blood 
of their bare feet, on the snow and frozen ground of 
winter, had not cooled, nor was it lacking in the hearts 
of their sons, in the days of "Our Second War of In- 
dependence." 

When news of the attack "at Breed's hill, the 17th 
of June," reached Doctor Wilkinson, he determined 
"not to await the tardy proceedings of committees and 
conventions, then engaged in organizing a regiment; 
but, unrestrained by the admonitions of friends and re- 
lations," he abandoned his "profession forever," and, 
at his own expense, "repaired to the camp before Bos- 
ton, and as a volunteer, joined the rifle corps under the 
gallant Colonel William Thompson of Pennsylvania." 

For further biography of Wilkinson the reader is 
referred to the encyclopedias. It will be found that he 
was accused of meanness and high crimes, that he was 

62 



tried for treason and acquitted; that many believed 
him to be a traitor, and some, at least, were sure that 
he was a patriot. The truth doubtless is that he was 
unduly ambitious, that by some his attainments were 
over-rated, and that his crimes and misdemeanors 
were, at the least, greatly exaggerated. He lacked di- 
plomacy and cunning, and he lived during a period of 
intrigue, cabal, and practices of public officials that 
now would not be tolerated; when those that ex- 
pressed the loftiest ideas of patriotism, in beautiful 
language, were constantly guilty of treachery to the 
public interests as well as to friends, in order to fur- 
ther personal ambitions. To understand those times 
and the public men and the masses of those times, we 
must remember that there were no public schools in 
half of the states, and where they did exist they had 
deteriorated for more than fifty years ; there were no 
railroads or telegraphs ; there were few newspapers, 
with few readers ; the people were easily led and mis- 
led by violent language, and were narrow-minded and 
fanatical ; the people travelled little ; very few of the 
masses wrote or received letters ; ministers occasion- 
ally got drunk without much or any scandal ; some 
people were yet in doubt about women having souls ; 
there was much preaching, praying, fasting and im- 
morality ; and the degree of honesty and the regard for 
the public welfare expected of public officials were not 
r-.uch higher than prevailed to a considerable extent 

63 



for some years lately terminated, and to some limited 
extent may yet prevail, among the officials of railways 
and other big corporations. 

If only justly accused, and judged by the stand- 
ards of his time, Wilkinson would probably be pro- 
nounced a good citizen. What concerns us is that he 
was a student of strategy and tactics, his military 
ability was by many very highly regarded, and, in 
truth, his criticisms of military affairs and actions 
were, when stripped of his violent prejudices, often in- 
telligent and valuable. It would only weary the reader 
to transfer to these pages his minute and technical criti- 
cism of the American military operations against the 
Chesapeake expedition. We are not now intei ?sted 
in the exact location in which he would have posted 
this company or that detachment. Any unprejudiced 
student of the military operations in the vicinity of 
Washington will reach the conclusion, however, that 
Wilkinson's strategy and tactics were the strategy and 
tactics that should have been used. Further, he was 
able to show that he had advocated this strategy and 
these tactics some weeks in advance of the destruction 
of the capitol, and had not waited to announce them 
until after that event. 

This chapter cannot be better or more fittingly 
closed than with the following extract from Wilkin- 
son's "Memoirs" — published in three bulky, but inter- 
esting, volumes: 

"Cicero says that 'it is the first law of history that 
64 



the writer shall neither dare to advance what is false, 
nor to suppress what is true ; that he shall relate the 
facts with strict impartiality, free from ill will or fa- 
vor; that his narrative should distinguish the order of 
time, and, when necessary, give the description of 
places ; that he should unfold the statesman's motives, 
and in his accounts of the transactions and events, in- 
terpose his own judgment ; and should not only relate 
what was done, but how it was done, and what share 
chance, or rashness, or prudence had in the issue : that 
he should give the characters of the leading men, their 
weight and influence, their passions, their principles, 
and conduct through life.' " 



65 



5. 



HAVING EYES, SEE NOT. 

The national authorities had ample warning of an 
attack on the national capital. In the early spring of 
1813 Admiral Cockburn entered the Chesapeake with 
a considerable naval force, including marines. On 
April 24th of that year he destroyed the military equip- 
ments and munitions stored at Frenchtown, near the 
head of the bay. This was followed by the pillage and 
destruction of private property for some weeks, when 
Cockburn descended the bay to join Admiral Warren, 
who had arrived with naval reinforcements, more ma- 
rines, and the "Chasseurs Brittanniques" — a corps 
composed very largely of foreign renegades and ruf- 
fians, all the officers, however, being British. On the 
22nd of June the attempt was made on Craney Island 
and on the 25th and the following night occurred the 
horrors of Hampton. About the middle of July Admi- 
ral Warren entered the Potomac with a considerable 
force, took possession of Blackstone's Island, and took 
soundings as high up as Kettle Bottoms. This indi- 

66 



cated an attack on the national capital. At that time 
there was no defense'of the national capital, by land 
or water, that could have withstood five hundred mod- 
erately good troops fairly well equipped; yet the 
House Committee on Military Affairs, to which had 
been referred a motion of Mr. Stuart, a veteran of the 
Revolution, to distribute arms and embody the mili- 
tia of the district, reported : "That they have examined 
into the state of preparation, naval and military, made 
to receive the enemy, and are satisfied that the prepa- 
ration is, in every respect, adequate to the emergency, 
and that no measures are necessary on the part of the 
House to make it more complete." 

As a matter of fact, no preparations whatever had 
been made to receive the enemy. That a committee of 
the House should make such a report when the condi- 
tions were such as they were, would be unbelieveable 
were it not that at a more recent date in our history 
a committee of congress has actually accomplished as 
fine a whitewashing report to shield and please as in- 
competent a cabinet officer as the Secretary of War 
July 15, 1813. 

Mr. Stuart made his motion one day and the Com- 
mittee on Military Affairs made its report early the 
next day. It could not have made any investigation 
beyond Washington. Probably its report was written 
in the office of the Secretary of War, if not by him. 

There is much in the official management of the 

67 



War of 1812 to be studied with profit — not to reveal 
that which is to be followed, but that which is to be 
avoided. 

Fortunately for us, that the national capital was 
as defenseless as it was ; that the national administra- 
tion was as feeble and innocuous, while wise in its own 
conceit, as it was ; and that congress was as subservi- 
ent and lazy as it was; were so altogether incredible 
that the British commanders had no suspicion of the 
real conditions. 

In the autumn the British forces left the Chesa- 
peake. There was rather free intercourse between the 
British forces and the inhabitants of the country near 
the Chesapeake and as a result those inhabitants were 
certain that the British intended to return the next 
Spring. The national administration was equally cer- 
tain that the British would not return. It refused to 
do anything to defend the Potomac or to provide a 
land force to defend Washington, Baltimore and An- 
napolis. The President, the Secretary of State, and the 
Secretary of War, were very busy with political strat- 
egy and tactics. The nomination for the Presidency 
and the financial, political and military fortunes of 
friends, were of more concern than the successful pros- 
ecution of the war and the safety of the country ; and 
to silence the people and troublesome critics it was 
easier and more agreeable to accuse them of sedition 
and to abuse and scare, and possibly arrest and impris- 

68 



on them without trial, than to gather, equip and train 
troops and give the thought and energy necessary to 
co-ordinate in the management of the war. 

The danger to the capital was imminent. But in 
the language of Wilkinson, used in his Memoirs and 
quoted by Williams (the most intelligent and judi- 
cious of all that wrote books on the War of 1812), the 
administration acted, or, more correctly stated, refused 
to act, and continued to speculate, as if the war were, 
as the then Secretary of War went on record, "at a 
thousand miles distance." If any one knew of the state 
of defense of the capital at that time, it was Williams, 
and he says: 

"Throughout the whole boundary-line of the Dis- 
trict of Columbia there was not a single point forti- 
fied ; not a redoubt, dike or ditch ; not a solitary piece 
of artillery ; not a single battalion of regular soldiers ; 
not one company of militia or volunteers properly 
armed, equipped, and disciplined." 

Early in March, 1814, the British, as anticipated, 
returned to the Chesapeake in some force and renewed 
their depredations. The British had five vessels of 
war, which were reinforced from time to time. Their 
force was so superior to the American flotilla, com- 
manded by the able and brave Commodore Barney, 
and bottled up in St. Leonard's Creek, that the nation- 
al administration ordered its destruction ; but just in 
time to save it, a plan of Colonel Wadsworth, head of 
the ordnance department, was put into successful exe- 

69 



cution, and with the aid of two 18-pounders on land, 
the flotilla forced the British to fall down the river and 
this permitted Barney to proceed up to Benedict. And 
Wadsworth, instead of gaining merited credit, was ac- 
tually discredited ! Partisan politics were weightier 
than military merit. 

However, nothing was done to provide defenses 
for the national capital, or Baltimore, or Annapolis. 
Apparently to every intelligent person except the 
President, his Cabinet, and satellites, it was plain that 
the British would attack points in the Chesapeake ter- 
ritory with strong forces. As early as April 6, 1814, 
it was known in this country that events in Europe 
would permit Great Britain to send to our shores her 
veteran armies from Spain and France. The entrance 
of the allied armies into Paris March 30th and the ac- 
cession of Louis XVIII, were published in the Wash- 
ington papers May 18th. Yet the national administra- 
tion continued to slumber ; and with stubborn refusal 
to see what was obvious to many, actually repelled the 
aid that the patriotic people of the District were anx- 
ious to give. The truth of the foregoing is nicely 
shown by the treatment of Alexandria, which will be 
recounted in a future volume on "The Birth of the 
Star Spangled Banner." 

General Armstrong and others sought, after the 
War, to excuse the national administration by saying 
that it had no official information of the pacification 
of Europe until the 26th of June. Such an excuse is, 

70 



of course, worse than silence, for it is only evidence of 
culpability. Of course if General Armstrong had 
found robbers breaking into his house he would not 
have done anything whatever until the robbers had 
sent him in writing, properly sealed, official informa- 
tion that they had robbed his neighbor. 

One may get a good idea of the strange notions 
entertained in the year 1814 in Washington — and not 
dissimilar from the notions entertained there at more 
recent dates — by considering the following from the 
Memoirs of General Wilkinson, who had been a sol- 
dier all his adult life, had been given the highest posi- 
tion in the army, had been governor of Louisiana, and, 
while he cordially hated Madison, yet held such pa- 
cific notions as these : 

"If such doctrines" — which Wilkinson had just 
quoted with approval — "apply to the local and politi- 
cal circumstances of Great Britain, how much more 
applicable are they to those of this country; the for- 
mer within arm's length of a great, powerful, and rival 
nation, called her natural enemy, the latter three thou- 
sand miles removed* from every rival power; but be- 
cause the neighboring despots of Europe, whose es- 
tates join, and are ever engaged in controversies, find 
it political in time of peace to prepare for war, by 
building up today what was knocked down yesterday, 
or in this year to supply the place of mercenaries 

*In Wilkinson's mind war was sure to be "three thou- 
sand miles away." 

71 



whose throats have been cut the last, we, blindly and 
falsely, apply the same reason to our situation 

No ! although a soldier from early 

youth, and holding every honorable military man as a 
brother, I contend it were better the United States 
should run the hazard of suffering a year or two, in 
the commencement of every war, if wars they must 
have, until they can give form, consistency, and ex- 
perience to their levies, than that they should permit 
institutions, which ever have been, and will ever con- 
tinue to be, dangerous to civil liberty." 

And that was written after the War of 1812! 

The baleful, dangerous "institutions" referred to 
were "an invalid corps, ostensibly to provide for mili- 
tary unfortunates;" "three military academies;" "to 
increase the standing army ;" and "to saddle the people 
with a national university, on a site so insalubrious, 
that the great public functionaries find it necessary an- 
nually to abandon their public duties three months out 
of twelve. A national university at the city of Wash- 
ington within the purlieus of the court!" The quota- 
tions are from Wilkinson's Memoirs. 

At last, but not until 1814! the President became 
suspicious that Great Britain was not maintaining 
such a military force in the Chesapeake simply to steal 
tobacco, poultry and hogs, and to terrorize the people 
— to make, as was freely said, by terrorizing methods 
the war as unpopular as possible among the outraged 
people. The British did not yet know the Americans : 

72 



Havre de Grace, Frenchtown, Georgetown, Frederick- 
town, Hampton — all this, instead of making the people 
disposed to yield to the British, made them only the 
more disposed to fight. Only the national administra- 
tion had remained undisturbed. There is good evi- 
dence that after the British outrages of 1813 on the 
Chesapeake, a thousand citizens of Washington and 
Georgetown formed a legion of volunteers, and in due 
form "petitioned" the President to organize them. He 
graciously authorized the choice of officers; "but when 
the names were sent in he refused to commission them, 
for what reason remains a secret; and thus President 
Madison prevented the establishment of a corps, which 
had actually been enrolled, officered, equipped, and, 
except the rifle companies, completely armed." It was, 
therefore, quite a reversal of previous position when 
on June 30th, 1814, President Madison sent to the 
members of his cabinet a note requesting them to meet 
him at the White House at noon the next day "to con- 
sult them on the measures which it would be proper 
to adopt for the safety of this city and district." 

But note the date, June 30th, 1814! Fifteen 
months after the British had begun to occupy the wa- 
ters and the land of the immediate vicinity! Just three 
months after the allied armies had entered Paris! Six 
weeks after it was known in Washington that Great 
Britain had a free hand in her war with the United 
States ! 



73 



6. 



A CABINET MEETING. 

As for what occurred at the consultation of the 
President with his Cabinet July 1, 1814, we must go 
to the reports made of that meeting by the members 
of the Cabinet that attended it, in their letters to the 
committee of congress appointed to inquire into the 
causes of the capture of Washington. 

In his letter to the committee named, Mr. Monroe, 
Secretary of State, said that "the President convened 
the heads of department and the attorney-general to 
consult them on the measures which it would be prop- 
er to adopt for the safety of this city (Washington) 
and district. He appeared to have digested a plan of 
the force to be called immediately into the field ; the 
additional force to be kept under orders to march at a 
moment's notice ; its composition, and necessary equip- 
ment. It seemed to be his object that some position 
should be taken between the Eastern Branch and the 
Patuxent with two or three thousand men, and that 
an additional force of ten or twelve thousand, includ- 

74 



ing the militia of the District, should be in readiness 
in the neighboring states to march when called on; 
the whole force to be put under the command of an 
officer of the regular army. The measures suggested 
by the President were approved by all the members of 
the administration." 

The Secretary of the Navy, Mr. Jones, wrote that 
"the President stated the object of the meeting to be 
consideration of the menacing aspect of things, in con- 
sequence of the augmented power of the enemy by the 
great political changes which had taken place in Eu- 
rope, and the disposition manifested by the govern- 
ment and people of Great Britain to prosecute the war 
with the most vindictive and devastating spirit; rep- 
resented the motives and inducements which he con- 
ceived the enemy had to prefer the invasion of the cap- 
ital rather than any other immediate enterprise; and 
urged the necessity of speedy and efficient preparation 
for the defense of the District and capital ; inquired in- 
to the existing state of its military and naval defenses, 
and the extent of the disposable force which it would 
be practicable to concentrate in the District. The Sec- 
retary of War estimated the disposable regular force 
applicable to the intended purpose, to the best of my 
recollection, at about twelve hundred, including about 
two hundred cavalry at Carlisle, Pennsylvania, who, I 
think he said, were not all mounted, but would prob- 
ably be so in a short time. The Secretary of the Navy 
enumerated the naval force within immediate reach as 

75 



follows: The marines at headquarters, about 120; the 
force attached to the flotilla under the command of 
Commodore Barney, on the Patuxent, 500; total 620. 
To the regular force, the President proposed to add 
ten thousand militia, to be designated and held in read- 
iness in such neighboring districts as should be found 
most convenient. He also suggested the propriety of 
depositing at a suitable place, contiguous to the me- 
tropolis, a supply of arms, ammunition and camp 
equipage. These propositions produced very little dis- 
cussion. The propriety and expediency of the meas- 
ures appeared to be admitted, though no formal ques- 
tion was taken, nor was any dissent expressed." 

Here we may well stop to note certain facts. First, 
there was "very little discussion." The probability 
that the enemy would attack the capital and the cer- 
tainty that the force to defend it was altogether inade- 
quate, seem to have caused only a languid interest on 
the part of the gentlemen assembled, and who might 
be thought to have something to do with the defense 
of the capital and the conduct of the War. 

Second, "no formal question was taken." No defi- 
nite, positive conclusion to act was reached. Mr. 
Jones continues that "the meeting separated with the 
understanding that the measures proposed were to be 
carried into effect." It was only an understanding — 
not definite, not positive. Apparently the matter was 
not of sufficient importance to stir the lethargic gen- 
tlemen even so far as to think with considerable vigor, 

76 



not to speak of something so laborious as reaching a 
definite conclusion or positive action. By the first of 
July the weather is hot and oppressive in Washington, 
and in 1814 the most important employment of cabinet 
and congress was maneuvering for political advantage. 

Third, the force at hand for the defense of the cap- 
ital — or Baltimore or Annapolis — was only a rather 
small fraction of what any real knowledge of condi- 
tions would have shown to be the least that could 
prove adequate. 

Fourth, the President led the way, not only in 
stating the danger, but in submitting plans. More of 
this hereafter. 

The Attorney-General, Mr. Rush, wrote: "On the 
30th of June, the heads of departments were desired to 
meet at the President's house on the following day 
Our public affairs were brought into discussion * * * 
The President mentioned what I had heard him indi- 
vidually express before relative to Washington, stat- 
ing his impressions unequivocally to be, that if it fell 
within the plans of the enemy to send troops for opera- 
tion upon the Atlantic frontiers this season, he thought 
the capital would be marked as the most inviting ob- 
ject of a speedy attack; that it would be right forth- 
with to put in train measures of precaution and de- 
fense. He then declared that to him it appeared that 
a force of ten thousand men should be got in readiness 
for the city and District ; that it would be desirable to 
have as large a portion of it as practicable regular 

77 



troops, but that, at the least, there should be a thou- 
sand of this description, and more if more could be ob- 
tained. That the residue should be made up of the 
volunteers arid militia of the District of Columbia, 
combined with that from the parts nearest adjacent of 
Virginia, Maryland and Pennsylvania. That conven- 
ient depots of arms and military equipage should be 
established. No dissent was expressed to these opin- 
ions of the President." 

I have reserved the Secretary of War to the last. 
General Armstrong — the rival of Monroe for the nom- 
ination for the Presidency in 1816 — wrote: "The ques- 
tions proposed for discussion were two: 1st. By what 
means can the seat of government and Baltimore be 
defended, in case the enemy should make these cities 
objects of attack? 2nd. Should he select the former, 
will his approach be made by way of the Potomac or 
by that of the Patuxent? On these questions I took 
the liberty of offering the following statements and 
opinions: 1st. That the principal defense to be relied 
upon for either place was militia ; that, besides 
artillerists comprising the garrisons of Fort M'Henry 
and Washington, about one thousand regular troops 
only could be collected ***** fa^t the number of 
militia called into service should be proportioned to 
the known or probable strength of the enemy, and be 
taken from the states of Virginia, Maryland and Penn- 
sylvania; that it is not believed the enemy will hazard 
a blow at either place with a force less than five thou- 

78 



sand men ; that, to repel one of this extent, we should 
at least require double that number of militia." Gen- 
eral Armstrong writes at length of the proper naval 
defense of the Potomac, etc. 

It will be observed that General Armstrong's let- 
ter, as quoted, indicates that the views expressed and 
the plans proposed were his, and not the President's. 
In this he differs from the others. 

This would lack the importance to be mentioned 
were it not that it shows the rivalry and division 
among the members of the national administration. 
This rivalry and jealousy was largely responsible for 
the failure to take proper and effective measures of de- 
fense of Washington; it was largely responsible for 
the failures of the War and the feebleness of its prose- 
cution ; it was largely responsible for a good many 
wounds and a good many deaths among our brave 
soldiers. 

There are three against Armstrong alone: the 
chances are three to one that the plans were those of 
the President. The probabilities are yet greater, for, 
as Williams said, "Mr. Madison made no pretensions 
to military science." Major Williams thought that be- 
cause of this the President had consulted some mili- 
tary friend and had derived the plans from him. Major 
Williams conjectured that this friend was Colonel 
Monroe. A conclusion opposite to that reached by 
Williams is the more reasonable. History shows that 
it is the public man who knows the least about mili- 

79 



tary science or strategy that is often the most ready to 
formulate military plans and advocate military cam- 
paigns. There is, however, more than a possibility 
that the plans proposed by President Madison were 
derived from his Secretary of War. The Secretary of 
War and the Secretary of State being rivals for the 
next nomination for the Presidency, they were natur- 
ally antagonistic to each other in more ways than one, 
they were envious and jealous of each other, and both 
were continually trying to become more popular, to 
advocate those things and to do those things that 
would please the populace. The opinions expressed 
by their contemporaries are so conflicting that one can 
only conjecture the feeling the President had for Mon- 
roe and Armstrong. It is the most probable that 
President Madison sincerely admired and liked his 
Secretary of State while fearing, yet not having the 
highest respect for, his Secretary of War. It is cer- 
tain, however, that he frequently consulted his Secre- 
tary of War — but rarely heeded his recommendations. 
If the President had obtained the plans for the defense 
of Washington from Armstrong or if the plans were 
advanced by Armstrong, Monroe and the Secretary 
of the Navy and the Attorney-General would have 
preferred to give the credit to Madison, and it is cer- 
tain that for these plans and everything else they 
would give as little credit as they well could to the 
Secretary of War. 

It is to be considered further that the letters to 

80 



the committee of congress were written after the de- 
struction of the capital, when every one was trying to 
put the blame and humiliation on some one else, and 
when nearly every one else of the national administra- 
tion was trying to put the blame on the Secretary of 
War. Monroe, Jones and Rush would be exceedingly 
loath to write that July 1st the Secretary of War had 
proposed plans for the defense of Washington. 

The sympathies of the writer are almost sure to 
be with the loser. He has not been able to escape the 
conclusion that some injustice was done Armstrong 
when the destruction of Washington was used to dis- 
credit and almost disgrace him and certainly to put the 
Presidency forever far from him. Yet it was said that 
if it was easy to make the people believe that he had 
not advanced plans for the defense of Washington 
July 1st, or even later, or that it was easy to make him 
unpopular, his conduct, and especially his man- 
ners, were to blame. He was "cold and re- 
pulsive." ''His peculiar temper and turn of 
mind were supposed to be entirely uncongen- 
ial with the official and confidential relations 
in which he must necessarily stand with the Presi- 
dent." His appointment to the War Department oc- 
casioned much surprise. For various reasons, after 
the resignation of Mr. Eustis as Secretary of War, the 
President found it really difficult to get any one accept- 
able to him to take the place. Several prominent and 
able men, offered the place, declined it. At this junc- 

81 



ure General Armstrong was recommended to the 
President by friends in whose judgment Mr. Madison 
had confidence. The President had good reason to be- 
lieve that General Armstrong had the ability and the 
military knowledge and experience to fill the place sat- 
isfactorily. Unfortunately he did not know of the pe- 
culiar temper and disagreeable manners of General 
Armstrong or else he chose to ignore them. The sen- 
ate did not ignore them and General Armstrong was 
confirmed by a bare majority. It was almost, or quite, 
a tragedy that time developed that the freakish temper 
and natural stubborness of General Armstrong made 
him disposed to oppose what others advocated, to de- 
ride what others advanced, and to adhere to his opin- 
ions when it was all too plain to others that those opin- 
ions were wrong. 

It is not strange, therefore, that it was possible to 
make General Armstrong as well as the militia — who 
were only common people — the scapegoats after the 
destruction of the capital ; as it was only to be expect- 
ed that General Armstrong would maintain longer 
than any one else that the British did not intend to at- 
tack Washington, and delayed until too late any effec- 
tive measures for the defense of the capital. 

The attitude of the Secretary of War is doubtless 
correctly set forth in what follows from General Wil- 
kinson's "Memoirs": 

"It appears from the best information I have been 
82 



able to obtain, that towards the end of June, 1814, 
President Madison had conceived the idea that the en- 
emy might make the capital an object of attack, and 
that advices received from Messrs. Bayard and Galla- 
tin the 26th of the month, confirmed his suspicions ; in 
consequence of which, he on the 1st of July, submitted 
to his Cabinet a plan for immediately calling 2,000 or 
3,000 men into the field, and holding ten or twelve 
thousand militia and volunteers, of the neighboring 
states, in readiness to reinforce that corps. It seems 
also that he suggested the plan of taking a position, 
somewhere between the Eastern Branch and the Pa- 
tuxent, and that this proposition was not objected to 
* * * * * there are abundant existing evidences, of 
applications made to the executive by individuals and 
by corporate bodies, as well posterior as anterior to 
this convention of the Cabinet, on the subject, of the 
defense of the city, to which no satisfactory answer 
could be obtained. I understand that to the earnest in- 
quiries of two gentlemen, of the first intelligence, re- 
spectability, and fortune in the District, after listening 
to the expression of their apprehensions, the Secretary 
of War laconically replied, 'I don't believe there is any 
danger.' " 

Before we dismiss the meeting of the President's 
cabinet July 1, 1814, we should consider that with the 
exception of Monroe, the members of that Cabinet 
were not men of the first rank in ability or force 

83 



of character. Naturally Monroe would not favor the 
prominence of a cabinet position to any one that might 
gain troublesome popularity. But doubtless he found 
no need of argument with Madison to have maintained 
a cabinet that could not, in any place, become danger- 
ous. Madison, though one of the very greatest men in 
the history of this nation, was not great throughout 
his character. He lacked that greatness, the breadth 
and perfection of greatness, seen in Washington and 
Lincoln, that chose, for the furtherance and security 
of a great cause, the intimate service of the ablest, 
most forceful contemporaries, though they might have 
been — and yet were — rivals and critics. Madison pre- 
ferred for cabinet ministers those that would seek in- 
structions and heed suggestions, rather than men that 
would think and act with ability and force for them- 
selves. The members of his cabinet present at the not- 
able meeting July 1, 1814, should not be harshly criti- 
cised because they did not discuss the plan submitted 
for the defense of Washington or because they accept- 
ed that plan by implication: that the plan was sug- 
gested by the President or was approved by him, was 
all that they cared to know — and that was just the at- 
titude the President desired. It was unfortunate for 
his country that Madison did not feel the need of the 
counsel and activities of the very ablest and most 
forceful of his fellow citizens, regardless of political 
party or personal feeling, for the United States was at 

84 



war with its overmatch. Only the very greatest feel 
the need, and are ready to acknowledge the need, of the 
very best help they can get when great issues are put 
to the decision of war — as when a Lincoln joins with 
him such men as Seward, Chase and Stanton. 



85 



7. 



CERTAIN CONDITIONS CONSIDERED. 

We wil 1 all certainly agree with Cicero and others 
that the historian must write down much more than 
the events. Justice to the dead that participated in 
the events written about and especially justice to the 
readers of what is written, demand that the writer 
give such information beyond the mere recital of facts 
as will enable the reader to judge people and events 
correctly. Hence the reader must know of the public 
opinions and morals, of the material and spiritual con- 
dition of the people, and of the inherited and inevita- 
bly acquired characteristics of the persons of promi- 
nence. 

On the shoulders of President Madison must be 
laid so very much of the responsibility for the course 
of the War — he had a subservient congress as well as 
cabinet — that, while it may be tiresome to the reader, 
it is nevertheless well to call attention again to his 
peaceful disposition, for it was his repugnance to war 
that was responsible for his all but fatal procrastina- 

86 



tion in the conduct of the War. "President Madison 
would neither act himself nor allow others to act," 
wrote Wilkinson. 

Wilkinson was frankly unfriendly to President 
Madison, and this must be considered; nevertheless, 
his assertion just quoted contained a good deal of 
truth. 

In an effort to shield and excuse Madison and 
Monroe — and Armstrong — it has been said that the 
first information they had of the fall of Bonaparte and 
as a result the release of Wellington's Peninsular vet- 
erans for service in America, was June 26, 1814. As 
already pointed out, this is not true. It was on June 
26 that the President received certain official infor- 
mation from our ministers, Gallatin and Bayard. But 
the President and the country knew in April that the 
allies fighting against Bonaparte were everywhere 
gaining ground and that the end was not far off. On 
the 3rd of April, Mr. Calhoun, Chairman of the Com- 
mittee of Foreign Relations of the House, introduced 
a bill to repeal the Embargo Act and made a notable 
and eloquent address in support of this bill, in which 
his principal argument was founded on the complete 
change that had just occurred in the circumstances of 
the European belligerents. On April 6th Bonaparte 
abdicated. It will be seen that the astute Calhoun had 
correctly interpreted the news he had received — and 
in those days six weeks might be required for news 
to get from France to Washington. On the 12th of 

87 



May the brig Ida, from Rochelle, arrived at Boston, 
and brought information of the entrance of the allied 
armies into Paris March 31st, and also of proclama- 
tions issued in the name of Louis XVIII. Three days 
later the cartel Fair American, from Liverpool, 
reached Sandy Hook, and its passengers had read in 
the London papers the official account of the abdica- 
tion of Bonaparte and the virtual end of the war with 
France in which Britain had participated. The infor- 
mation brought by both the Ida and the Fair Ameri- 
can appeared in the Washington papers on May 18th. 

Yet ninety days later no effective measures had 
been taken to defend Washington ! 

Bonaparte had set the fashion of capturing the 
capital city of an enemy. Britain was now free to send 
her seasoned soldiers, natives and mercenaries, to 
America. British forces had been active on the Chesa- 
peake for more than a year and their conduct at sev- 
eral places, contrary to the usages of civilized warfare, 
gave ample earnest of what might be their conduct if 
they reached the national capital. Yet Madison, Mon- 
roe — and Armstrong — perceived no danger, found no 
time for military activity, but remained exceedingly 
busy about the Presidential nomination to be made in 
1816 and about public and political offices. Well might 
Williams, brigade-major of the Columbian Brigade in 
the War, write after mature reflection : 

"The moral which we are disposed to draw from 
the history of the battle of Bladensburg is, not that 



Americans were too 'pusillanimous' to defend their 
seat of government, and that, therefore, it would be 
safer to hire an army of foreign mercenaries to defend 
it for us ; nor that militia troops are not to be depend- 
ed upon, and therefore a large standing army of regu- 
lar troops is necessary ; but that politicians of fairest 
fame require watching, and will not hesitate to sacri- 
fice or jeopardize the interests and honor of their coun- 
try in order to advance themselves or ruin a rival." 
Yet if one were to apply that without qualifica- 
tion to Madison or Monroe or Armstrong he would 
do every one of them a great injustice. We must be 
careful to understand the conditions, opinions and 
standards of 1814 in the United States. For fifty years, 
and especially during the years following the Revolu- 
tion, there had been much profound, fine and eloquent 
speech-making and writing about the science and 
practice of government, in which the loftiest senti- 
ments were expressed and the strictest standards of 
conduct of public officials were set forth. The spoken 
and printed word were of the purest patriotism, the 
strictest honesty, the most virtuous conduct. The 
thought and expression about government and the du- 
ties and conduct of public officials reached commonly 
a plane that had rarely been attained before and has 
as rarely been attained since. But between preach- 
ment and practice there was a wide and deep chasm. 
To steal money directly and boldly from the national 
treasury was an unthinkable crime ; but to rob the peo- 



pie obliquely or to sacrifice the public interests was 
more than excusable when the motive was partisan 
political advantage. There were two schools that 
taught very differently about the safe and proper func- 
tions of government; nearly all connected with these 
schools thought that the success of the other school 
would be the destruction of the nation; each school 
was organized as a political party ; hence to defeat the 
other party and secure the success of one's own was 
the purest and most practical patriotism. Partisan 
feeling ran high, partisan contests were bitter, and 
from this grew personal animosities that made invin- 
cibly strong the conviction that when the triumph of 
a party and its candidates was the end, it justified any 
means. 

It is doubtful if truer patriots ever lived than 
Madison and Monroe. It is not easy, and it would 
probably be unjust, to question the patriotism of Arm- 
strong. All served their country well at times, though 
some, at least, did not serve their country well at all 
times. But it is only right and fair, if one presumes to sit 
in judgment on any man, to consider all the conditions 
— material, intellectual and moral — of his time. When 
we consider these conditions as they existed during 
the lives of Armstrong, Monroe and Madison, we will 
not have much censure for the first, and the faults of 
character and conduct of the others will be hid in the 
dazzling brilliancy and steady light of their great and 
patriotic services to the weak and struggling Republic. 

90 



As the greatest responsibility rested on the Pres- 
ident, on him might fall the greatest blame. There- 
fore we should keep in mind that which the author will 
risk repeating once more — Madison was a man reluct- 
ant to engage in war and preferred the pen far above 
the sword. This would have been commendable 
if the outrages of our enemies on our commerce and 
seamen had been confined to the work of the pen only. 
Madison's preference for the pen and his belief in his 
diplomatic ability were responsible for his giving cre- 
dence to the reports that were brought to America in 
the early summer of 1814 that Britain would seek 
peace during the summer. While making prepara- 
tions to send Wellington's Peninsular veterans to 
Canada — to be so unkindly treated at Plattsburg! — 
and to the Chesapeake and later to Louisiana, Great 
Britain, knowing Madison well, was careful to lull him 
yet more securely into the certainty of safety by giv- 
ing grounds for rumors of negotiations for peace. 
Madison was easily deceived. He even regarded the 
mediation of Russia as promising. Madison evidently 
believed that with the pen he could make the English 
people ashamed of the way the English forces were 
making war, and thus make them so opposed to the 
War as to influence their government. Doubtless 
Monroe did not approve of this, for he knew the class 
that ruled in Great Britain ; but he was unable to get 
Madison to act, if he really attempted to do so. There 
is little evidence that Monroe was more alarmed than 

91 



Madison about the safety of the national capital. True, 
it was very often said that the War was "Monroe's 
war." If he had been President the War would have 
been differently conducted — he would have sought 
victory on the field of battle; his weapons would not 
have been made of paper. But the man that was Pres- 
ident delayed and procrastinated in the making of war 
because he believed that he could do the impossible 
with the diplomatic pen. 

The conditions responsible for, and made by, the 
military methods of the British must be considered if 
we would have a correct or proper understanding of the 
events leading up to "The Invasion of the City of 
Washington." Undoubtedly some of the British 
forces at times ignored the laws of civilized warfare-- 
even for that time. But what war of any magnitude 
has been so conducted that the same charge could net 
justly be brought against some of the contending 
forces? And plainly while they are at peace men are 
not always just and moral. While engaged in peace- 
ful pursuits all men do not always live the Golden 
Rule. Those that have so much to say about the evils 
and abuses of war have nothing to say about the evils 
and abuses of peace. The evils and abuses of war are 
much the more obtrusive for we are accustomed to 
peace. The evils of peace are real and great, and yet 
more insidious, and not infrequently clothed as bene- 
fits. However, we will grant, what is true, that war 
is — no one knew better what it is than Napoleon Bo- 

92 



naparte, and he said, "What is war? A trade of bar- 
barians."* War can not be made a pink tea affair. 
And pink teas do not develop strong characters or 
peoples or produce good moral fibre. While the ex- 
cesses of the British troops along the Chesapeake just- 
ly merited the execrations of the American people, to 
condemn all because of the acts of a few is illogical 
and unjust. We must consider the general practices 
of the British troops along the Chesapeake. Of those 
practices, the one most complained of was the taking 
or destruction of private property. But if that is to 
condemn an army, the British have not been the only 
troops within the borders of the United States that 
must suffer condemnation. Further, the appropria- 
tion and destruction of private property by the British 
were doubtless much exaggerated. The victims rare- 
ly start these things too small and the recitals rarely 
shrink during their travels. 

The most charming writer about the Chesapeake 
expedition — and a very fair and just one — is the Brit- 
ish "Subaltern in America." His narrative is direct 
and frank, his style simple and lucid. As a matter of 
course, without any attempt to justify or excuse, he 
narrates that from the time the British troops landed 
they foraged and pillaged. What they could not con- 
sume they frequently destroyed. They took every- 
thing they wanted that they could find, and they espe- 
cially wanted everything to drink and eat. True, there 

♦Count de Segur's Campaign in Russia, Book VII, Chap. 8. 

93 



were "orders already issued against plunder and ra- 
pine." But, observes this subaltern, "it would have 
been unreasonable to expect that hungry soldiers, in 
an enemy's country, would sit down to digest their 
hunger, whilst flocks of poultry and herds of swine 
were within their reach." Consider that the voyage 
from England had begun in an exceedingly severe 
storm lasting for days, yet later the ships were be- 
calmed — the voyage was of weeks ; some of the casks 
of water became poisonous, some of the sea biscuit 
spoiled ; some of the poultry the officers had provided 
for their use was washed overboard, and the pigs died : 
how toothsome indeed must have been the fat fowls 
and swine of the enemy ! Fowls and swine have often 
been the undoing of a hungry trooper. 

But the indignation because of the taking of fowls 
and swine was not near so great as the indignation be- 
cause of the taking of slaves. The negroes were more 
valuable. The Norfolk Herald was of opinion that 
"To take negroes, who were human beings ; to tear 
them forever from their kindred and connections is 
what we should never expect from a Christian nation, 
especially one that has done so much toward abolish- 
ing the slave trade. There are negroes in Virginia 
and, we believe, in all the Southern states, who have 
their interests and affections as strongly engrafted in 
their hearts, as the whites, and who feel the sacred ties 
of filial, parental, and conjugal affection, equally 

94 



strong, and who are warmly attached to their owners 
and the scenes of their nativity." 

Commenting on this, that most interesting Cana- 
dian historian of the War of 1812, Auchinleck*, says : 

"James very correctly notices this. as one of the 
most inadvertent but happiest pieces of satire extant ; 
and so it must appear to all. Even at the present time, 
no later than two days back, a New Orleans journal, 
the 'Creole,' contained an advertisement offering to 
purchase slaves from any quarter, and it is impossible 
to take up a southern paper without the eye being 
offended and the senses disgusted with the accounts 
of slave sales — the attractions of a young quadroon 
being dwelt on and puffed with as much minuteness 
as the points of a horse. The revelations of the hor- 
rors of American slavery are so patent, and have ex- 
cited such universal horror, that it is almost unneces- 
sary to dwell on the unparallelled impudence which 
could assert that the slaves were warmly attached to 
their masters — slave owners selling their children, and 
the mothers of their children ; but the bare thought of 
these things is sickening, yet the very journals con- 
taining those advertisements were the foremost to ac- 
cuse the British of having violated 'the dictates of 
Christianity and civilization' * * * * During the 
whole period that the English fleet were on the wa- 
ters of the Chesapeake, the officers, who were sent on 

*See The Battle of Plattsburg. 

95 



shore to procure provisions and water, were constant- 
ly beset by crowds of fugitive slaves, who implored 
to be rescued from a state of bondage. These appeals 
were too piteous, always to be disregarded, and the 
consequence was that hundreds of them were taken 
on board the British vessels, from whence they were 
mostly transported to Halifax, a few being landed at 
Jamaica. This circumstance it was that afforded an 
excuse for the assertion of the American Government, 
that 'the British, after receiving the negroes, shipped 
the wretches to the West Indies, where they were sold 
as slaves, for the benefit of British officers' * * * * 
The assertion that slaves were dragged away by force 
with the greatest cruelty is simply absurd ; it was with 
the greatest difficulty that the British commander 
could victual his fleet, lying as it did on an enemy's 
shore, and it was not very probable that he would suf- 
fer his difficulties in that respect to be increased by 
the addition of loads of negroes, whom, to make profit 
on it, it would be necessary to feed and keep in good 
condition. The only marvel is that the British com- 
mander should have allowed his feelings of humanity 
to overstep the strict line of duty, inasmuch as by res- 
cuing these unhappy victims from slavery he was seri- 
ously inconveniencing the crews of the vessels under 
his command, and so crowding his ships as to render 
them almost unfit for going into action." 

It is to be hoped that the amiable reader has read 
carefully what has just been said about the depreda- 

96 



tions of the British on the shores of the Chesapeake, 
and that as he has read carefully he has also consid- 
ered carefully, and honestly and justly. It might not 
be amiss for him to re-read what is said on the subject 
just named, especially the extract from the edifying 
history of that consistent lover of "the glorious Brit- 
ish constitution" — Auchinleck. 

For with this careful reading, and careful, and 
especially honest and just, consideration, there will 
surely come a conviction that most questions are pos- 
sessed of two sides, if not three ; and there will surely 
arise also a tolerant feeling that is needed by every 
one that reads history, a fortiori the history of war. 
We may have, and should have, some little feeling of 
kindness toward even our enemies in war — unless, as 
has rather rarely happened, they have so outraged the 
laws of humanity and raped the decencies of mortal 
combat, that they have put themselves beyond the 
pale of those to be regarded as human beings; and 
even then we should be very careful to outlaw only 
those directly guilty and those that have approved the 
guilty. Most assuredly we may have, and we should 
have, no small measure of charity for our own, for 
their sins of delay or omission, whether they be civil- 
ians or soldiers. We may be sure that we know of 
only the very small part of the obstacles in their way. 
It is easy to blame a commander for a defeat — and the 
chances are many to one that no man could have 
avoided the defeat. It is easy to scold at troops be- 

97 



cause they retreated when they saw some of their 
number being killed or wounded — but would we have 
stood in the ranks as long? Our two greatest men — 
so great that they stand aloof, like two giant trees on 
the top of a high hill — Washington and Lincoln, were 
objects of more criticism, of more impatience, of more 
abuse, of more scheming enmity, than any other two 
of our Presidents ; and how petty and immaterial are 
now all their faults and errors that at the time seemed 
so big and criminal to some honest people! It is the 
duty of the historian to point out the faults of Madi- 
son and the others responsible for "The Invasion of 
the City of Washington ;" but considering all the con- 
ditions, of which not the least important was the char- 
acter of the American people themselves — their ideas, 
their jealousies, their lack of cohesion, their little loy- 
alty to the national government — who could have done 
much better? And if we are disposed to be impatient 
with a later President, if we see that his administra- 
tion has a good many of the faults of the Madison ad- 
ministration, let us be careful indeed that we are im- 
patient and that we point out faults, only so far as is 
justified, and with the one clear purpose, to aid the 
administration to greater efficiency. When war was 
declared June 18, 1812, there was but one thing for 
every American citizen to do, regardless of his opin- 
ions of war in general or of the war with Great Brit- 
ain in particular — do his utmost for victory. How 
plainly do we see that now ! May not a like clear vision 

98 



be his that, in 2018, looks back a century? And he will 
see clearly also that it was the part of true patriotism 
to expose faults and corruption — for that, is essential 
to victory ; and also to give credit generously for the 
many things done — for that is equally essential to 
victory. 

At the time, the people of the United States were 
indeed indignant that their national capital had been 
wantonly devastated; and this act of the British was 
almost universally condemned. Even among the Brit- 
ish people, and especially among the British common 
people, there were many indeed that felt that the Brit- 
ish, not the Americans, had been disgraced. Yet one 
must marvel, not that the British burned the national 
capitol and other buildings, but that the Americans 
permitted it. Notwithstanding the opinion of Bona- 
parte*, Jomini could speak as an authority on some 
phases of war; and he said — 

"The English performed an enterprise which may 
be ranged amongst the most extraordinary: — that 
against the capital of the United States of America. 
To the great astonishment of the world, a handful of 
seven or eight thousand English were seen to descend 

*The Count de Segur, in his History of the Expedition 
to Russia, book IV, Chap. 5, says that in the course of a con- 
versation with an envoy from the Czar, Bonaparte said: 
"You all believe yourselves to understand the art of war be- 
cause you have read Jomini; but if his book could have 
taught you anything, do you think that I would have al- 
lowed it to be published?" This was at the beginning of the 
invasion of Russia. 

99 



in the midst of a state of ten millions of souls, pene- 
trate a considerable distance, besiege the capital, and 
destroy the public establishments there; results which 
history may be searched in vain for another example 
of."* 

Here the American citizen may well stop to do 
some hard thinking; starting with the quotation from 
Jomini, and assisted by much that has preceded. 






♦Summary of the Art of War. 
100 



8 



A PAPER ARMY. 

It is not the task of the author of this little book 
to make any defense of General Wilkinson ; and with- 
out a defense many will consider Wilkinson exceed- 
ingly untrustworthy about anything. I can only say 
that Wilkinson was one of those on whom was visited 
grave injustice in a time of bitter feeling and partisan 
rancor hard to understand at this time. He was guilty 
of a good many things he should not have done. He 
may have been guilty of treason. Grant even that, 
and it remains true that in his statements about con- 
ditions before the burning of the capitol, the measures 
that were taken and those that were not taken for 
defense, and the disposition and handling of the forces, 
he is intelligent and enlightening and nearly always 
correct and accurate. His prejudice is so open that it 
is easily perceived, and I have paid no attention to it. 
The reader will not be wearied with his minute and 
laborious explanations of how he would have success- 
fully defended the capital, although some space must 

101 



be given to this later on — more than one general with- 
out a command has had better hindsight than fore- 
sight. However, it must be said that he has proved 
by witnesses of the highest character that as early as 
July 1st, 1814, he foresaw that the British would at- 
tack Washington and had elaborated plans for its de- 
fense. Further, although he was under arrest when 
he went to Washington in late June, he asked to be 
allowed to serve in the military forces when danger 
threatened. Yet, further, as will appear later, in Aug- 
ust even Monroe did not scorn to seek his advice. His 
military attainments, experience and knowledge were 
such that few, indeed, could be more capable of stat- 
ing a military situation and therefore the following is 
quoted from his Memoirs: 

"It appears, that the day after the cabinet coun- 
cil, the 2nd of July, the President judged it expedient 
to create a 10th military district ***** A district 
was accordingly created to comprehend the whole 
state of Maryland, the District of Columbia, and that 
part of Virginia north of the Rappahannock river, em- 
bracing an exposed coast of 800 to 1,000 miles, vulner- 
able at every point, and intersected by many large 
rivers, and by Chesapeake Bay ****** General 
Winder accepted the command without means and 
without time to create them ; he found the district 
without magazines of provisions or forage, without 
transport tools or implements, without a commissa- 

102 



riat or efficient quartermaster's department, without 
i general staff, and finally without troops." 

Why was this 10th military district created? 
There is little doubt that its creation was the result of 
bringing partisan political maneuvering and wire-pull- 
ing into military operations. Until the creation of 
this new military district, Washington was in the 5th 
military district, and this 5th district "was then com- 
manded by one of the bravest and most experienced 
generals in the service, Moses Porter, who had en- 
tered the Revolutionary army as a common soldier, and 
had gradually raised himself, by his own signal merits, 
from a private in the ranks to the high and distin- 
guished post of brigadier general and commander of 
a military district* * * * * The Secretary of War, it 
appears, was desirous of calling this veteran to the 
seat of government, for the purpose of defense, but 
his wishes were over-ruled * * * * Another general 
could not be appointed to an independent command 
within District No. 5 without a gross insult to General 
Porter; and as the President had already determined 
to have another, and had, indeed, 'specially assigned' 
him to the service, a commendable respect for his old 
fellow-soldier of the Revolution may have induced the 
Secretary of War to save his feelings by suggesting 
the establishment of a new district * * * * *After 
having created military district No. 10 * * * * * the 
next subject of discussion, we may suppose, was the 
selection of a military^ commander for the new district 

103 



— though it might be inferred from the language of 
General Armstrong that this had been pre-determined 
by the President himself: so, at least, if we are to 
credit the statement of the other members of the cabi- 
net * * * * * It was a point of even more importance 
than the selection of troops, whether regard be had to 
the quality or number of the latter. A commander of 
well known and acknowledged experience and good 
fortune — for sometimes success is as much the result 
of the latter, in the eyes of the soldiers, as of skill or 
courage — would have brought with him to the execu- 
tion of his duties what the French call a prestige, 
a prepossession in his favor, which would have in- 
spired the troops with a confidence perhaps sufficient 
to counterbalance all the deficiencies in their organiza- 
tion. They would have obeyed the orders of such a 
leader with a trustful conviction that whatever he 
commanded was right and necessary. They would 
have fought under him with the animating presenti- 
ment of victory ; and all who are acquainted with hu- 
man nature are aware that the stimulus of such an an- 
ticipation rarely fails to bring about its own realiza- 
tion * * * * If there had been no mutual jealousies 
between the two Revolutionary secretaries,* it is not 
probable that any objection would have been made to 
the selection by the head of the War Department of 
General Porter to command the force destined for the 

♦Monroe and Armstrong. 

104 



defense of the seat of government; for that the objec- 
tion originated, either directly or indirectly, with the 
Secretary of State, was never doubted by any intelli- 
gent citizen of Washington at the period referred to ; 
and it is as little to be doubted that the principal 
ground of the objection was that the Secretary of War 
recommended the appointment." 

This last quotation is from Williams' volume on 
the "Capture of Washington." He certainly was in as 
good position to know about the topics just discussed 
as any one except Monroe and Armstrong, and he 
never hesitated to write the truth as he saw it. He 
hints that another reason for the creation of the 10th 
district and thus putting Washington and the sur- 
rounding territory outside the command of General 
Porter, was the wish of the Secretary of State, "re- 
garded as a prominent candidate for the presidential 
succession," to execute a brilliant military achievement 
which would "render his future elevation sure," but 
which "could not well be attempted under the bluff old 
soldier, Moses Porter, or any other experienced gen- 
eral not indebted to him for appointment." 

This much space has been given to this matter, 
and yet more will be again, because it is a matter of 
much importance — of vital importance. Political am- 
bition is all too prone to intrude itself into military 
operations. Far too often in our history there have 
been "political generals" who may have been patriotic, 
but certainly were so incompetent that treason could 

105 



have been but little more disastrous. It may be safely 
said that the fewer politicians and methods of the poli- 
tician in the conduct of war, the better for the soldiers 
and the country. Whenever military promotion is 
used in any way to build up a political following to 
secure public office, a crime of no light hue is commit- 
ted against the people. Even the indirect methods of 
the politicians in the War and Navy departments are \o 
be heartily condemned. The creation of District 
No. 10, as just recounted, indirectly, by the favorite 
hidden methods of the politicians, to displace one com- 
mander and place another, may not have been respon- 
sible for the disgrace and humiliation of the destruc- 
tion of the national capital, but the ideas and methods 
responsible for this shifting of commanders were re- 
sponsible for that disgrace and humiliation. The read- 
er knows only too well that the War of 1812 is not 
the only war in which the United States has engaged 
in which lives have been sacrificed, defeats suffered 
instead of victories won, and the burden of war laid 
heavier on all the people, because the politician was 
allowed to have his way in places— where he should 
not have been allowed to intrude. 

As set forth in a previous chapter, there was, for 
the selection of the commander of the new district, a 
politician's reason, other than to have a commanding 
general under direct obligation to the Secretary of 
State and willing to stand aside that all the rays of 
glory might shine on that Secretary. 

106 



General W. H. Winder was, as Ingersoll* states 
in his historical sketch of the War of 1812, a relative 
of Levin Winder, the governor of Maryland, federal 
governor of a federal state; "and Mr. Madison and 
Mr. Monroe deemed it politic to conciliate opposition 
by appointing him to that responsible and arduous 
command." 

The view of the soldier, as expressed by Wil- 
liams, was that "the most effectual mode of mitigating 
the opposition to the War would have been to render 
the War successful and glorious ; and that would have 
been accomplished by selecting able men for the 
conduct of military operations, without reference to 
their personal relations or party opinions, by encour- 
aging capacity, no matter from what rank or class of 
life it sprung, and giving it the means of displaying 
itself in a way which should advance the public in- 
terests." 

The author must confess that he agrees with Ma- 
jor Williams on this point, at least. 

General Armstrong states further that "the per- 
son recommended by the Secretary of War for this 
appointment was Brigadier-General Moses Porter, 
then at Norfolk, whose whole life may be said to have 
been military. Entering the army of the Revolution 
a boy, he had, by uniform good conduct, risen 
through every rank, from that of a private to the com- 

*See The Battle of Plattsburg. 

107 



mand of a brigade. No objection to General Winder, 
except a want of military experience, either was or 
could be made ; his patriotism and courage had already 
been tested, and were generally acknowledged." 

General Winder was not without military train- 
ing or experience, but in neither was he near to Porter, 
or other available generals. 

Such was the new commander of the new military 
district. Not his military experience or attainments, 
but the expediency of politicians, was responsible for 
his selection. He did not lack ability ; he did not alto- 
gether lack military training; he certainly did not lack 
energy or patriotism ; but he was unknown to the 
troops that were to serve under him ; even had they 
known him they would have lacked that confidence 
in their commander that is so important to victory; 
and considering what was needed for his success and 
what was lacking, he was given what to him — or to 
any man living — was an impossible task. The fault 
was not in Winder or in the soldiers he commanded. 
It was in the national administration. 

To repeat the sententious statement of General 
Wilkinson, "General Winder accepted the command 
without means and without time to create them ; he 
found the district without magazines or provisions or 
forage, without transport tools or implements, with- 
out a commissariat or efficient quartermaster's depart- 
ment, without a general staff, and finally without 
troops." But truly magnificent preparations were 

108 



made — on paper — to furnish him with everything 
needed. That was always the way with the national 
administration. There never was a regime that could 
more easily call armies from the farm and forge by 
requisition — and get no troops. There never was an 
administration more valiant with proclamation. One 
shrinks from considering what would have happened 
if there had been typewriters ! The writer knows well 
of a small city that at least once a month has a public 
meeting addressed by its most prominent citizens — 
tight-fisted old fogies; at which meeting certain com- 
mittees are appointed, numerously enough to put the 
name of nearly every one present in the next morn- 
ing's paper; which committees report copiously of 
whereases and resolutions which, after every one 
present who thinks he is an orator has painfully dem- 
onstrated that he is not, are adopted — and then all go 
home to read, the next morning, the usual congratula- 
tions of the Press on having done something — some- 
thing important. And always when I read of the con- 
duct of the War by the Madison administration I am 
reminded of that little city on the river bank each year 
growing less in business and educational importance, 
but more fruitful in meetings, speeches and wordy res- 
olutions. 

On the Fourth of July, 1814, the President made a 
requisition on the various states for 93,500 militia ! It 
was just as easy to make a requisition for 93,500 as for 
9,350. Inevitably Madison called for the 93,500. Cer- 

109 



tain soi-disant historians have taken account of the 
different "calls" and "requisitions" of the national ad- 
ministration for troops, and being contemptuous of 
the truth and exceedingly brave and broad liars when 
the truth would not serve their purposes, have allowed 
their readers to understand, or seme have positively 
asserted, that the numbers called for were the numbers 
obtained. As a matter of fact, all in arms during the 
War were but a rather small fraction of the number 
these lying writers of popular or unpopular histories 
lead their readers, unfortunately mostly school chil- 
dren, to believe were actually in service. 

Not all of the 93,500 troops — on paper — were, 
however, to be for the defense of Washington. The 
quota to be furnished by each state was designated. 
Virginia was to furnish 2,000; Pennsylvania 5,000; 
Maryland 6,000; and the District of Columbia 2,000; 
a total of 15,000 for the defense of the capital. 

But even this diminished number was not to be 
immediately available — was not to be immediately 
available even on paper. The President's requisition 
specified that these militia were "to be organized and 
equipped, and held in readiness for future service, 
within their respective states, until the 10th district 
shall be actually invaded, or menaced with invasion." 
Then General Winder might "call for a part or for 
the whole of the quota assigned to the state of Mary- 

110 



land,* which shall have been organized and equipped 
under the aforesaid requisition." 

And then General Winder was cautioned not to 
call for troops until they were clearly needed, being 
careful "to proportion the call to the exigency." Fur- 
ther, it will be noted that he could call for only, at the 
most, the Maryland quota of 6,000. Yet further, he 
could not call for even these until the invasion of his 
military district was imminent or an accomplished 
fact. And yet further, he could have only those Mary- 
land militia "which shall have been organized and 
equipped under this requisition." This meant as many 
as the governor of Maryland chose to organize and 
equip, for, as General Wilkinson points out, Winder 
had no power or authority to organize or equip the 
militia — nor had the states ! Wilkinson is right in say- 
ing that "the requisition was a mere matter of form, 
and incapable of producing the end it affected to em- 
brace ; in each state the militia was first to be organ- 
ized and equipped in the manner prescribed by the 
requisition, and yet in those states there existed no 
power so to organize and equip in such form, and un- 
til such special organization and equipment had taken 
place, the call was not to be made." All of this is true. 
General Winder was not to have militia collected or 
trained or equipped before he needed them. He was 

♦Apparently Pennsylvania, Virginia and the District of 
Columbia had been named in the requisition only that they 
might not feel slighted. 

Ill 



not to have any militia "trained to military duties in 
a camp of observation and exercise, to await the ex- 
pected exigency, around which the remainder might 
rally; he is, when danger stares him in the face, to the 
utter neglect of the many important duties pressing 
on him, obliged to devote his time to the collection 
and formation of a body of raw yeomanry ; and is him- 
self trammelled with restrictions." 

But the national administration, busy with parti- 
san political concerns and timorous, weak and vacil- 
lating in its prosecution of the War, actually feared 
that it had gone too far! One can not refrain from 
quoting again from General Wilkinson : 

"President Madison appears to have been 
alarmed, lest he should have done too much, and in 
recommending depots of arms and equipments, he 
seems to have forgotten that subsistence was an in- 
dispensable article of the munitions of war; that trans- 
port was necessary to convey his baggage ; and that 
entrenching tools and axes might be useful, in break- 
ing up and obstructing roads, or to fortify his camps ; 
and to put it out of General Winder's power to 
burthen the public with the expense of a competent 
force for the defense of the capital, he informs him, 
through his Secretary of War, on the 17th of July, two 
days after he had received advice of the arrival of 
Commodore Cochrane's van at Lynnhaven bay with 
heavy reinforcements, that 'the militia of the District 
of Columbia, amounting to about 2,000 is kept in a 

112 



disposable state, and subject to your orders; I have 
also to express the wishes of the President, that not 
less than two, nor more than three thousand of the 
new drafts, under the requisition of the 4th of July, 
be organized, embodied and encamped at some middle 
point between Baltimore and this city.' How incon- 
sistent was the conduct of President Madison ! The 
enemy had been reconnoitering the Potowmack and 
the Patuxent since the beginning of May ; no doubt 
remained of their designs against the capital, which 
were admitted by himself, and under the impression, 
he calls on the respective states for the immediate or- 
ganization and equipment of their respective quota of 
93,500 militia, 15,000 of whom he designated for the 
defense of the metropolis, but directs them to be held 
'in readiness for future service.' This was doing with 
one hand and undoing with the other ; it was blowing 
hot and cold in the same breath ; it followed that Gen- 
eral Winder must, necessarily, have been perplexed 
and embarrassed." 

It must be taken into account that General Wil- 
kinson was prejudiced against President Madison ; 
that his feeling toward the President, who had had 
him arrested, and, when the Memoirs were written, 
had had him courtmartialed, was bitter. Yet it is true 
that in the main the criticisms of the President were 
justified. What Wilkinson criticises is only one of the 
several highly successful attempts of Madison to cre- 
ate a large paper army — but pitiably small when actu- 

113 



ally ready for service. On one point, however, Wil- 
kinson is incorrect — when he states that the President 
admitted that there was no doubt of the designs of the 
British on the capital. The President was not sure 
that the British thought of attacking the capital — ap- 
parently he was rarely sure of anything about the 
War. Incredible as it is, not he or the members of his 
cabinet were sure that the British intended to attack 
Washington, as late as the morning of August 24th. 
This will be shown hereafter. The President found 
it impossible to decide in his own mind where the Brit- 
ish forces would strike ; until the very eve of the battle 
of Bladensburg he was not sure that they intended to 
strike at all; day after day and week after week he 
persisted in the happy dream that the British had no 
greater object than to continue to "live off the coun- 
try" — a procedure in war not altogether sanctioned by 
the rules of the game, but made respectable by cus- 
tom — to "appropriate" tobacco, flour, hogs and poul- 
try, and occasionally to relieve this routine by burning 
a farm house. It was indeed unfortunate that nothing 
could disturb the belief of the national administration 
that the British forces were amiable gentlemen bent 
on a little prankish and thievish, but friendly, diver- 
sion. 

That the conditions and circumstances must 
prove perplexing and embarrassing to General Win 
der, was beyond doubt. In his Historical Sketch of 
the Second War of Independence, Ingersoll says: 

114 



"Winder's was an arduous perplexity : to arm and 
fortify a military district without magazines or troops, 
composed by a cabinet of older soldiers than himself, 
whom it would be disrespectful in him to contradict, 
and almost insubordinate to overrule; to lead undis- 
ciplined neighbors to battle, in whose material prow- 
ess he could not confide, of whose blood he was hu- 
manely sparing, overlooked by several superiors, and 
distracted by a host of advisers." 

Another says of the conditions and task that con- 
fronted General Winder : 

"The appointment of a general, unless a proper 
military staff is furnished him, and efficient troops 
given him, is a very unnecessary ceremony. There 
were few regular troops within the power of the gov- 
ernment ; the most numerous body which had recently 
been near or within the district, 500 men of the 10th 
infantry, under Lieutenant-Colonel Clinch, a body of 
stout, active young men enlisted in North Carolina, 
which had been encamped near Washington for sev- 
eral weeks, were marched away to the northern fron- 
tiers on the 13th of June, in the midst of the alarm of 
an expected attack. In strictness, two detachments of 
the 36th and 38th infantry, and a small detachment of 
artillery, amounting in the whole to 330 men, were all 
that could be said to be at disposal at the time that the 
10th military district was created, nor was this great 
deficiency remedied in any degree before the troops 
were called into action. No orders were issued by the 

115 



War Department appointing an assistant adjutant- 
general, assistant inspector-general, or assigning to du- 
ty in the district any topographical engineers; and it 
is well known that General Winder's greatest com- 
plaint was, that he had not the aid of this staff, with- 
out which the proper organization, equipment, and 
efficiency of troops is impossible and that his time was 
occupied by an oppressive mass of detail, when he 
should have been at liberty to devote it to duties of a 
very different character." 

The recital, later on, of the many activities, the 
travel, the hurry, of General Winder, will emphasize 
the closing sentence of the paragraph just quoted. 

General Winder received his commission as com- 
mander of the new 10th district on the 6th of July. 
Three days later he addressed a letter to "Hon. John 
Armstrong, Secretary of War," in which he said : 

"The utmost regular force which it is probable 
can, in the present state of affairs, be placed at my 
command, including the force necessary for garrison- 
ing the several forts, will not exceed 1,000 men, and 
some weeks will necessarily elapse before the detach- 
ments from Virginia and Carlisle will reach my dis- 
trict. The detachments of the 36th and 38th are, there- 
fore, the only troops that I can expect to have in the 
meantime, and when those other detachments join, 
the utmost force will be from 700 to 800 * * * * The 
enemy's fleet has now spent more than a twelvemonth 
in the waters of the Chesapeake, and during that time 

116 



has visited almost every river falling into the Bay, 
and must be presumed to have such accurate informa- 
tion that whatever expedition may be destined to these 
waters will have a definite object, to the execution of 
which, on its arrival, it will proceed with the utmost 
promptitude and dispatch. Should Washington, Bal- 
timore or Annapolis be their object, what possible 
chance will there be of collecting a force, after the ar- 
rival of the enemy, to interpose between them and 
either of these places? They can proceed, without 
dropping anchor, to within three hours' rowing and 
marching of Baltimore, within less of Annapolis, and 
upon arriving off South River, can debark and be in 
Washington in a day and a half. This celerity of move- 
ment, on their part, is not probable, owing to adverse 
weather and other causes; but if the enemy has been 
active, while in our waters, to acquire a knowledge of 
our country, of which there can be no doubt, and 
should be favored with weather on the arrival of re- 
inforcements, he can be in Washington, Baltimore, or 
Annapolis in four days from entering the Capes. But, 
allowing liberally for all causes of detention, he can be 
in either of those places in ten days from his arrival. 
What time will this allow us to hear of his arrival, to 
disseminate through the intricate and winding chan- 
nels of the various orders to the militia for them to as- 
semble, have their officers designated, their arms, ac- 
coutrements, and ammunition delivered, the necessary 
supplies provided, or for the commanding officers to 

117 



learn the different corps and detachments, so as to 
issue orders with the promptitude and certainty so 
necessary to active operations? If the enemy's force 
should be strong, which, if it comes at all, it will be, 
sufficient numbers of militia could not be warned and 
run together, even as a disorderly crowd, without 
arms, ammunition, or organization, before the enemy 
would already have given his blow. 

"Would it not, then, be expedient to increase the 
force of my command by immediately calling out a 
portion of the militia, so that, by previously selecting 
the best positions for defense, and increasing as far as 
possible the natural advantages of these positions, the 
advance of the enemy might be retarded, his force 
crippled, and time and opportunity thus gained for 
drawing together whatever other resources of defense 
might be competent to resist the enemy? The small 
force of regulars will be incompetent to accomplish 
any material works at favorable positions for strength- 
ening the defences,, and to supply the various vedette 
parties which it will be necessary to station on the 
prominent points of the Bay to watch the enemy, and 
communicate his movements with the greatest possi- 
ble dispatch." 

To this letter the Secretary of War vouchsafed no 
reply. 

This is a very important letter — important be- 
cause of several things in and about it, as we shall see. 

118 



Yet no one of the national administration gave it any 
attention. 

But General Winder need not have given himself 
any concern about organizing and equipping a rather 
large assemblage of militia, for he would not have any 
large number even to assemble. As already stated, 
the President's call for militia named conditions that 
made a compliance impossible, unless the states exer- 
cised powers that they did not have ! 

A copy of the proclamation calling for 93,500 mili- 
tia — 6,000 from Maryland — was not served on the gov- 
ernor of Maryland until July 10th ; and not until July 
12th was General Winder authorized to call for the 
Maryland quota in case of "menaced or actual invas- 
ion." Certainly the administration believed in leis- 
urely methods ! When one considers all the circum- 
stances he would be greatly surprised if Maryland had 
even assembled any considerable body of militia. Of 
the Maryland response hereafter. 

Pennsylvania, nearby, was to furnish 5,000 mili- 
tia. In The Battle of Plattsburg, the contempt for the 
national government, and especially the national ad- 
ministration, shown by the states, is made plain, and 
will be only mentioned here. The requisition on Penn- 
sylvania did not reach the office of the governor of 
that state until July 14th — ten days in getting from 
Washington! The following correspondence is so 
typical of communications from state authorities to 

119 



the national administration that it may well be read 
with interest. It explains itself: 

Letters from the Secretary of the Governor of Penn- 
sylvania to the Secretary of War. 

Secretary's office. 

July 14, 1814. 
SIR, 

In the absence of the Governor, I deem it my duty 
to inform you that your communication containing a 
requisition for a detachment of 14,000* Pennsylvania 
militia, came to the office this morning and was imme- 
diately forwarded by express to the Governor, at Sel- 
in's Grove. Be assured the requisition will be met 
with all the promptness the circumstances possibly 
will permit. 

With high considerations of respect, 
I am, sir, 

Your obedient servant, 
M. B. Boileau, 

Secretary. 
John Armstrong, esq. Secretary of War. 

Secretary's office, 

July 25, 1814. 
SIR, 

The governor has directed me to inclose to you 

*Nine thousand — on paper — to go elsewhere than the 
Tenth Military District. 

120 



copies of general orders issued by him in compliance 
with a late requisition for a military force from Penn- 
sylvania, by the president, communicated by yours un- 
der date of the 4th inst. He has not, as you will per- 
ceive, designated places of rendezvous: he thinks it 
will be in time to do so in subsequent orders, which 
must issue before the troops can march : the threaten- 
ed point of attack by the enemy will, it is probable, 
then be better ascertained, and a more prudent selec- 
tion of place can be made. The repeal of our militia 
law of 1807, and its several supplements, on 
the 1st of August next; the disannulling of all 
commissions by the last session, granted un- 
der the old law, except the commissions of 
such officers as may then be in actual service; the or- 
dering by the new law ; the holding of elections of offi- 
cers by the militia, after the said 1st of August; the 
notice of election; returns to be made; and the pro- 
tracting to the 4th Monday of October next the classi- 
fication of the militia ; cause an almost total disorgan- 
ization of our militia system, between the 1st of Aug- 
ust and the 4th of October, and present difficulties, in 
yielding perfect compliance with the requisition of the 
president, insurmountable. It is hoped, however, that 
the patriotism of the people will obviate the difficulty, 
by a voluntary tender of services, which the governor 
has invited, growing out of the unaccountable over- 
sight of the legislature. It is strongly doubted wheth- 

121 



er any orders can be enforced under the present state 
of things.* 

The requisition refers to the act of Congress 
passed 28th of February, 1795; under which militia 
can be held in service three months only; and to the 
law of 1814, which authorized the president to keep 
them six months in service. The law of Pennsylvania, 
passed at the last session of the legislature, required 
the governor to mention in general orders the period 
for which any militia ordered into service is to remain 
on duty. It is desirable, therefore, to know whether 
the requisition is intended for three or six months ser- 
vice. The offices of deputy quarter master general and 
assistants and assistant adjutant generals, are not rec- 
ognized by our state laws. 

I have taken the liberty of inclosing to you a copy 
of the militia law of this state, passed at the last ses- 
sion of the legislature ; from a persual of which you 
will perceive the difficulties under which the executive 
at present labors, in attempting to comply with the 
requisition. 

With high consideration of respect, 

Sir, 
Your obedient servant, 

N. B. Boileau, 

Secretary. 

John Armstrong, esq. Secretary of War. 

*Please consider that the conditions existing in Pennsyl- 
vania — a very important state — were existing while the coun- 
try was at war with Great Britain. 

122 



Secretary's office, August 27, 1814. 
SIR, 

I am directed by the governor to inclose to you a copy 
of general orders issued yesterday. The letter of gen- 
eral Winder containing the requisition, under date of 
the 18th instant, was not received until the evening of 
the twenty-third. The deranged state of our militia 
system prevented a more prompt compliance with the 
demand. To obviate as far as possible the inconven- 
ience of delay, the governor has directed the flank and 
volunteer companies to push on as rapidly as possible, 
without any regard to the time fixed on for the gen- 
eral rendezvous of the ordinary drafts. The command- 
ing officers of the companies or detachments are in- 
structed to report themselves and the number of their 
men to General Winder, as the officer who may have 
command of the troops in the service of the United 
States, in the 10th military district. 

The tents, camp-equipage, as well as arms and ac- 
coutrements belonging to the state being insufficient 
to accommodate the troops called into service, the 
governor relies on the deficiency being supplied by the 
United States as promptly as practicable, to render 
the men comfortable and efficient. 

With highest respect and esteem, 

Your obedient servant, Sir, 
N. B. Boileau, 

Secretary. 

John Armstrong, esquire, Secretary of War. 

123 



It will be observed that this letter is dated three 
days after the burning of the capitol ! 

Also, that it is dated 54 days after the proclama- 
tion of July 4, calling for the militia! 

On that same date — August 27 — General Winder 
wrote to the Secretary of War a long letter — his offi- 
cial report — about the battle of Bladensburg and the 
burning of the national capital. This letter begins as 
follows : 

"When the enemy arrived at the mouth of the Po- 
tomac, of all the militia which I had been authorized 
to assemble, there were but about 1,700 in the field." 



124 



9. 



RUNNING AROUND IN CIRCLES. 

On the morning of August 16, 1814, "twenty-two 
sail of enemy's vessels came in from sea, and proceed- 
ed up the Chesapeake to join the force previously sta- 
tioned at the mouth of the Patuxent. The whole force 
then ascended that river, and on the 19th commenced 
landing troops at the old village of Benedict, situated 
about forty miles southeast of Washington. The in- 
telligence was promptly received in Washington, and 
the questions at once arose, what is the object of the 
enemy? What is the contemplated point of attack?"* 

Monroe wrote to the committee of congress 
formed to investigate the destruction of the capitol : 

"Calling on the President on the morning of the 
18th of August, he informed me that the enemy had 
entered the Patuxent in considerable force, and were 
landing at Benedict. I remarked that this city (Wash- 
ington) was their object. He concurred in the opin- 
ion." 

*Williams' Capture of Washington. 

125 



Knowing the mental characteristics of Armstrong 
and his feeling towards Monroe, we are not surprised 
to be told that on the 18th and later the Secretary of 
War "derided the notion that the British intended a 
visit to Washington." 

Of those that testified before the committee of 
congress that investigated the invasion of Washing- 
ton, was General Van Ness, a prominent man of the 
highest character. He testified that when the "in- 
creased and reinforced" British fleet entered the Pa- 
tuxent, he called on Secretary Armstrong and ex- 
pressed his "apprehensions, arising from want of 
means and preparations, adding that, from the known 
naval and reputed land force of the enemy, he proba- 
bly meant to strike a serious blow. His reply was, 
'Oh, yes; by G — d, they would not come with such a 
fleet without meaning to strike somewhere, but they 
certainly will not come here. What the d — 1 will they 
do here? * * * * No, no; Baltimore is the place, sir; 
this is of so much more consequence.' " However, in 
his Notices of the War of 1812, Armstrong yet main- 
tains that the "first and great object" of the British 
was to destroy Barney's flotilla, and that the attack 
on Washington was a casual enterprise — an after- 
thought of General Ross. 

General Winder believed from the first that the 
enemy intended to attack Annapolis — and the best 
reasons favored that conjecture. But, also, he thought 
that the squadron might be "intended to unite with 

126 



the land force, and co-operate in a joint attack on 
Washington." Williams, who was not unfriendly to 
Winder, says : 

"General Winder's doubts as to the objects and 
destination of the enemy continued from the time of 
the debarkation at Benedict on the 18th of August, 
until within three hours of the commencement of the 
battle of Bladensburg on the 24th." 

Winder says himself, in his account of the battle, 
and referring to his own position at the Eastern 
Branch Bridge, near the Navy Yard, after nine o'clock 
of the morning of the battle : 

"My patrols and vedettes not having yet brought 
me any intelligence of a movement of the enemy (from 
his bivouac twelve miles from Washington) and be- 
ing still doubtful whether he might not move on An- 
napolis, Fort Washington, or towards the bridge rath- 
er than Bladensburg, I held the position near the 
bridge as that which, under all circumstances, would 
enable me best to act against the enemy in any alter- 
native." 

Thus up to less than three hours before the begin- 
ning of the battle of Bladensburg, there was no cer- 
tainty among the four active American commanders — 
already mentioned, and of which later — as to the move- 
ment of the enemy. 

From the landing at Benedict, the objective of 
the enemy was believed by 

127 



Madison and Monroe to be Washington. 

Armstrong to be Baltimore. 

Winder to be Annapolis. 

But no one was sure. 

As the result of this uncertainty, it was attempted 
to protect three points, and also to guard three avenues 
of approach — by Bladensburg; by the Eastern Branch 
Bridge ; and from Fort Washington. And all knew — 
when too late — that the available force was not suffi- 
cient for one point. 

It is now our hard and unpleasant task to follow, 
for some days before the battle at Bladensburg, the 
two parts of that available force ; for we must do this 
to understand the physical and mental condition of the 
American forces that participated in the battle at 
Bladensburg. 

To begin our task, with the most competent guide 
— John S. Williams, "Brigade Major and Inspector, 
Columbian Brigade, in the War of 1812:" 

"The brigade of District militia under General 
Smith left the Capital in the afternoon of the 20th of 
August, taking the road for Nottingham, and halted 
for the night about four miles from the Eastern 
Branch." General Smith reported that they "were 
here overtaken by their baggage, when it was ascer- 
tained there was great deficiency of necessary camp 
equipage, the public stores being exhausted ; many 
of the troops were compelled to lie out in the open 
field ; and of the essential article of flints, upon a requi- 

128 



sition of one thousand, only two hundred could be 
had." The next day, which was Sunday, those troops, 
"after a hot and fatiguing march," as expressed by 
General Smith, arrived at "the Wood Yard, about fif- 
teen miles from Washington and twelve from Notting- 
ham." Here other troops were assembled ; and on 
this day, the 21st, Sunday, General Winder joined the 
force at the Wood Yard. 

At sunrise on Monday General Winder ordered 
a body of his best troops, about 800, "to proceed im- 
mediately to Nottingham, to meet the enemy," the rest 
of the force to follow and support. General Winder 
and his staff, "accompanied by Colonel Monroe," pro- 
ceeded in advance of the first body, "and upon arriv- 
ing within half a mile of the place where the road from 
Nottingham forks, they received intelligence that the 
enemy was moving in force towards the junction." At 
this time the advance body of American troops was 
about two miles from the junction and the rest about 
two miles in the rear. The American troops were or- 
dered to stop and select the best defensive positions. 
But Ross, who, on reaching the junction, had proceed- 
ed some distance on the road to the Wood Yard, after 
halting for an hour or more, took "the road to Marl- 
borough, thus renewing General Winder's uncertainty 
as to his purposes. In consequence, an order was giv- 
en for the whole force to retire, on the same road on 
which they had advanced, to a place called the Long 
or Battalion Old Fields, about eight miles from Wash- 

129 



ington. This movement in advance, therefore, result- 
ed in nothing but the fatigue and discouragement of 
the troops. It was judicious in General Winder to 
avoid an engagement, because his force was wholly 
insufficient. But that was known before the move- 
ment began; and if it was wise to retire, it certainly 
was unwise to have advanced."* 

When these troops had rejoined the others, left at 
the Wood Yard, the entire force "retired to encamp at 
the Long Old Fields," and, says Wilkinson, "like all 
retrograde movements in the face of an enemy, this 
disheartened the men and officers." 

As our object is to determine the condition of the 
forces in the battle at Bladensburg, it is proper for us 
to know that "Ross arrived at Marlborough about two 
o'clock in the afternoon of the 22d, and remained there 
until the same hour the next day, having abundant 
time to rest and refresh his troops, and being perfectly 
unmolested. They employed themselves in securing 
and sending off tobacco and other plunder." 

To rejoin our troops at Long Old Fields — very 
tired, very hot, ill equipped. 

Soon after the troops reached Long Old Fields, 
General Winder was informed that the President and 

cabinet had arrived at a house about a mile in the rear 

__^_ • 

*Wilkinson is not disposed to excuse any one, but he 
says, "if a fault was then committed, he (Winder) should not 
be held responsible, for he was attended by a minister of the 
cabinet (Monroe), an old soldier, by whose advice he was 
doubtless influenced." 

130 



of the camp. There is no record that this gave him 
any great joy and he certainly did not use any undue 
haste in calling on the distinguished meddlers. "He 
detached a captain's guard to their quarters, but was 
himself too much overwhelmed with business to wait 
upon the President until next morning." 

It will be recalled that General Winder had not 
been provided with any of the usual assistants, to han- 
dle details. He says: 

"After having waded through the infinite appli- 
cations, consultations, and calls necessarily arising 
from a body of 2,500 men, not three days from their 
homes, without organization, or any practical knowl- 
edge of service on the part of their officers, and being 
obliged to listen to the officious but well-intended in- 
formation and advice of the crowd, who, at such a 
time, would be full of both, I lay down to snatch a mo- 
ment of rest." 

But it could have been only "a moment of rest," 
for, "to add to the fatigue and discouragement" of the 
troops, they "were roused about 2 o'clock in the morn- 
ing of the 23rd by a false alarm from a sentinel, were 
formed in order of battle, and when dismissed, were 
ordered to hold themselves ready for their posts at a 
moment's warning. This was the second successive 
night they had been needlessly deprived of their rest. 
Shortly after daybreak orders were given to strike 
their tents, load the baggage-wagons, and have all in 
readiness to move in the course of an hour. The troops 

131 



were then got under arms, and were reviewed by the 
President and suite." 

The worn-out troops that we have been accompa- 
nying were "ordered to move in the direction of Marl- 
borough, reconnoitre the enemy, approach him as near 
as possible without running too much risk, and annoy 
him whether he should be stationary or in motion." 

General Winder led a troop towards Bladensburg, 
to confer with General Stansbury — of whom later — 
but after the troop had marched ten miles, in the hot 
August sun, it was called back by the intelligence con- 
veyed to Winder that the troops sent towards Marl- 
borough had skirmished with the enemy and been 
driven back, and were then halted within three miles 
of the Old Fields; and that all the troops at Old Fields 
were "drawn up ready to receive the enemy, should he 
make an attack." 

Marching in the vicinity of Washington, in Aug- 
ust, and standing in line, is not refreshing. Ross was 
at this time resting and refreshing his troops. 

The American troops were kept in line "until near 
sun-down !" It was then determined to retire across 
the Eastern Branch Bridge. Winder gives good reas- 
ons for this move — if the enemy had done certain 
things. There is good evidence that apprehension — 
and without cause — was the first reason, and there are 
grounds to believe this apprehension started in the 
farm house around which Winder had kept a captain's 
guard ! 

132 



One of the prominent citizens of Washington, a 
soldier in the American army, Mr. John Law, testified 
before the committee of congress : 

"Although our march in the retreat was extreme- 
ly rapid, yet orders were occasionally given to captains 
of companies to hurry on their men. The march, there- 
fore, literally became a run of eight miles ; and the 
propriety of this rapid movement, which unnecessarily 
fatigued and dispirited the men, may be tested by the 
fact that the main body of the enemy bivouacked that 
night on the Melwood estate, more than three miles 
distant from the ground we had left." 

These troops, retreating from a force about which 
they knew nothing definitely, moved hither and thith- 
er without regard to plan or reason so far as they 
could see, finally reached Washington at the close of 
the 23rd, worn out, poorly equipped, dispirited. Gen- 
eral Smith, the brigade commander, says that they, 
"much wearied and exhausted, encamped late at night" 
within the capital. He says — and being in command 
of the brigade, and an able soldier and trustworthy 
man, what he says may be considered as a correct and 
also conservative statement : 

"Thus terminated the four days of service of the 
troops of this district preceding the affair at Bladens- 
burg. They had been under arms, with but little in- 
termission, the whole of the time, both day and night ; 
had travelled, during their different marches in ad- 
vance and retreat, a considerable tract of country, ex- 

133 



posed to the burning heat of a sultry summer day, and 
many of them to the cold dews of the night, uncov- 
ered. They had, in this period, drawn but two ra- 
tions, the requisition therefor, in the first instance, be- 
ing but partially complied with, and it being after- 
wards almost impossible to procure the means of 
transportation, the wagons employed by our quarter- 
master for that purpose being constantly impressed by 
the government agents for the purpose of removing 
the public records, when the enemy's approach was 
known, and some of them thus seized while proceed- 
ing to take in provisions for the army. These hard- 
ships and privations could not but be severely distress- 
ing to men, the greater part of whom possessed and 
enjoyed at home the means of comfortable living, and 
from their usual habits and pursuits of life but ill qual- 
ified to endure them. They, however, submitted with- 
out murmuring, evincing by their patience, their zeal, 
and the promptitude with which they obeyed every or- 
der, a magnanimity highly honorable to their charac- 
ter. Great as was their merit in this respect, it was 
no less so in the spirit manifested whenever an order 
was given to march to meet the foe ; and at the Long 
Old Fields, where his attack was momentarily ex- 
pected in overwhelming force they displayed, in pres- 
ence of many spectators, although scarce any of them 
had ever been in action, a firmness, a resolution, and 
an intrepidity which, whatever might have been the 
result, did honor to their country." 

134 



These men were ready to fight. They wanted to 
fight. And whenever any of them had competent com- 
manders, they fought extremely well indeed, and in 
almost every case victoriously, although at times 
against great odds. The troops under General Smith 
did not complain when they were marched back and 
forth, beneath the broiling August sun of the vicinity 
of Washington, many of them without any shelter at 
night, and with, during the four days, only two ra- 
tions, one of them only a partial one! 

The memory of these men may well inspire our 
soldiers at any time. And we may be sure that at all 
times our troops will exhibit the same patience, forti- 
tude and courage — will be worthy of those that before 
them have fought under The Star Spangled Banner. 

The troops that encamped in Washington the 
night of the 23rd, were kept in uncertainty until eleven 
the next morning, when they were very hurriedly 
marched to the battlefield near Bladensburg — situated 
about six miles northeast of Washington. They reach- 
ed the battle-ground just as the action began and had 
scarcely time "to make a hasty selection of position." 

Doubtless the reader thinks that he has been read- 
ing of the troops that were most unfortunately treated. 
By no means! The Maryland militia, under General 
Tobias E. Stansbury, and which formed nearly all the 
first line at Bladensburg, were even worse treated. As 
to this, I can not do better than quote from General 
Stansbury's letter to the committee of congress that 

135 



investigated the destruction of the capitol : 

"On Saturday, August 20th, about one o'clock P. 
M., I received by express letter No. 1, directing me to 
move down with my whole force for Washington.* 

"I immediately issued orders for wagons to be 
procured, provisions served out, tents struck, and ev- 
erything prepared to march that evening. But the 
difficulty of obtaining wagons to transport tentsand 
camp equipage prevented my moving more than a part 
of the brigade this evening. The residue followed on 
the morning of the 21st. The advanced party camped 
at the Stag tavern ; the rear three miles short of it, on 
the evening of the 21st. 

"About 10 o'clock P. M. I received from General 
Winder by express letter No. 2, dated the 21st, direct- 
ing me to halt until further orders. August 22nd, at 
10 o'clock A. M., received from General Winder letter 
No. 3, dated at the Wood Yard the 21st, 10 o'clock P. 
M., directing me to advance with all speed to Bladens- 
burg. In consequence thereof, the line of march was 
taken up immediately, and at 7 o'clock P. M. we ar- 
rived at Bladensburg * * * * About 10 o'clock A. M. 
(the 23rd) received from General Winder letter No. 4, 
dated at Headquarters, Battalion Old Fields, August 
22nd, containing orders to march my brigade slowly 
toward Marlborough, and take a position on the road 
not far from that place. The brigade was instantly 

*At this time his brigade was encamped one and a half 
miles north of Baltimore. 

136 



put in motion, and the march commenced towards 
Marlborough. ***-** After proceeding about one 
mile on the road to Marlborough, I met Captain Moses 
Tabbs riding express to inform me that the enemy, 
with their whole force, had left Marlborough, and 
were on their march toward me, distant about six 
miles. This information made me determine to avail 
myself of the high grounds I occupied in the morning, 
to which I immediately returned, and made the neces- 
sary preparations to receive the enemy.* I directed 
Captain Tabbs to return and reconnoitre the enemy, 
and give me every information. About 4 o'clock P. M. 
he returned, and informed me that the enemy, on leav- 
ing Marlborough, had taken a different route. Soon 
after, my aid-de-camp, Major Woodyear, returned 
from General Winder, and informed me that the intel- 
ligence I had received of the movements of the enemy 
was in part incorrect, and that General Winder wished 
me to encamp on the direct road from Bladensburg 
to Marlborough, at about seven miles distant from the 
latter place. ***** By letter No. 4 I was first in- 
formed that Lieutenant-Colonel Sterett's detachment, 
were attached to my command. * * * * About sunset 
on the 23rd he (Sterett) arrived with his command. 
The fatigued condition of his troops induced me to 
halt for the night on the hill near Bladensburg, with 



*At this time he had a force of only 1,353, officers and 
men. The British force was reported at this time to be from 
7,000 to 10,000 men. 

137 



the intention of moving toward Marlborough at re- 
veille on the 24th. At about 8 o'clock P. M. a militia 
captain * * * came into camp, and informed me he 
was from General Winder's camp at Battalion Old 
Fields * * * * that a detachment from the army had 
skirmished that day with the British. * * * * About 
11 o'clock P. M. the Secretary of State, Colonel Mon- 
roe, with several gentlemen, came to my tent * * * * 
and advised vigilance to prevent surprise. Soon after 
the departure of Colonel Monroe, the advance pick- 
ets, on the road by which we expected the enemy, and 
which was the direct one from Marlborough, fired, and 
in a few moments my whole command was under arms 
and prepared for action. * * * * The troops were un- 
der arms until after 2 A. M. of the 24th, when, being 
advised by the cavalry that the enemy were not near, 
I ordered them to retire to their tents, but to be ready 
to turn out at a moment's notice. * * * * About half 
after 2 o'clock A. M., Major Bates came to me from 
Washington, with a message from General Winder in- 
forming me that General Winder had retreated from 
Battalion Old Fields into the city of Washington. 
* * * ** Thus was my expectation of security from 
the Battalion and river roads cut off, my right flank 
and rear uncovered, and liable to be attacked and 
turned. * * * * Orders were instantly given to strike 
tents and prepare to march, and in about thirty min- 
utes, without noise or confusion, the whole were in 
motion, and about half past 3 o'clock in the morn- 

138 



ing passed the bridge at Bladensburg leading to the 
city of Washington. Securing our rear from surprise, 
we halted in the road until the approach of day, with 
a view of rinding some place where water could be had, 
in order that the men might cook their provisions. 
The provisions consisted of salt beef in inferior quali- 
ty, the flour old and musty. At daylight I moved on to 
the foot of a hill near a brick-yard, and there ordered 
the troops to refresh themselves. This was about one 
and one-half miles from Bladensburg. Early in the 
morning, I had dispatched Major Goodyear to Wash- 
ington to inform General Winder of my movements 
and situation, of the exhausted state of the troops, and 
the impracticability of their meeting the enemy, in 
their present fatigued state. * * * A note was pre- 
sented to me by an express from General Winder 
* * * * directing me to oppose the enemy as long as 
I could. * * * * I called a council of war ***** 
Colonel Sterett observed that he marched from Balti- 
more with a determination to defend the city; that his 
men, the day before, by a forced march, reached Blad- 
ensburg without halting to cook ; that they had been 
under arms nearly the whole of the night, without 
sleep or food ; that Major Pinkney's riflemen, and the 
twj companies of artillery, were in the same situation; 
that they were so completely worn down and exhaust- 
ed that he would consider it a sacrifice of both men 
and officers to seek the enemy. ***** At this mo- 
ment Major Woody ear returned from Washington, 

139 



with positive orders from General Winder to give the 
enemy battle at Bladensburg. * * * * I immediately 
ordered the troops to retrace their steps to Bladens- 
burg, determined to maintain, if possible, the ground 
at all hazards." 

It was these troops, marched and counter- 
marched, forward and back, all the day and through 
the night, not an hour for rest, much less sleep, "their 
only provision salt beef of an inferior quality, and old 
and musty flour, and no time to cook that," marched 
and marched back again in the morning, ready to drop 
from hunger and fatigue, that two or three hours later 
had to meet the British I* 

What was the physical condition, and resultant 
morale, of the opposing forces? 

During the three days after the British army land- 
ed at Benedict they advanced only fifteen miles and 

*Possibly Laval's cavalry suffered most of all. It was 
on constant duty, reconnoitering, patrolling and escorting 
"from the afternoon of the 21st until 11 at night of the 23rd, 
when it reached the Eastern Branch Bridge, 'both men 
and horses hungry and harassed with fatigue,' and remained 
in that condition until the next morning. They then suc- 
ceeded in procuring a stack of hay, and the men were in the 
act of fetching it on their heads to feed their famished horses, 
when the trumpet sounded, and they were compelled to drop 
it and mount, a number of the horses being unable to pro- 
ceed." Yet the cavalry managed to reach the battle ground 
before the battle of Bladensburg, and they "seem to have 
been considered as a part of the first line." Laval, a French- 
man and an officer of experience, stated, in his account to the 
congressional committee, that his men were unable to make 
a charge: "the men, from fatigue and hunger, hardly able to 
sit their horses, or the horses to move." 

140 



rested quietly each night. Williams says that they 
took time "to amuse themselves during the day by 
plundering the country bordering on their line of march, 
and to regale themselves on the summer fruits and 
melons." A Subaltern in America says of the troops 
landed at Benedict that some were "lying at full length 
upon the grass, basking in the beams of a sultry sun, 
and apparently made happy by the very feeling of the 
green sod under them. Others were running and leap- 
ing about." Speaking of them later, after the night 
spent at Marlborough, he says : "Fresh, and in excel- 
lent spirits, we rose next morning, and, having stood 
the usual time with our men, began to consider how 
we should most profitably and agreeably spend the 
day. * * *The attacks which they from time to time 
made upon farm-yards and pig-styes were, to a certain 
degree at least, allowable enough. It would have been 
unreasonable to expect that hungry soldiers, in an en- 
emy's country, would sit down to digest their hunger, 
while flocks of poultry and herds of swine were within 
their reach. And then with respect to tobacco, that 
principal delicacy of soldiers upon active service, 
there was no reasonable cause for scarcity or com- 
plaint." The Subaltern in more than one page of his 
interesting history, details the moves made by officers 
and men to keep their stomachs well filled with the 
delicacies of the countryside. The stores of preserves 
were especially relished and more than one respectable 
wine cellar was discovered. Sustenance was so abund- 

141 



ant that "the quarter-master arriving soon after the 
halt with stores of bread and rum, an additional al- 
lowance of both was served out, as well to the men as 
to the officers. " 

The British army felt itself secure. It had, during 
one night, at least, no pickets, though Winder and his 
army were only a few miles away. Of its nights be- 
tween landing and the battle at Bladensburg, all but 
the last afforded a full night's comfortable rest (for 
this army was well equipped) "with nothing to dis- 
turb their repose and self-complacency." The night 
of the 23rd was the only one that did not give them 
long repose — Ross put them in motion the morning of 
the-24th some time before four o'clock. But that was to 
avoid marching in the heat of the day. Always they 
marched slowly — while our troops were hurried back 
and forth ; always they were complacent and con- 
temptuously indifferent — while our troops were kept 
in uncertainty and apprehension; always they rested 
during the day and reposed comfortably at night — 
while our troops lay in the open, and were not allowed 
one full night's undisturbed rest ; always they had full 
rations and even more — while our troops got less than 
two rations in four days. 



142 



J 



10. 



THREE COMMANDERS TOO MANY. 

We have seen that the American troops were 
marched and counter-marched, day after day and also 
night after night, and when not marching were often 
kept standing in the ranks; and during all this had 
only partial rations, of poor quality — at times none at 
all ; in fact, were handled, not as any good strategy or 
commonsense would have dictated, but clearly with- 
out settled plan or purpose, and certainly in a way 
that outraged all military rules and all intelligence and 
commonsense. If the British commander of the in- 
vading forces had been allowed to specify what should 
be done with and to the American troops, he could 
hardly have conceived — for he was an intelligent mili- 
tary man — of anything that would have been so favor- 
able to him as the very things that were done. If 
those responsible for the movements and treatment of 
the American troops assembling and assembled to 
meet the British Chesapeake expedition had endeavor- 
ed to do that which would be the most helpful to the 

143 



British, they could hardly have succeeded better. But 
the British commanders can not be blamed for the out- 
rage perpetrated on our troops, for what was done 
was so incredibly stupid and vicious that it never oc- 
curred to the British that anything of the sort was be- 
ing done! 

On whom, then, must the blame rest? There is a 
great and somewhat stinking mess of conflicting state- 
ments and so-called evidence. This mess leaves some 
things in doubt, but it makes it plain that the blame 
must rest on these four: 

Armstrong, Secretary of War — the most. 
- Monroe, Secretary of State — next. 

Madison, President and Commander-in-Chief. 

Winder, Commander under the preceding — the 
least. 

We have been advised in the preceding chapter 
of the arrival of the President and members of his 
cabinet at Long Old Fields the evening of August 
22nd. Unfortunately this was not the beginning and 
by no means the end of the meddling, and most unin- 
telligent meddling, of Madison, Monroe and Arm- 
strong. They were "in the field" during the two days 
before the battle, and, what was yet far more unfortu- 
nate, they were on the field the day of the battle ! 

Williams says in his most enlightening volume : 

"The President of the United States is, by the 
highest law of the land, commander-in-chief of the 
army and navy; and President Madison was actually 

144 



in the field and exercising command. The Secretary 
of War is the channel of communication from the 
President to all officers of the army, high and low, and 
any suggestion or request from him is equivalent to 
an order. Secretary Armstrpng was also in the field, 
and in addition to the authority of his official position, 
he was considered by many, and certainly considered 
h'.mself, to possess profound military science, as well 
as some military experience. Colonel Monroe, the 
Secretary of State, from the outset took an active in- 
terest and share in the practical operation of the cam- 
paign. General Winder was under the immediate 
personal supervision of these high functionaries, all 
much older than himself, and he, instead of having the 
prestige of a high military reputation to support him 
in case of difference of opinion, had yet a reputation 
to achieve." 

The National Intelligencer, the Washington pa- 
per that existed almost altogether to advance the po- 
litical interests of the administration, said in its issue 
of August 30th : 

"The President of the United States was not only 
active during the engagement which took place with 
the enemy, but had been exerting himself two or three 
days previous, and has been personally active ever 
since. Everyone joins in attributing to him the great- 
est merit." 

That is interesting as showing the very low depth 
145 



to which journalistic and political flunkeyism could 
reach at that time. 

The miscalled exertions of the President, very 
nearly altogether verbal, during the two or three days 
before the battle will have brief, and adequate, treat- 
ment later. As for his activities on the day of the 
battle, they also will have mention in a later chapter. 

With Madison — Monroe — Armstrong — Winder all 
active in the field, any result except victory was pos- 
sible and no result that was discreditable could be sur- 
prising. 

The first and most essential requisite of all milita- 
ry movements is the authority and direction of one 
mind and will. In his instructions to his generals, 
Frederick the Great quotes and endorses the saying of 
Prince Eugene that "a general who wishes to avoid a 
battle need only call a council of war." 

The most blame is put upon General Armstrong 
because, as Secretary of War, his duty was plain, was 
defined, and it was urgent — to do what he could to 
make the military forces of the United States more 
than a match for those of the enemy. Instead of doing 
what he could he did more nearly as little as he could. 
His stubbornness has been referred to : he would not 
believe that Washington was in any danger. He 
treated with discourtesy those that, intelligently and 
rightly apprehensive, sought to have him take proper 
measures for defense. Instead of acting promptly and 

146 



with vigor, he was both feeble and dilatory in the lit- 
tle that he did. His stubbornness was not the only 
reason for his attitude, and in justice to him this other 
reason, referred to in a previous chapter, should be 
mentioned. He had recommended for the post given 
General Winder (and, as we have seen, if not for po- 
litical reasons, at least the reasons of the politician) 
Brigadier-General Moses Porter, an experienced, tried, 
and rather able commander. General Armstrong was 
very much chagrined that General Porter was not put 
in command of the American forces in the vicinity of 
Washington, and he had a right to be. In the summer 
of 1814, the 5th Military District, which included the 
District of Columbia, Maryland and Virginia, was 
commanded by General Porter. It would have aroused 
too much public criticism to have removed him or to 
have put General Winder over him; hence out of his 
district was carved the new 10th Military District. It 
was freely said and written, especially during the con- 
troversy over the burning of the capitol, and appar- 
ently no real effort was ever made to disprove it, that 
Colonel Monroe was responsible for the 10th Military 
District and Winder, and for this reason: It would 
not do to allow a commanding general to get such 
glory from a victory over the British that he could 
aspire to the nomination for the Presidency; hence a 
really able commander, especially if his record were 
such that the troops would have in him that confidence 
that is such an important influence for victory, would 

147 



be too dangerous. Further, Colonel Monroe intended 
to be active on the field of battle — and apparently both 
he and Madison thought at the time that when it oc- 
curred the battle would be a victory for our forces — 
and he hoped and expected to get no small glory from 
his part in the battle ;* but that would be impossible 
if General Porter were in command, for such was his 
repute as a commander that Colonel Monroe could not 
hope possibly to shine very brilliantly with him on the 
field ; especially as Porter was an exceedingly blurT 
old soldier that probably would not stand for any in- 
terference or other nonsense. It is certain that Gen- 
eral Armstrong urgently recommended that General 
Porter be called from his headquarters at Norfolk, 
which he "had made impregnable to any force which 
the enemy could bring against it," and be given the 
immediate task of organizing and equipping an army 
that, under his command, would meet and defeat the 
invaders. It is equally certain that when General 
Armstrong found that his recommendation would not 
be heeded he, on one occasion, at least, did the grace- 
ful thing, and signed the order for the creation of the 
10th Military District ; and he did this although it did 
not correctly state the reasons for the creation of the 

*The eyes of the whole people would be upon the defend- 
ers of Washington; a brilliant volunteer achievement, accom- 
plished without the orders acknowledged of the commanding 
general, would win for him the hearts of his countrymen, and 
render his future elevation sure. — Capture of Washington by 
Williams. 

148 



district. It has been suggested that the reason for this 
was General Armstrong's desire to obtain the nomina- 
tion for the Presidency and therefore his disposi- 
tion to do what would please the President; but this 
surely does him an injustice. He could, and, at times, 
he did, show a broad, generous spirit. Thus, in his 
Memoirs, written after the War of 1812, and "when cer- 
tainly he had reason to think bitterly of the events of 
that War, and of the blame unjustly put on him for 
"the Invasion of the City of Washington," he writes 
dispassionately and fairly of the appointment of Gen- 
eral Winder and of his (Armstrong's) desire to have 
General Porter appointed, and adds: "No objection to 
General Winder, except a want of military experience, 
either was or could be made ; his patriotism and cour- 
age had already been tested, and were generally ac- 
knowledged." 

Armstrong might have been more receptive, alert, 
prompt and energetic in doing his part to provide a 
force adequate to meet the British army if General 
Porter had been in immediate command of that force. 
But the fact can not be gainsaid that as Secretary of 
War in his office in Washington he fell far short of his 
full duty. He was stubbornly blind and inactive. 

Yet even greater blame may properly be put on 
him because he left his office in Washington and, like 
Madison and Monroe, journeyed to Long Old Fields 
August 22nd. His object, as was the object of Mon- 
roe, was to get more in the public eye, to be more 

149 



prominent in the military operations, to get a greater 
portion of the glory — it actually appears that victory, 
rather than defeat, was expected ! Monroe was much 
less culpable than Armstrong, for the duties of the 
Secretary of State at that time did not confine him 
closely to Washington. It was very different as re- 
gards the Secretary of War. With an army to be as- 
sembled, organized, equipped and properly officered, 
the proper place for the Secretary of War could be 
only in his office in the city of Washington, for only 
there could he transact the heavy and important busi- 
ness that it was imperative he should transact to do 
his work as Secretary of War. In his office at Wash- 
ington he would be sought by those that had business 
to transact with him ; there were the records, assist- 
ants, aids and means essential to the transaction of his 
urgent business. 

Armstrong was much to blame for neglecting the 
business of the Secretary of War while he was in 
Washington; he was more to blame for deserting his 
office and his business altogether. The proper place 
for the Secretary of War, who is an executive, not a 
commander, is in his office, and not in the field. In the 
field he can do only one of two things — interfere or, 
more happily, nothing. And in the field he can not 
possibly escape the neglect of his proper work. For 
whatever reason he leaves his office he condemns him- 
self as not a good Secretary of War. Armstrong must 
bear most of the blame for the failure at Bladensburg 

150 



because of his inefficiency while in Washington and 
even more because he left Washington. 

Monroe is blamed more than Madison because he 
was useless while he hindered as much and meddled 
even more — especially on the field, at Bladensburg — 
and he had even less excuse for meddling. As for use- 
fulness, General Wilkinson gives the following ac- 
count, which he says he had from "an officer of charac- 
ter, rank, and intelligence," and there is abundant oth- 
er evidence to corroborate : 

"During the morning of the 24th I was repeatedly 
in the tent of General Winder, where I found the Pres- 
ident, the Secretaries of War and of the Navy, and the 
Attorney-general assembled, to deliberate on the state 
of things and aid the general (Winder) with their coun- 
sel. Observing no privacy in their deliberations, the in- 
terest I took in the public welfare prompted me to in- 
trude some of my own ideas, more especially as a pal- 
pably erroneous opinion appeared to prevail that the 
enemy would approach by that bridge, and that the 
troops ought therefore to be detained where they were 
to defend it. I felt anxious they should move to Blad- 
ensburg early, and unite with the militia which had 
arrived from Baltimore, because it would require a 
great deal of time to post the men advantageously, and 
to communicate the orders and instructions how to 
act, according to the various chances and events of 
battle. It seemed mere folly to expect the enemy by 
way of the bridge, where a dozen men, with half an 

151 



hour's notice, by destroying it, might arrest their pro- 
gress. General Armstrong suggested they might lay 
a bridge of pontoons; I answered, it was impossible; 
to which he replied, with a sneer, that the word impos- 
sible was not to be found in the military vocabulary. 
The mere belief that an army, certainly short of 7 
or 8,000 men, destitute, as we knew them to be, of 
horses to transport their artillery and baggage could, 
notwithstanding, contrive to carry an equipage of pon- 
toons sufficient for laying a bridge across a river near- 
ly half a mile wide, demonstrated that General Arm- 
strong's knowledge of pontoon bridges extended not 
much beyond the name. 

"The conversation at General Winder's quarters 
during the morning was rather desultory ; first one 
suggestion was made and commented on, and then an- 
other ; no idea seemed to be entertained that it was 
necessary to come instantly to a decision how we 
should act, and to set immediately about it. When I 
mentioned the certainty of the enemy approaching by 
the route of Bladensburg in preference to the bridge, 
and the expediency of taking post there without fur- 
ther delay, I observed my opinion to produce some 
effect on the mind of the President ; by the others it 
was not much regarded." 

The reader is advised to read the quotation again, 
considering carefully all the points therein, being care- 
ful to keep in mind that the British forces had landed 
a few miles away the 18th, that they had been in that 

152 



neighborhood for six days, and that at the headquar- 
ters of the commanding general the morning of the 
day of the battle of Bladensburg there was no definite 
knowledge of the numbers of the British force ; of its 
movements, although it had been on the march since 
three o'clock that morning: only the sheerest conjec- 
tures of its destination — and they wrong; no plan of 
action decided on, or even being seriously considered, 
and no disposition to prompt, energetic action ; all was 
"desultory!" 

Mr. Rush, the Attorney-General, in his letter to 
the committee of congress to investigate "the Invasion 
of the City of Washington," said of this morning of 
August 24th at General Winder's headquarters : 

"I there found the President, General Winder 
and two or three military officers. The Secretary of 
State, I understood, had previously been there, 
but had gone on to Bladensburg. The Secretary of the 
Navy came into the room not long afterwards. The 
conversation turned upon the route by which it was 
thought most likely the enemy would make his ap- 
proach. It was interrupted by dragoons, who had 
been on scouts, coming in every few minutes with 
their reports. The preponderance of opinion, at this 
period, I took it to be, that he would be most likely to 
move in a direction toward the Potomac, with a view 
to possess himself of Fort Warburton (Fort Washing- 
ton) in the first instance. This way of thinking in- 
duced, as I supposed, General Winder to retain a large 

153 



portion of his force in the neighborhood of the East- 
ern Branch Bridge, in preference to moving it on to- 
wards Bladensburg. * * * * After the lapse of prob- 
ably an hour from the time I reached headquarters, an 
express arrived from General Stansbury, commanding 
the Baltimore troops at Bladensburg, rendering it at 
length certain that the British army was advancing in 
that direction. General Winder immediately put his 
troops in motion, and marched off with them for Blad- 
ensburg. 

"When he had left the house, the Secretary of 
War, in company with the Secretary of the Treasury, 
arrived there. The President mentioned to the for- 
mer the information which had just been received, at 
the same time asking him whether, as it was probable 
a battle would soon be brought on, he had any advice 
or plan to offer upon the occasion. He replied, that 
he had not. He added that, as it was to be between 
regulars and militia, the latter would be beaten. All 
who were in the house then came out, the Secretary 
of War getting on his horse to go to Bladensburg." 

Major Williams observes that "it appears, there- 
fore, that General Armstrong went, or rather was or- 
dered, to Bladensburg for the purpose of making exer- 
tions to falsify his own prediction as to the result. 
He had to choose between endeavoring to save his rep- 
utation as a military man and his credit as a prophet, 
and the latter was certainly the easier task of the two." 

It was, when the destruction of the capital was a 
154 



live topic, rather freely insinuated that Armstrong 
found his vindication as a prophet not only the easier 
task, but the more agreeable task. The manuscript 
papers of President Madison showed that on the 23rd 
and 24th of August the President and the Secretary of 
War had very little direct communication with each 
other, that there was great reserve between them, and 
that Armstrong told the truth when he wrote of the 
moment of departure from Winder's headquarters for 
Bladensburg: "I again met the President, who told 
me that he had come to a new determination, and that 
the military functionaries should be left to the dis- 
charge of their duties, on their own responsibility. I 
now became, of course, a mere spectator of the com- 
bat." 

To sum up : The Secretary of War offered no plan 
of campaign; doubtless he had none ; and if he had had 
one, the probabilities are that he would not have di- 
vulged it, as he did not desire to do anything to aid 
General Winder, who had been appointed contrary to 
his wishes. Further, no one else — President, Secre- 
tary of State, Winder or any one else in authority — 
had any plan. All were most excellent Micawbers, 
waiting for something to turn up. Even as late as 
after nine o'clock of the morning of the 24th there was 
the same indifference, the same lassitude, the same 
lack of information, the same lack of plan and of ac- 
tion, the same hesitancy, vacillation, inefficiency, as 

155 



well as of common sense and military intelligence, that 
there had been since the War began.* 

Was a successful plan of campaign against the 
British force possible? Yes — easy and certain. Of that 
in another chapter. Was Armstrong right — must mili- 
tia always be defeated by regulars? Let Plattsburg and 
New Orleans answer. If Macomb or Jackson or Har- 
rison had been in command of the 10th Military Dis- 
trict ; if the Secretary of War had been competent for 
his place and had stayed where he could do his work and 
had done it, instead of seeking publicity by being with 
the army ; and if Madison and Monroe had kept away, 
the British under Ross would have been grievously 
defeated. But ifs, even an array of them, do not win 
battles. 

The least blame is placed on General Winder be- 
cause all the evidence is that he did his very best, and 
had from no one in position to give him real aid near 
the help that he had a right to expect. There is abund- 
ant evidence, some of which appears in this book, that 
he labored hard during the day and late into the night, 
that he travelled from place to place, that he made the 
greatest exertions, to assemble, equip and put into 
shape an efficient force ; and everywhere he met with 
indifference and procrastination, if not actual opposi- 
tion — none the less actual because often covert. Yet 



*Only Winder and Monroe displayed physical energy 
and activity. Monroe was active because, most of all, he 
wished to be President. 

156 



further, as is made plain from what has preceded in 
this chapter, for days before the battle and even on the 
day of battle, he was under the eye and direction of 
the President and Commander-in-Chief, the Secretary 
of War, and Colonel Monroe — all three his superiors, 
and two of them regarding themselves as men of much 
greater military ability. As Brigade-Major Williams 
observes, "General Winder was the commanding gen- 
eral in little more than name, and that his movements 
were influenced, if not actually dictated, by his super- 
visors, who were neither in harmony among them- 
selves, nor consistent any one with himself, and one of 
whom, General Armstrong, was not likely, from his 
self-willed and resentful disposition, to be over-zealous 
in his efforts to produce a result which would justify 
Mr. Madison's selection of General Winder instead 
of General Porter as the commanding-general." 



157 



11. 



STRATEGY AND TACTICS. 

In the preceding chapter it was asserted that a 
successful plan of campaign against the British force 
that burned the capitol could have been devised and 
executed. 

The total American force at the battle of Bladens- 
burg was 5,435 — 4410 militia, 380 regulars, 125 dra- 
goons, 400 sailors and 120 marines. The British force 
was 3,540, all regulars. 

In addition to the troops actually at or near Blad- 
ensburg, as enumerated in the preceding paragraph, 
there were other troops that should have been em- 
ployed. There was a brigade of 500 militia and vol 
unteers, which included a company of cavalry. They 
cwere unusually efficient for militia and volunteers. 
They reported to General Winder August 18th. The 
only use made of them was to defend the approach to 
Fort Washington — no real use at all. Also, a regiment 
of Virginia militia, 600 infantry and 100 cavalry, but 
they could not get arms until August 24th, after the 

158 



battle of Bladensburg! And about 500 additional 
troops, including about 200 cavalry, in several small 
bodies. 

The battles of Plattsburg and New Orleans show 
that, rightly used, the American troops would have 
defeated the British. 

Not in a pitched battle; not in any one battle un- 
less the militia had some protection or cover — and 
which they easily could have had when the time ar- 
rived. 

What, then, should have been the strategy, the 
plan of campaign, of the Americans? 

For a time, at least, the very opposite of that 
which is generally the best strategy. 

It is a military axiom that "He who divides his 
force will be beaten in detail." The corollary was ex- 
pressed by that master of strategy, Bonaparte, who 
said that "the whole art of war consists in being the 
strongest on a given point."* Another authority has 
said that the object of strategy should be always "to 
operate a combined effort with the greatest possible 
mass of force upon the decisive point." Another mili- 
tary maxim is, Divide et impera — Divide and conquer. 
It is axiomatic, and applies to many things other than 
war, and it is older and more fundamental than any 
scientific warfare. Another authority, Frederick, said 
that "the talent of a great captain consists in inducing 
theTenemy to divide his forces." It might be added that 

*Count de Segur's Campaign in Russia, book VII, chap. 8. 
159 



generally the efforts of the great strategist will be to 
compel the enemy to divide his forces — will be to di- 
vide the forces of the enemy. This was one-half of the 
favorite strategy of Bonaparte. The other half was to 
strike with all his force. It was the secret of his suc- 
cess from Montenotte to Ligny. Two days after Lig- 
ny he ignored his favorite strategy while Wellington 
succeeded late in the day in completing this strategy 
and the result was Waterloo. One of the very great- 
est commanders the United States has ever produced, 
General "Stonewall" Jackson, said that right strategy 
was "getting there fust with the mostest men."* As 
pointed out in The Battle of Plattsburg, the Platts- 
burg expedition and also the New Orleans expedition 
was founded on the strategy to divide the forces of the 
enemy. It was this same strategy which resulted in 
"the Father of Waters" flowing "unvexed to the sea." 
Sherman's March to the Sea was dictated by it. It has 
been the rule of all great commanders to strike with 
superior force — superior in number, or equipment, or 
training and experience, or morale — at the vital point ; 
and nearly all successful campaigns have been the re- 
sult of this. 

But there are properly exceptions to every rule, 

*Some have actually concluded that because Jackson 
used this language he was uneducated and used only such 
language! Like most very serious and religious men, Jack- 
son had a keen, subtle sense of humor; and he also knew that 
a great truth may often be made more effective by pictur- 
esque or peculiar expression. 

160 



and some of the most successful campaigns have been 
because a commander had the daring and resource to 
go contrary to the rule just discussed. Perhaps the 
best example of such a campaign is found in Bona- 
parte's invasion of Russia in 1812. The Russian gen- 
erals avoided a decisive battle ; they divided and re- 
treated, but harassed and nagged, while detachments 
bit at the French-and-allies army like stinging insects 
— Bonaparte ravaged Lithunia, but all the time swarms 
of Cossacks hung on his flanks and in Lithunia alone 
he lost more than 100,000 soldiers — dead of disease 
and hardship, but many killed or captured by the 
harassing parties of Russians. It was this that laid 
the foundation of Leipzig little more than a year later. 
It was this strategy — avoidance of a pitched battle and 
the constant harassment of mobile parties taking all 
advantage of every natural feature of the theatre of 
operations — that should have opposed the British that 
landed at Benedict and which doubtless would have 
been successful. 

This strategy was urged, but it was ignored. It 
was freely charged that it was ignored, and a pitched 
battle was insisted on, because not the proper strategy 
but a pitched battle would allow of the spectacular per- 
formance on the field of battle of a certain aspirant for 
the Presidency — a performance that would not only 
advance him toward the coveted nomination, but 
would also add to the prestige and popularity of the 
national administration. 

161 



Doubtless there was some good reason for this 
charge. But it is nearer the truth to say that no one 
connected with the movements of the American forces 
— from Madison to Winder* and beyond, had any plan 
of campaign or any strategy whatever. (Armstrong 
would be excepted, but he really had no voice in deter- 
mining those movements). Williams says, referring 
to the conferences in which the President took the lead 
and his expressed notions about certain military mat- 
ters, that it appeared that the Secretary of War and 
others were to "leave strategic operations to be deter- 
mined by the President in cabinet, aided by lights de- 
rived from Grotius and Puffendorff, instead of Lloyd, 
Tempelhoff, and Jomini." 

In another place Williams, a soldier of ability and 
experience, with a record always creditable, and in 
1814 "Brigade Major and Inspector, Columbian Brig- 
ade" (District of Columbia troops) says: 

"There is no treatise on strategy which can provide 
for all the circumstances of a general's position, and 
no one has acknowledged this more fully and frankly 
than Jomini himself. * * * * Nevertheless, the art of 
war has been reduced to certain fixed rules, and there 
is such a science as strategy, the principles of which 
are not to be despised because they are not infallible. 

*A letter that Winder wrote to Armstrong a few days 
after he was appointed to the command of the 10th District, 
rather feebly points out the right strategy; but apparently 
Winder dropped it at once and during August had neither 
strategy nor plan. 

162 






And the plan of harassing the enemy recommended by- 
General Armstrong and General Wilkinson, though it 
made detachments necessary, so far from being 
against the principles of the art of war, was in perfect 
conformity with them. Writers on the art of war rec- 
ommend, and common sense dictates, that the weaker 
of two belligerents should, as a rule, resort to harass- 
ing guerilla warfare rather than to pitched battles, 
more particularly against an invading enemy." 

Williams says that "this is the plan emphatically 
dictated by Lloyd, whom Jomini seems disposed to 
regard as the father of modern strategy." He quotes 
also General Rognat, as saying in his Considerations 
sur 1'Art de la Guerre, "Les bons principes de la guerre 
defensive veulent qu' au lieu de s'opposer de front a 
une armee envahissante qui cherche a penetrer dans 
Tinterieur d'un pays, on se place sur ses flancs, etc." 
But Williams goes on to say that Winder had not the 
means of pursuing the course recommended by Rog- 
nat — hanging on the enemy's flanks — and rear — and 
harassing him by multiplied attacks, because "such a 
plan of war requires experienced troops, or, at the 
least, men accustomed to the use of arms, to danger, 
and fatigue;" and he quotes Jomini, "il n'y a que de 
troupes legeres qui puissent remplir cet objet" — only 
light troops can accomplish this object.* And Wil- 

*The author's translation. And as an American by birth 
and long inheritance he would be indeed content to know 
only the language of the United States if he could always 
use it correctly — and forcibly in advocacy of military pre- 
paredness. 

163 



Hams quotes Jomini further that the light troops must 
be well trained, and not those that "manquaient en- 
tierement d'activite, et n'avaient rein de leger que le 
nonV' — lack training altogether and are light troops 
only in name.* Williams says that Jomini "probably 
would not have considered either raw militia or sailors 
with 18-pounders as fulfilling the necessary condi- 
tions." Yet he immediately goes on to say that "the 
petite guerre, therefore, recommended by General 
Armstrong and General Wilkinson, appears to be in 
perfect conformity with theory." 

Let us look, therefore, a little into the petite 
guerre, the flank attacks, the harassing guerilla war- 
fare, recommended by Armstrong and Wilkinson, and 
rejected by Madison and Monroe. 

Then we will briefly consider if the force that 
could have been put at the disposal of Winder — more, 
the force that was put at his disposal — was inadequate 
and unfitted for such warfare. 

Armstrong quoted "a high authority" that "mul- 
tiplying small attacks, made by day and by night, on 
the camp-guards, detachments, and communications 
of an enemy, will greatly retard his progress, dimin- 
ish his strength, and, not improbably exhaust his pa- 
tience." That General Armstrong and especially 
General Wilkinson** advocated this strategy was well 

*The author's translation. 

**Wilkinson was always much more successful than 
Armstrong in making himself heard. 

164 



known, especially in Washington, and naturally 
enough some supposed that this strategy would be 
employed. Thus Mr. Campbell, in his letter to the 
committee oi' congress, wrote: 

"It appears to have been expected that, in case our 
force was not considered sufficient to meet and repulse 
the enemy on his landing, his advance would be op- 
posed, and his progress, at least, retarded, as far as 
practicable, by harassing him on his march, erecting 
defensive works at suitable positions, and throwing 
such other obstructions in his way as was best calcu- 
lated to check his movements ; for all which operations 
the nature of the country through which he must pass 
was said to be favorable. * * * * Falling in conver- 
sation with the Secretary of War on this subject, I ex- 
pressed my apprehensions that suffering the enemy to 
approach so near as to make the fate of the city de- 
pend on a single battle ***** was hazarding too 
much. He appeared to concur in this opinion * * * * 
he gave me to understand that the movements which 
had taken place were not in pursuance of any plan or 
advice given by him." This was the evening of August 
23rd. 

That "the nature of the country through which" 
the enemy "must pass was said to be favorable" for the 
operations advised by Armstrong and Wilkinson was 
an over-cautious statement — they were favorable. This 
was considered very important by both Armstrong 
and Wilkinson. They recommended the guerilla war- 

165 



fare, not only because sound strategy indicated it, but 
because the nature of the country favored it. The 
country was cut up by numerous deep ravines separat- 
ed by ridges and hills and covered with timber, in 
many places exceedingly dense, as so vividly shown 
by A Subaltern in America. These ravines ran in many 
directions — often at right angles to the line of march 
of the British and at times parallel. This, of course, 
was true of the ridges also. The reader knows that 
such a terrain is especially well adapted to guerilla 
warfare. It was doubly suitable to warfare conducted 
by such troops as Winder had. They were accustomed 
to the woods, though they may have lived in Balti- 
more or Washington. They were "woods wise." The 
British were not. Then the greater part of the troops 
Winder had were militia and it had been well demon- 
strated that they would fight well when they had some 
protection, some cover. It will be recalled that Wash- 
ington noted this in his letter to Reed. Macomb knew 
this, and after the first day his absolutely raw militia 
and volunteers fought well because they had the cover 
of the woods or of stone walls. They fought well 
September 12th, because they had not only the cover 
of the woods, but the planks from the bridges across 
the Saranac had been made into barricades, and while 
the militia and volunteers had been harassing Prevost 
on the flanks, the regulars and others had been com- 
pleting redoubts and other protective works.* Jackson 

*See The Battle of Plattsburg. 
166 



knew militia thoroughly and won at New Orleans be- 
cause he gave his troops cover, protection. The forces 
under Winder, posted on the ridges and hills to attack 
the flanks of the British, would have had excellent 
cover, a protection they were familiar with and would 
have appreciated ; and when it became advisable or 
necessary for them to retire they could have done so 
safely along a ravine, under cover of the woods. Wil- 
kinson has told with great detail just where each de- 
tachment would have been stationed and by what 
route it would have retired ; he names or locates each 
hill, ridge, ravine or road, and gives the number of 
troops, and the name aPnd character of the detachment 
that should have been placed at each point. We are 
not interested in these details ; and to understand them 
fully one would need not only maps, but probably also 
a personal knowledge of the localities. What is im- 
portant is that although Wilkinson had many enemies 
and they never wearied of attacking him, they were 
never able to show that his strategy was not much 
better than that which was employed — rather, than 
the hit or miss lack of strategy. And this makes it 
proper to take three extracts from his Memoirs — 
enough to give a correct idea of the strategy he advo- 
cated. It is proper to say that Wilkinson produced 
witnesses that could not be impeached to prove that 
he had advocated this strategy and had formulated 
plans of defense days and weeks before August 2-1 — 
very early in July, if not in June. But to quote Wil- 

kmson: ,,- 

16/ 



"Here it may be proper to remark, that the max- 
im, 'he who divides his forces will be beaten in detail,' 
must be received with qualification, as the art of war 
depends on an infinity of contingencies, and therefore 
is not reducible to specific rules: it will apply to 
armies nearly on an equality, which are maneuvering 
for advantages-, but never to an inferior force, which, 
though competent to harass its adversary, dare not 
hazard a general engagement." 

"Apathy, indifference, and a blind confidence 
marked President Madison's conduct, until the enemy 
was at the threshold; yet from the singular nature of 
the country, the capital might have been saved by the 
instrumentality of axes and spades, supported by two 
hundred mounted riflemen, an hundred dragoons, and 
four pieces of artillery only ; but such was the distrac- 
tion, the irresolution, and imbecility which ensued the 
landing of the enemy, and such had been the unpar- 
donable improvidence before, that not a single bridge 
was broken, not a causeway destroyed, not an inunda- 
tion attempted, not a tree fallen, not a rood of the road 
obstructed, not a gun fired at the enemy, in a march 
of nearly forty miles, from Benedict to Upper Marl- 
borough, by a route on which there are ten or a dozen 
difficult defiles; which, with a few hours labor, six 
pieces of light artillery, 300 infantry, 200 riflemen, and 
60 dragoons, might have been defended against any 
force that could have approached them; such is the 

168 






narrowness of the road, the profundity of the ravines, 
and the sharpness of the ridges." 

"I did believe, that by covering the roads in front 
of the enemy with working-parties, to obstruct them 
by all practicable means, and at the same time by fall- 
ing on their rear by the new road to Zakiah swamp, 
or that by St. Paul's church, with Peter's artillery, 
Stull's, Davidson's, and Dougherty's riflemen and in- 
fantry, and fifty dragoons; whilst simultaneous at- 
tacks were made on his front and left flank, at every 
exposed point or difficult defile, by flying parties of 
four or five hundred infantry, so stationed as to relieve 
each other as the enemy advanced ***** that by 
such attacks, judiciously conducted and vigorously 
pushed, if the enemy had not retraced their steps, 
they would have crossed the Patuxent at Nottingham 
or Pig Point, and returned to their shipping; or if 
they had persevered in their march against the capital, 
their boats might have been destroyed, and their re- 
treat cut off, or rendered a scene of carnage." 

It will not be amiss to remark that the British 
were especially weak in such warfare as Armstrong 
and Wilkinson advocated. The British fought by 
rule. They always lacked adaptability. Generally 
they had an ill-founded contempt for their adversary — 
a contempt that on rather numerous occasions cost 
them dearly. On uneven ground — ridges and ravines, 
cut by streams — and covered with the forest, they em- 
ployed the same tactics that they used on the open 

169 



plain on which they were trained and to which they 
were accustomed. "These savages may indeed be," 
said General Braddock to Benjamin Franklin, "a for- 
midable enemy to your raw American militia, but up- 
on the King's regular and disciplined troops, sir, it is 
impossible they should make any impression." But 
400 Indians and French killed or wounded 63 of the 86 
officers of the Braddock expedition, and killed 714 men 
out of 1,100 — and would have done even better had it 
not been for a young American officer, named George 
Washington, whose training, such as that which many 
of the militia had received, fitted him for Indian war- 
fare. Indian warfare was essentially guerilla warfare. 
Guerilla warfare was legitimate and according to the 
rules, for it did not include cruelty nor did it make 
women and children its victims, as did Indian warfare. 
The British would have fared better in the War of the 
Revolution if they had not stubbornly held fast to cer- 
tain methods of warfare. Their tactics were inflexi- 
ble. This was generally true in The Second War of In- 
dependence. Wellington's Peninsular veterans fought 
at Plattsburg and New Orleans in exactly the 
same way, employing the same tactics and means, 
that they had used in Spain ; and they did the same 
on their leisurely march to Bladensburg, although 
they used better tactics in the battle near there. 
Stubbornly maintaining their close ranks, sticking in 
column to the road, disdaining to deploy or skirmish, 
they were pre-eminently the troops that would have 

170 



suffered most from the warfare advocated by Arm- 
strong and Wilkinson, and they were just the troops 
that would have been of the least embarrassment and 
danger to light troops, mobile, agile, having initiative, 
at home in the woods, and readily adapting themselves 
to cover. All the more would they have been helpless 
against such troops because they did not have any cav- 
alry whatever — not one horse. Yet further, they had 
practically no artillery of any kind. Both Armstrong 
and Wilkinson attached much importance to the lack 
of cavalry and artillery, as it certainly lessened great- 
ly their ability to prevent guerilla warfare or to strike 
back at light troops infesting flanks and rear. 

Apparently Armstrong stuck to his strategy to 
the last, and it is not evidence to the contrary that on 
one occasion, when it had become impossible to em- 
ploy his strategy at that time, he advocated something 
else. On the morning of August 24th General Wind- 
er, from his headquarters "near the Eastern Branch 
Bridge," sent a note to Secretary Armstrong, in which 
he said: 

"The news up the river is very threatening. Bar- 
ney's or some other force should occupy the batteries 
at Greenleaf's Point and the Navy-Yard. I should be 
glad of the assistance of counsel from yourself and the 
government." 

The committee of congress reported that on the 
back of this note was the following memorandum in 
the handwriting of Secretary Armstrong : 

171 



"Went to General Winder ; found there the Presi- 
dent ; Mr. Monroe had also been there, but had set out 
for Bladensburg to arrange the troops and give them 
an order of battle, as I understood ; saw no necessity 
for ordering Barney to Greenleaf's Point or the Navy 
Yard. Advised the Commodore to join the army at 
Bladensburg, and ordered Minor's regiment to that 
place. Advised General Winder to leave Barney and 
the Baltimore brigade* upon the enemy's rear and 
right flank, while he put himself in front with all the 
rest of his force. Repeated this idea in my letter to 
him of the 22nd." 

Commenting on this, Williams says, "he (Arm- 
strong) still harps upon the enemy's rear, and flanks, 
and front." 

• Williams had no friendship for Armstrong. His 
position as Brigade Major and Inspector of the Co- 
lumbian Brigade brought him into contact with the 
Secretary of War and he says, with evident feeling, 
that General Armstrong was "not a very agreeable 
person to hold a discussion with, his arsenal of argu- 
ments consisting in too great part of oaths, sneers and 
sardonic smiles." He was, also, "opinionated, rude 
and disdainful." 

Williams was an able and nearly always fair writ- 
er on military topics, but his personal feeling must 

*This was Stansbury's brigade, which, as we know, was 
inarched back and forth, or kept standing in ranks, night as 
well as day, with rations of infamous quality or no rations, 
until worn out; yet was in the front line of the battle at 
Bladensburg. 

172 



have led him to condemn the strategy of Armstrong 
and Wilkinson, on the ground that Winder's troops 
were not suitable to the warfare advocated. If their 
18-pounders that he mentions were not suited to the 
work to be done, they could have been ignored — if the 
Americans had no artillery, they would be on an equal- 
ity with the British. But the Americans had suitable 
artillery. For example, they had two companies of 
light artillery among the District troops — commanded 
by Major George Peter, whom Williams himself says 
"had obtained a high reputation as an officer of experi- 
ence and ability in the regular service," and by Cap- 
tain Benjamin Burch, a Revolutionary soldier. Wil- 
liams himself says that each company had six six- 
pounders. Also, according to Williams, there was an- 
other District "company of artillery, with two brass 
six-pounders and one brass four-pounder, command- 
ed by Captain Marstetler." Among the Maryland 
troops were "two companies of volunteer artillery, un- 
der Captains Myer and Magruder, with six six-pound- 
ers." These quotations are from Williams' own enu- 
meration of forces; and this light artillery was avail- 
able from the 18th and all was capable of effective 
work. Williams would lead one to believe that Wind- 
er had no troops that could shoot. At Bladensburg 
they demonstrated that they could shoot. A Subal- 
tern in America says the fire from the militia was the 
hottest he had ever encountered, and he was an old, 
seasoned soldier. He pays a high compliment indeed 

173 



to the marksmanship of the militia. The American 
militia were good marksmen. Many of them were ac- 
customed to fire-arms. It should be remembered, also, 
that there were some well trained regular troops. 
Finally there were, according to Williams himself, 
"more than 400 cavalry," generally efficient, "a part of 
it very efficient." Rightly employed, this cavalry 
would have given the Americans a great advantage, 
for the British had no cavalry ; especially as the Amer- 
icans could have been well supplied with guides that 
knew not only every road but every acre of the forest, 
and the men and the horses of the cavalry did not need 
to have good roads to move along — they were accus- 
tomed to find their way through the woods. 

No ; it would not have been impossible for Gen- 
eral Winder to have employed the strategy advocated 
by the Secretary of War and Wilkinson, notwith- 
standing that Williams allows his personal feeling to 
sway him so far at times that he argues that Winder 
lacked the essential means. Wilkinson had said, to 
illustrate how his strategy might have been employed 
and might have worked out :* 

"General Winder should, in my judgment, have 
ordered his main body, commanded by General Smith, 
which was under arms near the Wood Yard ready for 
combat, to have gained the heights on the left of 
Charle's Creek, and, as soon as the enemy had resumed 
their march and passed Oden's, he should have fol- 

*Memoirs. 

174 



lowed them, and fallen on their rear at the time Gen- 
eral Smith engaged their front, or when their center 
had passed the creek ; but the enemy gave him a more 
favorable opportunity by turning to their right soon 
after they had passed Bishop Claggett's, on a road so 
flanked by hills and ravines that, by a vigorous attack, 
their rear might have been broken and cut up before 
they could have made front to support it. Pent up in 
such narrow, difficult grounds, and pressed in front 
and rear, the effect of General Ross' discipline and 
numbers would have been impaired, and he must have 
been crippled before he could have extricated himself, 
while the American corps, with the country open be- 
hind them, could have withdrawn at discretion, and, 
although the enemy might have gained Upper Marl- 
borough, it would have terminated their advance. 
This is speculation, but, whatever may have been its 
merits, I know the corps of Scott and Peters panted for 
action, and they should have been indulged; in such 
circumstances, blood judiciously expended excites em- 
ulation and inspires courage." 

His critics could not successfully attack General 
Wilkinson's strategy. They could only assert that 
Winder lacked the necessary means. Thus, comment- 
ing on the quotation just made from Wilkinson's Me- 
moirs, Williams says : 

"In indulging in these speculations, General Wil- 
kinson does not seem to have recollected the anecdote 
with which, in another part of his book, he satirizes a 

175 



speculation of Secretary Armstrong 'in his cabinet at 
a thousand miles distance.' 'I think,' said the minister 
to Eugene, 'you might have crossed the river at this 
point,' tracing the route on a map with his finger. 
'Yes, my lord, if your finger had been a bridge.' " Yet 
even Williams at times admits that Winder's availa- 
ble force might have been effective for the harassing 
warfare. He quotes Armstrong, without disapproval, 
for the fact could not be gainsaid, as saying August 
23rd, (according to Colonel M'Clane) : "mul- 
tiplied attacks, made simultaneously or in succession, 
on the front, flank and rear of an enemy's march. 
Such was the well-known affair of Lexington, in the 
War of the Revolution, in which 1,800 of the British 
elite were so beaten, disheartened and exhausted, that, 
had they not, at sunset, found armed vessels to pro- 
tect, and an intrenched camp to receive them, not a 
man would have escaped capture or death." 

Williams says that this "plan advised by General 
Armstrong on the 19th* was similar to the course Gen- 

*This was reported by Colonel Allen M'Clane, who was 
a volunteer aid to General Winder and kept a journal during 
the campaign. On date of August 19th in his journal, M'Clane 
reported a conversation with General Armstrong, in which 
Armstrong said: 

"Our course is a plain one: assemble as large force as 
we can; place it speedily at Nottingham or other point on the 
Patuxent; clear the road between that and Benedict of horses 
and cattle; break down bridges; abattis the route, when lead- 
ing through woods; select strong points for defense; and, as 
soon as his movements begin, harrass his front and flanks 
by small attacks made by night and by day, while Stuart op- 
erates in the same way on his rear." 

176 



eral Wilkinson says he would have adopted;" and 
which course has already been made plain. 

As Wilkinson said, with rather rare modesty for 
him, his plan was "speculation"; but certainly it was 
more promising, more in accord with # the strategy in- 
dicated by the conditions and more in accord with the 
warfare of successful commanders under like condi- 
tions, and it was far more nearly common sense, than 
the strategy, if such it could be called, that was adopt- 
ed. 

But the Fabyan strategy and tactics advocated by 
Armstrong and Wilkinson is not often popular among 
the masses, and certainly did not give the promise of 
glory to an aspirant to the Presidential nomination 
and of popularity for a national administration, that 
was offered by one important pitched battle. Further, 
Madison was, as pointed out in an early chapter, in- 
clined to urbanity and had a nice sense of the proprie- 
ties. Wilkinson, at times inclined to satire, may have 
happily expressed the fact when he wrote : 

"President Madison preferred to signalize himself 
in a pitched battle, and, as he scorned the idea of tak- 
ing any advantage of his antagonist, he permitted him 
an undisturbed march to the theatre of combat." 



177 



12. 



THE BATTLE LINES. 

It will not be amiss to review the location and 
condition of the American forces assembled to defend 
Washington, on the morning of August 24, 1814. 

Bladensburg, already frequently mentioned, a vil- 
lage, in 1814, of about 1,200 people, is about six miles 
northeast of Washington. ''But," wrote A Subaltern 
in America, "the houses are, for the most part, com- 
posed of brick." There was, connecting it and Wash- 
ington, a good turnpike, "formerly the mail road to 
Baltimore. North of this road is another old road, 
which before the City of Washington was founded, 
was the route from Georgetown to Bladensburg. 
These roads meet, at an angle of about forty-five de- 
grees, some sixty or eighty yards from the river at 
Bladensburg. From the junction the turnpike-road 
continues on to the river, not abutting, however, im- 
mediately at the bridge, but curving for a short dis- 
tance to the south and east along the margin of the 
stream, and following a sort of causeway, which, at 

178 



the time we speak of, was bordered on the west side 
by thickets of small trees and bushes, and which led 
to the bridge. The bridge is somewhat less than thirty 
yards in length, and about four in breadth, and the 
stream, a few rods above or north of the bridge, is 
everywhere fordable."* 

A Subaltern in America said, as just quoted, that 
"the houses are, for the most part, composed of 
brick;" and he continues: "There is a mound on the 
right of the entrance very well adapted to hold a light 
field piece or two for the purpose of sweeping the 
road. Under these circumstances, we naturally con- 
cluded that an American force must be here. Though 
out of the regular line, it was not so far advanced but 
that it might have been maintained, if not to the last, 
at all events for many hours, while the means of re- 
treat, so soon as the garrison should be fairly over- 
powered, were direct and easy. Our surprise, there- 
fore, was not less palpable than our satisfaction, 
when, on reaching the town, we found that it was 
empty." 

The other British soldiers of this expedition as 
well express their surprise that Bladensburg, 
which would have so well lent itself to defense, 
was not occupied by a considerable body of American 
troops; especially as the houses would have afforded 
cover and protection that the American troops so 
well liked ; would have favored the style of fighting 

*Major John S. Williams. 

179 



that the American forces should have adopted; and 
made conditions that plainly indicated the use of not 
only light artillery, but of riflemen. But the only 
riflemen Stansbury had with him had been refused 
rifles! And, besides, it could hardly have been ex- 
pected that Stansbury would risk the occupation of a 
position so far advanced when his force, sadly limited 
in numbers, was made far less effective because of fa- 
tigue and hunger. Further, Stansbury was not an ex- 
perienced and perhaps not an able commander — cer- 
tainly he never claimed to be. Armstrong quotes 
this description of his army from Winder's letter to 
"the Committee of Inquiry:" "A mass of men sud- 
denly assembled without organization or discipline, 
or officers of any the least knowledge of service, 
excepting Major Peter; or if any, unknown to me." 
And Armstrong proceeds to comment as follows: 
"Yet to officers thus described — to Stansbury and 
Smith — he assigns the duty of choosing his position, 
and to Mr. Monroe, that of forming his order of bat- 
tle !" It must be remembered that Armstrong had 
wished Porter, not Winder, in command of the Amer- 
ican forces; also, that Armstrong was a man of vio- 
lent prejudices; but it appears that there were good 
grounds for his criticism, especially as what he said 
about Stansbury was never disputed. 

At any rate, Stansbury's force, after its counter- 
march to Bladensburg, recounted in a previous chap- 
ter, "occupied the triangular field" formed by the 

180 



roads named on the first page of this chapter, near 
their junction. "In this field, on the Georgetown 
road, and about a hundred and fifty yards from the 
junction of the roads, there stood a large barn or to- 
bacco house, and between the barn and the Washing- 
ton turnpike there was an orchard, which commenced 
at the barn and extended more than half way across 
the field, or about a hundred and twenty or thirty 
yards toward the turnpike. In front of the barn, 
looking toward the river, the ground has a gentle 
descent, and upon the brow of the declivity, near the 
Georgetown road, and some thirty or forty yards in ad- 
vance of the barn, had been hastily constructed a bar- 
bette battery of earthwork, intended for heavy ord- 
nance. This battery was distant about three hundred 
and fifty yards from the bridge at Bladensburg, nearly 
west of it, and commanded it by an oblique and not 
enfilading fire."* 

We should remember that Stansbury had posi- 
tive orders to give battle at Bladensburg; and if a 
pitched battle for the defense of Washington was to 
be fought, the route of the British troops made the 
crossing of the two highways the place for the battle. 
The battle ground presented natural features that, 
properly used, recommended it to the American forces. 
Stansbury's choice of battle ground was not altogeth- 
er faulty by any means ; nor was his disposition of his 
forces subject to severe criticism, if any. Even Wil- 
*Major Williams' account. 

181 



liams says that his intended order of battle was "not 
the worst that could have been adopted." 

In his account of the battle, General Stansbury 
said: 

"On arriving in the orchard near the mill, I di- 
rected the artillery to post themselves behind a small 
breastwork of dirt that lately had been thrown up by 
Colonel Wadsworth.* This battery commanded the 
pass into Bladensburg and the bridge southwesterly 
of the town. Our artillery consisted of six six-pound- 
ers ; Major Pinkney's battalion of riflemen on their 
right, under cover of the town and bushes, also com- 
manding the pass by the bridge; two companies from 
Lieutenant-Colonel Shutz's regiment, under the com- 
mand of Captains Ducker and Gorsuch, acting as rifle- 
men, although principally armed with muskets, on the 
left of the artillery, near, and protected by, the barn, 
intended to defend the road leading by the mill, on 
the left of the battery, into the field ; Colonel Sterett's 
regiment was halted in the orchard, on the right and 
in the rear, and the regiments of Colonels Ragan and 
Shutz were also halted in the orchard, in the rear and 
on the left flank, near the creek. My intentions were 
that they should remain here to refresh themselves 
as long as possible, and, as soon as the enemy ap- 
peared, to form Colonel Sterett's regiment (in whom 



*The same Colonel Wadsworth that, as already narrat- 
ed, arranged and executed the plan that once saved Barney's 
flotilla. He was a most capable, efficient and active officer, 
and was almost disgraced because of his good work. 

182 



I placed great confidence) on the right, their left rest- 
ing on and supporting the right of Major Pinkney's 
riflemen, in view of the bridge, and fronting the road, 
along which ran a fence, and act as occasion should 
require. Colonels Ragan and Shutz's men were to be 
drawn up in echelon, their right resting on the left of 
Captains Ducker and Gorsuch's rifle companies, in or- 
der to prevent the enemy from pressing and turning 
our left, hoping that General Winder would join me 
before the battle would commence, and occupy the 
ground in my rear as a second line." 

It must be said, in justice to General Stansbury, 
that he displayed no small ability in disposing of his 
force. Major Williams made further comment on his 
battle formation as follows: 

"By this prepared disposition of Sterett's regi- 
ment, the troops from the city of Baltimore would 
have been stationed so as to support and give confi- 
dence to each other; and as they were well disciplined 
and reliable troops, and some of them were necessarily 
to encounter the first shock of the contest, Stansbury's 
intended order (of battle) * * * * had the merit of 
placing all parts of his line within supporting distance 
of each other." 

What was the condition of the forces thus dis- 
posed the morning of August 24th? We already 
know how they were marched and countermarched 
or kept standing in line, without opportunity to cook 
their unfit and well nigh poisonous rations, without 

183 



even opportunity at times to have water to drink. 
Stansbury says of their condition this morning of 
August 24th: 

"The men under my command were worn down and 
nearly exhausted from long and forced marches, want 
of food, and watching. They had been, with very lit- 
tle intermission, under arms and marching from the 
time of their departure from Baltimore, with but little 
sleep, bad provisions, and but little opportunity 
to cook. They certainly were not in a condition to go 
into battle; but my orders were positive, and I was 
determined to obey them." 

But General Stansbury's line of battle was not al- 
lowed to remain as above described. The change that 
was made in it was, all competent critics agreed, large- 
ly responsible for the conduct of his forces and was 
certainly a serious error. Whoever was responsible 
for the change was careful not to take the blame ; and 
who that person might be led to a lively controversy. 
This change in his line, and its tactical effect, are 
well stated by General Stansbury: 

"While I was giving some directions to the artil- 
lery, I found Lieutenant-Colonels Ragan's and Shutz's 
regiments had been moved from the place where I 
had stationed them, and marched out of the orchard 
up the hill, and formed in order of battle about two 
hundred and fifty yards above the orchard, and up- 
wards of five hundred yards in the rear of the artillery 
and riflemen. Thus uncovered by the trees of the or- 

184 



chard, their situation and numbers were clearly seen 
by the enemy from Lowndes' Hill, and the flanks of 
the artillery and riflemen unprotected, and laid liable 
to be turned, our main body being placed too far off 
to render them any aid. On riding up the hill to 
know who had ordered this movement, I was informed 
that General Winder was on the ground. I immedi- 
ately rode to the mill, where I understood General 
Winder was, and found him reconnoitering the posi- 
tion of the enemy. While in conversation with him, 
the 5th regiment was taken out of the orchard, 
marched up the hill, and stationed on the left of Col- 
onel Shutz's regiment, that of Colonel Ragan being 
on the right, its right resting on the main road ; but, 
as I before observed, the whole at so great a distance 
from the artillery and riflemen that they (the artillery 
and riflemen) had to contend with the whole British 
force, and so much exposed that it has been a cause 
of astonishment they preserved their ground so long, 
and ultimately succeeded in retreating. Whose plan 
this was I know not ; it was not mine, nor did it meet 
with my approbation ; but, finding a superior officer 
on the ground, I concluded he had ordered it, conse- 
quently did not interfere." 

General Stansbury's conclusion that General 
Winder had ordered the remarkable break-up of his 
battle line, was incorrect, and did Winder a great in- 
justice. In his account of the battle Winder states 
that almost immediately after he reached the field of 

185 



battle, and which was about noon, he found General 
Stansbury "and Colonel Monroe together. The latter 
gentleman informed me that he had been aiding Gen- 
eral Stansbury to post his command, and wished me 
to proceed to examine it with him, to see how far I 
approved of it." But this was prevented by the ap- 
pearance of the British and the beginning of the bat- 
tle. 

Undoubtedly it was Monroe that changed the bat- 
tle line, and General Armstrong has this to say* of 
the activities of Colonel Monroe on the field of battle : 

"It is only in the following report, that we are 
made acquainted with this busy and blundering tac- 
tician that Stansbury does not know, and whom 
Pinckney will not name. 'The 5th regiment,' 
says Sterett, 'was formed under the direction of Col- 
onel Monroe, on the left and in line with General 
Stansbury's brigade. * * * * I ought also to notice, 
that the first line formed on the battle ground, was 
changed under the direction of Colonel Monroe.' In 
addition to this information, Colonel Sterett adds : 
'The action commenced about one o'clock, by an at- 
tack on the redoubt, where the riflemen and artillery 
were placed. These soon retired, and the 5th covered 
their retreat, and kept up a lively fire, and supported 
their place in line with firmness, until the enemy had 
gained both flanks, when the order to retreat was giv- 
en, by General Winder himself. The opposing front 

♦Notices of the War of 1812, Vol. II, Chap. 5. 
186 



of the enemy was never disconcerted by the fire of the 
artillery or the riflemen, and the brigade of General 
Stansbury was seen to fly, as soon as the action be- 
came serious. No second line or reserve appeared to 
advance or support us, and we were out-flanked and 
defeated, in as short a time as such an operation could 
well be performed.' " 

The statements of Colonel Sterett were not ac- 
curate or correct, though doubtless made honestly 
enough. As A Subaltern in America and other Brit- 
ish soldiers testified, General Stansbury's brigade 
fought much better and longer than Colonel Sterett 
states. It is certain, also, that this brigade would have 
fought yet longer and better if the battle line had not 
been changed. 

The tactics of the day of battle were almost, or 
quite, as stupid and bad as the alleged strategy of the 
days preceding the battle. It is certain that the front 
line, broken up and misplaced by Monroe, was of such 
extent, was so formed, and so placed, that the tactics 
of the British were obvious, and the flanking of the 
line inevitable. Its forced retirement was also inevi- 
table unless it had reinforcements, but the reinforce- 
ments it might have had were so placed — rather mis- 
placed — that they were never brought forward — were 
really not intended to reinforce the first line. Just 
what they could reasonably be supposed to do has 
never been determined. Even the master tactician of 

187 



the day, Monroe, never found time to give this infor- 
mation. 

But we are anticipating the battle itself. For a 
moment we will here digress to observe that those 
responsible for the strategy and tactics of the battle 
at Bladensburg certainly believed in keeping soldiers 
on the go. Apparently they thought that the two 
things a soldier should not be allowed to do were to 
eat and sleep. The American troops were kept march- 
ing most of the day and night ; and when not marching 
they were kept standing in line, without rations, or 
were reviewed by the President. Apparently their 
commanders thought that it was a crime to let an 
American soldier rest. Though worn out, and ready 
to drop from exhaustion, due to hunger and exposure 
as well as to much marching and little rest, the troops 
were marched and again marched as the battle was 
about to begin. Major Pinkney had this to say of the 
effect of the change of position of the 5th regiment: 

"The 5th regiment, which had been removed from 
a position where it might have contrived to repulse 
the enemy, in his attempts to leave the bridge, had 
now, to the great discouragement of my companies, 
and of the artillery, been made to retire to a hill, sev- 
eral hundred yards in the rear. The two companies of 
General Stansbury's brigade, acting as riflemen, had 
changed their position, so that I no longer perceived 
them. The residue of the brigade had been removed 
from the left, and made to take ground (invisible to 

188 



us by reason of the intervening orchard) on the right 
of the 5th regiment, with its own right resting on the 
main road, and disclosed to the enemy." 

In his statement to the committee of congress, 
Major Pinkney complained rather bitterly of what he 
termed this "new order of battle." "The 5th regi- 
ment,',' he said, "had been made to retire to a hill sev- 
eral hundred yards in our rear, but visible, neverthe- 
less, to the enemy, where it could do little more than 
display its gallantry." 

In his statement Lieutenant-Colonel Sterett said, 
"I ought to notice that the first line formed on the bat- 
tle ground was changed under the direction of Colonel 
Monroe. On this occasion he observed to me, 'Al- 
though you see I am active, will you please bear in 
mind that this is not my plan?' or words to that ef- 
fect." 

But if not Monroe's plan, whose? It hardly was 
Madison's or Armstrong's or Winder's or Stansbury's. 
The only explanation is that Sterett must have misun- 
derstood Monroe. Williams quotes Monroe as say- 
ing that the removal of the 5th regiment "at a late 
period, was a measure taken in reluctance and in 
haste." And what follows in his statement leaves it 
to be inferred that this movement was ordered by 
Stansbury. 

Moving the 5th regiment, etc., was such a tactical 
blunder that after the battle no one wished to own it. 

We can not better dismiss this matter than by 
189 



making a rather lengthy quotation from Williams' 
Capture of Washington : 

"We have dwelt particularly upon this matter, 
not only to illustrate the confusion existing at the 
time of forming the order of battle, owing to the near 
vicinity of the enemy, and the number of persons ex- 
ercising independent authority, but in justice to the 
troops of Stansbury's line, the only troops who can 
be said to have fled. * * * * It was hardly reasonable 
to expect that raw militiamen would remain firm in 
the position in which Stansbury's troops were placed, 
considering the force which they believed were ad 
vancing against them, and the alarm created by the 
rockets, a species of weapon wholly unknown to them, 
and apparently of the most formidable description. 
The orchard would have served as a cover for them, 
and, if permitted to remain in it, they might have been 
encouraged by the shelter which it afforded, by the 
steadiness which the troops in their front displayed 
under the advance of the enemy, and even by the ex- 
citement attending an opportunity of immediate ac- 
tion." 

What about the rest of the American forces? 

About eleven A. M. General Stansbury was 
reached by a dragoon from Lieutenant-Colonel Beall, 
who brought the information that Beall "was on the 
road from Annapolis to Bladensburg, with about 
eight hundred men, distant from me about five miles," 
says Stansbury in his account of the battle, "and 

190 






wished to know the distance and situation of the en- 
emy. * * * I advised the colonel * * * to take a po- 
sition on the high grounds north and northwest of 
Bladensburg, which would completely protect my left 
by preventing the enemy from outflanking us that 
way, and force their main body across the bridge, in 
the face of my artillery and riflemen, and expose them 
to the fire of the 5th regiment under Colonel Sterett,* 
who would be protected by the fence. This advice it 
appeared Colonel Beall only took in part. * * * * He 
took his station on the hill, as I was informed * * * * 
about one and one-half miles in my rear." General 
Winder says that when the British reached the vicin- 
ity of Beall's position, his (Beall's) "detachment gave 
one or two ineffective fires and fled." Before we dis- 
miss these troops it is only just to observe that as they 
were not moved forward to support and aid the first 
line, but were held in their position, the battle did not 
reach them until the American forces were in such 
condition and situation that Beall's troops could not 
have been much blamed for their conduct, even if the 
preceding correctly reported it. 

Also, it is but justice to these soldiers to state 
further, that "the veteran Colonel Beall, in his brief 
and modest letter to the committee (of Congress) 
makes no other excuse for his men than to state that 
they were fatigued and exhausted from their march 

*This was before the 5th had been moved by Colonel 
Monroe. 

191 



of sixteen miles that morning before the battle, and 
that, according to his own impression, they did not 
give way 'as early as represented by some.' ,: While 
it is anticipating the actual battle, it will be said now 
that Colonel Beall's troops did not flee, and they did 
not retire until ordered to do so by General 
Winder. Of this later. Unfortunately they were so 
misplaced that they could be of little use. 

As for the cavalry, they were placed near the first 
line. Just who assigned them to their place is not 
clear. Probably it was Colonel Monroe. Stansbury 
does not mention their place in the line. Colonel Mon- 
roe stated that they "were placed to the left, some- 
what in the rear of the line." There was no attempt 
made to use them during the battle, and they were 
not in condition to be of use. The reader will recall 
that we left them, the morning of the 24th, men and 
horses exhausted with hard service and by hunger, 
just as the bugle called the men from giving then- 
starving horses some hay. It will be recalled that 
their commander said that they were unable to make 
a charge — from fatigue and hunger hardly able to sit on 
their horses, or the horses to move. As a matter cf 
fact, quite a number of the horses were unable to pro- 
ceed on the hurried march to Bladensburg the morn- 
ing of the 24th, and several died on the march. 

The second line was composed of the troops 
which General Winder had held at the Battalion Old 
Fields. We have, in a previous chapter, seen what 

192 



was their condition the morning of the 24th. That 
condition was made all the worse by the hurried march 
through the broiling sun from the Eastern Branch 
Bridge to the battle field. This march was begun at 
11 A. M. and these troops reached the field at such 
time that "they had barely time, on arriving on the 
ground, to make a hasty selection of position." This 
position was some distance to the rear of the first line. 
Just what this distance was can not be determined. 
General Smith, who commanded these troops, said in 
his report of the battle : 

"On Wednesday morning, the 24th of August, 
at 11 A. M., I received orders from General Winder 
to detach one piece of artillery and one company of 
infantry to repair to the Eastern Branch Bridge, and 
to proceed with the residue of the troops to Biadens- 
burg and take a position to support General Stans- 
bury. This order was put in immediate execution, and 
the troops for Bladensburg moved off with all the <*/- 
pedition of which they were capable. Having put 
them in motion, I passed on ahead, in order that I 
might select my position against their arrival. I found 
General Stansbury * * * * I left him to hasten the 
arrival of my troops. They moved rapidly on, not- 
withstanding the excessive heat of the day, covered 
with clouds of dust and were promptly disposed ot as 
follows * * * * This position (of the 36th U. S. regi- 
ment) was about one hundred and fifty yards in the 
rear of the front line, but extending to the right." 

193 



Other of his troops— Peter's artillery, Davidson's light 
infantry, Stull's riflemen armed with muskets, and 
part of a District regiment of infantry — were posted a 
hundred yards further in the rear. Then, "after a 
short space of time," objection was raised to these po- 
sitions—Smith did not say by whom— but he "yielded 
with reluctance to the abandonment of the position: 
time did not admit of hesitation." Then, when Major 
Peter's battery had taken its new position, "it was 
found that the range of his guns was principally 
through that part of the field occupied by the 36th reg- 
iment." ( !) "To remove one or the other became nec- 
essary, and the difficulty of the ground for moving 
artillery, and the exigency of the movement, left no 
alternative. The 36th fell back about one hundred 
yards, losing, in some measure, the advantage of its 
elevated ground. The position of the 1st regiment 
District militia, from this circumstance, was also nec- 
essarily changed. It fell back about one hundred 
yards. Of the 2nd regiment District militia, two 
pieces of artillery and one company of riflemen, armed 
with muskets, were, by directions of General Winder, 
sent on to the front; with those he flanked the ex- 
treme left of the front line ; two pieces more of artil- 
lery were posted in the road near the bridge at Blad- 
ensburg; the residue of that regiment was formed as 
a reserve a short distance in rear of Major Peter's bat- 
tery." General Smith goes on to state that the battle 
began while his "troops were yet taking their different 
positions." 

194 






It will be seen that to the very last possible mo- 
ment these exhausted troops were marched and 
marched ; kept uncertain and apprehensive ; and regi- 
ments were broken up. 

The accounts of others would place this second 
line a good deal farther to the rear of the first line. 
Williams says that "the second line of the American 
army was nearly a mile in the rear of the first." It is 
certain that it was not in supporting distance of the 
first line. General Winder was frank in confessing 
the faults of the disposition of the troops, and his con- 
fession was to the effect that "the main defect in the 
arrangement of the troops was their being out of sup- 
porting distance of each other." General Wilkinson's 
criticism of the battle simmered down to two definite 
points — "the bridge at Bladensburg should have been 
better defended, and the troops were not within sup- 
porting distance of each other." Williams says that "the 
disadvantages of the order of battle and of the distance 
of the two lines from each other, were made worse by 
the fact that the troops of the first line were generally 
ignorant that there was a second line, or any troops 
in the rear to support them, or on which they could 
fall back. They were under the impression that they 
were to fight the battle unassisted, against a force four 
or five times as numerous as their own." Lieutenant- 
Colonel Sterett said that he "knew nothing of any 
second line or reserve being formed to support" him. 
Major Pinkney stated that he "did not know 

195 



that Brigadier-general Smith's brigade was in or near 
the field until the action had ceased," nor that Bar- 
ney's artillery was on the field. General Stansbury 
stated that "before and during the action, he "did not 
see any of the force" he "was led to expect would sup- 
port" him. 

When one regards the disposition of the Ameri- 
can forces one must agree with Wilkinson that it 
was "void of plan or proportion ; and the naked truth 
is the best apology for it, that is, it was formed on the 
spur of the occasion, by pieces, and under the direction 
of many different chiefs, without preconcert, principle 
or design!" One must grant the justice of the criti- 
cism of Williams, who said, "in orders of battle formed 
with such precipitation as those were, under direction 
of a variety of inexperienced heads, it would be 
strange if errors did not exist which the merest tyro 
might point out." 

"Inexperienced heads." "Military inexperience." 
Therein lay all the trouble; from that came the 
grievous errors, the defeat, the humiliation! 

One unit of the American forces is yet to be 
placed. While it is mentioned last, it was of the first 
importance. It was the sailors of Commodore Bar- 
ney's flotilla, 400 in number, and the marines from 
Washington, 120 in number, with two eighteen-pound- 
ers and three twelve-pounders, and who had joined 
General Winder at the Wood Yard the morning of the 
22nd. Barney had continued with General Winder until 

196 






the morning of the 24th, and in his account of the bat- 
tle be speaks feelingly of the heat, the crippled con- 
dition of his men from the severe marches they had 
experienced the day before, many of them being with- 
out shoes, and the hurried manner in which he was 
compelled to take a position.* This position was 
"about a mile from the stream at Bladensburg." The 
two eighteen-pounders were planted in the highway, 
and the three twelve-pounders immediately on 
the right of them, a portion of his seamen acting as 
artillerists, and the rest, with the marines, supporting 
them as infantry. Immediately on his left was the 
1st regiment of General Smith's brigade commanded 
by Colonel Magruder, and on his right, on an eminence 
about 250 yards from the highway, was the command 
of Colonel Beall. 

This places the American troops on the field of the 
battle of Bladensburg, although, of course, it does not 
mention every small division. But we would miss a 
most juicy bit of evidence of the inefficiency of the 
conduct of the War if we failed to have some account 
of the regiment of Virginia militia under Colonel Mi- 
nor. General Winder said that on the evening of 
August 23rd "Colonel Minor had arrived in the city 
(Washington) with five or six hundred militia from 
Virginia, but they were without arms, accoutrements, 

*He reported: "I preceded the men, and when I arrived 
at the line which separates the District from Maryland, the 
battle began. I sent an officer back to hurry up the men, 
who came on at a trot." 

197 



or ammunition. I urged him to hasten his equip- 
ment." 

Colonel Minor diligently endeavored to do this. 
It will be recalled that the Secretary of War had de- 
serted his office to seek glory in the field. From 
Colonel Minor's letter to the committee of congress 
we make the following extracts : 

"We concluded it would be proper," to march 
"with my whole force to the City (Washington), 
which consisted of six hundred infantry and about one 
hundred cavalry ***** On receipt of which 
(General Winder's orders) I took up my line of march 
immediately, and arrived at the capital between sunset 
and dark (August 23rd) and immediately made my 
way to the President and reported my arrival, when he 
referred me to General Armstrong, to whom I re- 
paired, and informed him as to the strength of the 
troops, as well as to the want of arms, ammunition, 
etc., which made it as late as early candle-light, when 
I was informed by that gentleman the arms, etc., could 
not be had that night, and directed me to report my- 
self the next morning to Colonel Carberry, who would 
furnish me with arms, etc., which gentleman, from 
early next morning, I diligently sought for, until a late 
hour of the forenoon, without being able to find him, 
and then went in search of General Winder, whom I 
found near the Eastern Branch, when he gave an or- 
der to the armorer for the munitions wanting. On 
my arrival at the armory, found that department in the 

198 



care of a very young man, who dealt out the stores 
cautiously, which went greatly to consume time; as, 
for instance, when flints were once counted by my 
officers, who showed every disposition to expedite 
furnishing the men, the young man had to count them 
over again before they could be obtained ; and at 
which place I met with Colonel Carberry, who intro- 
duced himself to me and apologized for not being 
found when I was in search of him, stating he had left 
town the evening before, and had gone to his seat in the 
country. After getting the men equipped, I ordered 
them on to the capitol, and waited myself to sign the 
receipts for the munitions furnished; and, on my ar- 
rival, was informed * * * * orders had been given to 
march to Bladensburg, when we took up our march 
for that place and met the retreating army." 

Alas, since then there have been, more than once, 
a General Armstrong* and a Colonel Carberry and 
"a very young man/' in the wrong place! 



*Wilkinson wrote in his Memoirs: "When Colonel 
Minor applied the evening of the 23rd of August, for arms 
for 600 Virginia volunteers, the Secretary (of War) observed 
it would be time enough in the morning; but being pressed 
for the delivery by the Mayor, who introduced the Colonel, 
he, with a horrible smile, replied: 'Doctor, you are more 



frightened than hurt. 



199 



13. 



THE BATTLE OF BLADENSBURG. 

Ross put his army in motion early the morning 
of August 24th. This was no hardship to his troops, 
for they had been eating well, sleeping well, and rest- 
ing well. About noon the British approached Blad- 
ensburg. For half an hour the progress of their col- 
umn had been made plain to the Americans by a cloud 
of dust. Hon. William Pinkney, described as an ora- 
tor and prominent citizen,* was, as we have seen in 
the preceding chapter, in command of the most ad- 
vanced American troops, and he says of the opening 
of the battle : 

"The enemy, having reached Bladensburg, de- 
scended the hill, about 12 o'clock, in a very fine style, 
and soon showed his intention to force his way by the 
bridge. Assisted by some discharges of rockets (which 
were afterwards industriously continued), he made 
an effort to throw across the bridge a strong body of 
infantry, but he was driven back at the very com- 
mencement of it, with evident loss, by the artillery in 

*But not as a man of military education and experience. 
200 



the battery, which principally acted upon the street or 
road near the bridge, and he literally disappeared be- 
hind the houses. * * * * After a long pause * * * a 
second attempt was made to cross the bridge, with in- 
creased numbers and greater celerity of movement. 
This, too, was encountered by the artillery in the bat- 
tery, but not with its former success, although it was 
served with great spirit. In consequence a large col- 
umn of the enemy, which was every moment rein- 
forced, either by way of the bridge or by the ford im- 
mediately above it, was able to form on the Washing- 
ton side, and to menace the battery and the inadequate 
force by which it was to be supported." 

A Subaltern in America says of the opening of the 
battle : "The very first shot* cost us three men — one 
killed, and the other two dreadfully wounded — and the 
second would have been, in all probability, not less 
fatal, had we not very wisely avoided it. We inclined 
at once to the right and left of the road, and, winding 
round the houses, made our way without any further 
loss as far as the last range, when we were command- 
ed to lie down and wait for the column. In the mean- 
while, the main body, being informed how matters 
stood (i. e., that Bladensburg was not occupied by the 
American troops) resumed its march and approached 
the town. It was saluted, as we had been saluted, by 
a heavy and well directed cannonade; but, being 
warned by some of our people where the danger lay, 

*From the battery. 

201 



it so far avoided it as to close up its ranks, and effect 
all the arrangements necessary for the assault under 
cover of the green mound." 

The u green mound" was known as Lowndes' Hill 
— "on the right of Bladensburg in approaching the vil- 
lage by the turnpike from Washington." 

General Winder's narrative is taken up from this 
point. He said : 

"Their light troops soon began to press across 
the creek, which was everywhere fordable, and in most 
cases lined with bushes or trees, which were sufficient 
to conceal the movements of light troops who act in 
the manner of theirs, singly. The advanced riflemen 
now began to fire, and continued it for half a dozen 
rounds, when I observed them to run back to the skirts 
of the orchard on the left, where they became visible, 
the boughs of the orchard trees concealing their origi- 
nal position, as also that of the artillery, from view. 
A retreat of twenty or thirty yards from their original 
position toward the left brought them in view on the 
edge of the orchard. They halted there, and seemed 
for a moment returning to their position, but in a few 
minutes entirely broke and retired to the left of Stans- 
bury's line. I immediately ordered ihe fifth Balti- 
more regiment, Lieutenant-Colonel Sterett, being the 
left of Stansbury's line, to advance and sustain the ar- 
tillery. They promptly commenced this movement; 
but the rockets, which had, for the first three or four, 
passed very high above the heads of the line, now re- 

202 



ceived a more horizontal direction, and passed very- 
close above the heads of Shutz's and Ragan's regi- 
ments, composing the centre and right of Stansbury's 
line. A universal flight of these two regiments was 
the consequence. This leaving the right of the fifth 
wholly unsupported, I ordered it to halt, rode swiftly 
across the field toward those who had so shamefully 
fled, and exerted my voice to the utmost to arrest 
them. They halted, began to collect, and seemed to be 
returning to their places. An ill founded reliance that 
their officers would succeed in rallying them when I 
had thus succeeded in stopping the greatest part of 
them induced me immediately to return to the fifth, 
the situation of which was likely to become very crit- 
ical, and that position gave me the best command of 
view. To my astonishment and mortification, howev- 
er, when I had regained my position, I found the whole 
of these regiments (except a few of Ragan's, not more 
than forty, rallied by himself, and as many, perhaps, 
of Shutz's) were flying in the utmost precipitation and 
disorder. 

"The advanced artillery had immediately followed 
the riflemen, and retired by the left of the fifth. I di- 
rected them to take post on a rising ground which I 
pointed out in the rear. The fifth, and the artillery on 
its left, still remained, and I hoped that their fire, not- 
withstanding the obstruction of the boughs of the or- 
chard, which, being low, concealed the enemy, would 
have been enabled to scour this approach and prevent 

203 



his advance. The enemy's light troops, by single men, 
showed themselves on the lower edge of the left of the 
orchard, and received the fire of this artillery and the 
fifth, which made them draw back. The cover to them 
was, however, so complete, that they were enabled to 
advance singly and take positions from which their 
fire annoyed the fifth considerably, without either that 
regiment or the artillery being able to return the fire 
with any probability of effect. In this situation, I had 
actually given an order to the fifth and the artillery to 
retire up the hill toward a wood more to the left and 
a little to the rear, for the purpose of drawing them 
farther from the orchard and out of the reach of the en- 
emy's fire while he was sheltered by the orchard. An 
aversion, however, to retire before the necessity be- 
came stronger, and the hope that the enemy would is- 
sue in a body from the left of the orchard and enable 
us to act upon him on terms of equality, and the fear 
that a movement of retreat might, in raw troops, pro- 
duce some confusion and lose us the chance, induced 
me to countermand the order, and direct the artillery 
to fire into a wooden barn on the lower end of the or- 
chard, behind which I supposed the enemy might be 
sheltered in considerable numbers. The fire of the en- 
emy now* began, however, to annoy the fifth still more 
in wounding several of them, and a strong column of 
the enemy having passed up the road as high as the 
right of the fifth, and beginning to deploy in the field 
to take them in flank, I directed the artillery to retire 

204 



to the hill to which I had directed the Baltimore artil- 
lery to proceed, and halt, and ordered the fifth regi- 
ment also to retire. This corps, which had heretofore 
acted so firmly, evinced the usual incapacity of raw 
troops to make orderly movements in the face of the 
enemy, and their retreat in a very few moments be- 
came a flight of absolute and total disorder." 

Of this part of the battle General Stansbury said : 
"The artillery, under the command of Captains 
Myer and Magruder, and the riflemen, the whole un- 
der the command of Major Pinkney, behaved in the 
most gallant manner (this gallant officer, in the course 
of the action, was severely wounded) ; but the superior 
force of the enemy, and the rapidity with which he 
moved, compelled them to retire. But one of the 
pieces was lost, and that was rendered harmless before 
it was abandoned. 

The enemy took every advantage of the cover af- 
forded them by the trees of the orchard, and their light 
troops from thence kept up a galling fire on our line. 
On this party, when advanced nearer, the 5th regi- 
ment, under Colonel Sterett, opened a steady and well 
directed fire, which was followed by the fire from the 
right, and ultimately from our center, when the firing 
on both sides became general. After a few rounds the 
troops on the right began to break. I rode along the 
lines, and gave orders to the officers to cut down those 
who attempted to fly, and suffer no man to leave the 
lines. On arriving at the left of the center regiment, 

205 



I found Lieutenant-Colonel Shutz's men giving way, 
and that brave officer, with Major Kemp, aided by my 
aide-de-camp, Major Woodyear, exerting themselves 
in rallying and forming them again. Captain Gallo- 
way's company, and part of Captain Ransdall's and 
Shower's companies, were rallied and formed again, 
and behaved gallantly. The rest of Colonel Shutz's 
and Ragan's regiments fled in disorder, notwithstand- 
ing the extraordinary efforts of their officers to pre- 
vent it. On the left, I soon after discovered a part of 
the 5th regiment giving way, and that excellent offi- 
cer, Lieutenant-Colonel Sterett, with those under 
him, most actively engaged forming them again. Soon 
after, the retreat became general, and all attempts to 
rally them and make a second stand were fruitless. 
With a body of United States cavalry, I endeavored 
to protect the rear and right of the retreating men, so 
as to prevent their falling into the enemy's possession. 
"The men under my command were worn down 
and nearly exhausted from long and forced marches, 
want of food, and watching. They had been, with very 
little intermission, under arms and marching from the 
time of their departure from Baltimore, with but little 
sleep, bad provisions, and but little opportunity to 
cook. They certainly were not in a situation to go 
into a battle."* 

*This closing paragraph from General Stansbury's re- 
port has already been quoted, but it will certainly bear repe- 
tition. We know how true was his report of the condition 
of his troops. 

206 



It will now be proper to stop and consider certain 
circumstances and conditions revealed by the preced- 
ing. 

First, the British had the initiative ; they out-ma- 
neuvered and out-guessed the American commanders, 
and excelled them very much indeed in strategy. 

Ross was a shrewd and able commander. On the 
night of the 23rd, as we have been informed in a pre- 
vious chapter, he was encamped about three miles 
from the Old Fields and some ten or twelve 
miles from Washington. As already stated, he had 
his army in motion early on the morning of the 24th — 
he passed Old Fields at four o'clock. Two miles be- 
yond Old Fields he came to the fork in the road — one 
fork going to Bladensburg, ten miles to the north, and 
the other to the Eastern Branch Bridge, west about 
eight miles. Here he did what he had previously done 
at the fork of the road from Nottingham to Upper 
Marlborough — he took the road leading to the East- 
ern Branch Bridge, and when his last column had got 
into it, he suddenly reversed his front and marched 
rapidly to Bladensburg. Thus he kept Winder and 
the others uncertain as to his route until the last pos- 
sible moment. 

Second, the British used tactics that they almost 
never employed — they took cover wherever possible 
and favored flank movements. One of those tl.at had 
reason to know well the usual tactics of the British 
noted that they generally made frontal attacks, and, to 

207 



use his phrase, "took the bull by the horns." The Brit- 
ish did what the Americans should have done — used 
the brick houses of Bladensburg for cover. They used 
Lowndes' Hill also for cover and did not disdain to 
use also the bushes along the creek for the same pur- 
pose. And, finally, they so maneuvered and fought 
that the orchard, which had sheltered the Americans, 
soon sheltered them. Ross did not hesitate to use tac- 
tics that might not have been sanctioned by British 
tradition, but which observation had shown him were 
good. It will be observed, further, that he at once saw 
the opportunity for successful flank attacks made by 
the withdrawal of Shutz's and Sterett's troops, on or- 
ders of Monroe or someone else, from the support of 
the artillery and Pinkney's riflemen, and so placed that 
their flanks, also, were exposed. 

Third, this breaking up of the front line, as orig- 
inally arranged, by Monroe or whoever was the "blun- 
dering tactician," was fatal, not only because of the 
opportunity it gave the British to flank not only Pink- 
ney, but Sterett, but for the further reason that tak- 
ing from one part of Stansbury's force the other part, 
both parts known to each other, greatly reduced the 
confidence and morale of both parts. There are many 
examples of certain forces that have fought well in- 
deed together in several engagements that have not 
fought well when broken up and thus each unit lacked 
the support of all the others, and knew it; and in all 
the history of warfare there is not one example of such 

208 



a force fighting as well after being dismembered. 

Fourth, the militia fought better than the reports 
above given would indicate — much better. It must be 
confessed that the shame, and deserved shame, of the 
Americans put the officers of the American forces at 
Bladensburg in such frame of mind that in their re- 
ports of the battle they fell quite a little short of doing 
justice to the "common soldiers." After the burning 
of the capitol all the officials and officers directly or 
indirectly interested, from Madison down, joined in an 
effort to put all the blame on the "common soldiers" — 
an effort so vigorous, able and persistent that if an 
equal effort had been made to defend the capital Ross 
and his forces would have been kept close to Benedict. 

If we would find justice done to the troops that 
fought on the American side at Bladensburg we must 
go to the accounts of their British antagonists. It is 
a shameful fact that so many of our own writers have 
robbed the dead of that good name which is the great- 
est riches — a ghoulish crime that the fair accounts of 
British soldiers have made all the more shameful. 

Williams observes that the "statement of General 
Winder shows very clearly the value of the orchard 
and barn as a military position, the advantage which 
its possession gave to the enemy, and the difficulty 
which they probably would have experienced in driv- 
ing back our troops if they had been suffered to re- 
main near and in it, as General Stansbury intended." 

209 



That "blundering tactician" was an excellent aid 
of the British. 

Major Pinkney's command — the artillery and the 
riflemen — certainly fought well. Stansbury says that 
they "behaved in the most gallant manner." But they 
numbered only 600 and the "blundering tactician" had 
removed their supports and exposed their flanks. 

Even Williams says that the statements of Ster- 
ett and the others do not do justice to the troops. He 
says : "Comparing all accounts, American and British, 
it is evident that even Stansbury's brigade stood its 
ground long enough to show that, under different 
auspices, it would have performed its part well. * * * 
Among the circumstances which induced" Stanbury's 
troops to retreat were "the galling fire from the or- 
chard ; the continued advance of fresh troops of the en- 
emy, amounting, as they had been informed, to eight 
or ten thousand veterans ; no knowledge that any re- 
serve troops were in their rear; and the conviction 
which every man of commonsense among them must 
have felt, that, under these circumstances, to continue 
longer on the field would expose them to the danger 
of being cut to pieces." 

As already stated, the "advanced troops, under 
Major Pinkney and others, who encountered the first 
shock of the British army," amounted to only 600 men. 
"The regiments under Sterett, Shutz and Ragan, too 
far in the rear to support the advanced troops, mus- 
tered about 1800 men," said Williams. These figures 

210 



are too high by about 200, unless one includes the 
dragoons — about 125 — under Laval. 

No one else made as careful and judicial a study 
of the battle of Bladensburg as Major Williams ; and 
his official position gave him the very best opportuni- 
ties to arrive at the exact facts. He did not write his 
volume on the "Invasion and Capture of Washington" 
until 1856 — he took more than forty years to gather 
and verify his data and to reach a ripe judgment of the 
events of the Chesapeake expedition. The following 
extracts are from his volume just named: 

"The British accounts describe but one battle. 
There were, in fact, two, as distinct as if they had tak- 
en place on different days and with different armies. 
The second line of the American army was nearly a 
mile in the rear of the first, and there had been no 
communication between them, no re-enforcement from 
one to the other * * * * none of the troops of the first 
line retreated to or rallied upon the second, which was 
left, therefore, to encounter the full force of an enemy 
inspirited by its victory over the first line and out- 
numbering the second nearly two to one. * * * The 
rest of the army (the second line), amounting to about 
2,700 men, was more than a mile from Bladensburg, 
and did not change its position until ordered to re- 
treat." 

The American force present at the battle of Blad- 
ensburg, though some of it really did not participate 

211 



in the battle, was, as stated in a preceding chapter, as 
follows : 

t Stansbury's Maryland militia and volunteers, 2,200 ; 
Smith's District brigade of militia and volunteers, 
1,070; Beall's militia and volunteers, 750; militia un- 
der Warring and Maynard, 390; total militia and in- 
fantry, 4,410; regulars — infantry — 380; Barney — sail- 
ors, 400, marines, 120; and dragoons, 125. Grand to- 
tal, 5,435. 

Ross, in his official dispatch, put Winder's force 
at "8 to 9000" ! 

Auchinleck makes much of a statement by a Dr. 
Smith, who put Winder's forces at the following fig- 
ures, and given here because they were much ex- 
ploited : 

United States dragoons 140 

Maryland ditto 240 

District of Columbia ditto 50 

Virginia ditto 100 5o0 

Regular infantry 500 

Seamen and marines 600 1,100 

Stansbury's brigade of militia 1,353 

Sterett's regiment, ditto :>00 

Baltimore artillery, ditto 150 

Pinkney's battalion, ditto 150 2,153 



212 



Smith's brigade, ditto 1,070 

Cramer's battalion 240 

Warring's detachment, ditto 150 

Maynard'r ditto ditto 150 1,610 

Beall's and Hood's regiment of ditto .... 800 
Volunteer corps 350 1,150 

Total 7,503 

It will be seen that his addition was faulty. Also, 
so were his figures. In his official report of the battle, 
Winder puts his total force at five thousand, which 
was substantially correct. 

As for the British force, it was exaggerated as 
much by some Americans as the American force was 
exaggerated by some British. Before the battle the 
British force under Ross was most frequently reported 
to the American troops to be 9,000. Some estimated 
it at 12,000. Auchinleck says that "Mr. Thomson 
states the British force at six thousand men, just one 
thousand more than Mr. O'Conner, and two thousand 
more than Dr. Smith." Dr. Smith's figure would be 
liberal if only the force present at Bladensburg was 
meant. Niles Register, Vol. VII, p. 14, gave the fol- 
lowing statement of the British force landed at Bene- 
dict: 

Infantry, 3,183; artillerists, 90; marines and sea- 
men, 1,850; total, 5,123. About 500 of these were left 
at Marlborough. Gleig, the British soldier and au- 

213 



thor, put the number that landed at 4,500. Probably 
the seamen were not landed — at any rate, they were 
not considered a part of the land forces. A Subaltern 
in America says the force under Ross numbered only 
4,000. Colonel Beall reached the same figure. De- 
ducting the 500 left at Marlborough leaves only 3,500, 
and this agrees closely with the estimate of Dr. Cat- 
lett — 3,540. Dr. Hanson Catlett was an eminent sur- 
geon of the regular army and staff surgeon to General 
Winder. He was permitted by the British to proceed 
to Bladensburg the day after the battle to attend to 
some of the American wounded. He was a man of the 
highest character. He said to the congressional com- 
mittee : 

''With better means of judging than any other 
American officer after the battle, my estimate was — at 
Capital Square 700 men; at Turnpike Hill, 2,000; at 
Bladensburg, wounded, 300, attendants and guards, 
300; in the city, wounded and attendants, sixty; and 
killed at Bladensburg, 180; total, 3,540. These esti- 
mates, though somewhat incorrect in the detail, are 
corroborated in the aggregate by the best information 
I could get from the British surgeons, sergeants, and 
others left in the hospital at Bladensburg." 

Commenting on Dr. Catlett's statement, General 
Armstrong said : "The Doctor's statement is fully 
sustained by the writer of British Campaigns in Amer- 
ica, who states Ross' army to have been composed of 
four regiments of infantry, one battalion of marines, 

214 



and a few rocket men and artillerists — the whole 
amounting to 4,020 men. Deduct from this number 
the 500 left at Marlborough to guard the boats and 
plunder and the result will bring the assailing army 
to 3,500, as stated by Dr. Catlett." 

It is safe to say that if this figure is not correct it 
is because it is too small. It is certain that Dr. Catlett 
would not see more than there were and might not see 
all that there were. It is certain that the British sur- 
geons and officers would not exaggerate the number 
of the British troops, and might conveniently forget 
some. However, 3,540 is probably very nearly the ex- 
act number of British that fought at Bladensburg — 
first against Pinkney's 600, then against the 1,600 to 
1,700 constituting what was somewhat in the nature 
of a second line ; and then the troops under Smith, the 
marines under Barney, and the others, that arrived 
just in time to get on the field — it could hardly be said 
to take positions. It is not strange that Winder's al- 
leged army, thus taken in detail, was forced to retreat. 
As for the resistance offered by the Americans in what 
Williams well calls the second battle, and by 2,210 
militia and volunteers, 520 marines and sailors, and 
380 regulars — total, 3,110 — we will take the account of 
A Subaltern in America, who will also be permitted 
to say something of the first battle : 

"The American army became visible. The corps 
which occupied the heights above Bladensburg, was 
composed chiefly of militia ; and as the American mili- 

215 



tia are not dressed in uniform, it exhibited to our eyes 
a very singular and a very awkward appearance * * * 
seemed country people, who would have been much 
more appropriately employed in attending to their ag- 
ricultural occupations, than in standing, with muskets 
in their hands, on the brow of a bare green hill. I 
have seldom been more forcibly struck with anything 
than with the contrast, which a glance to the rear af- 
forded at the moment, with the spectacle which was 
before me. A column of four thousand British sol- 
diers, moving in sections of six abreast * * * * met 
my gaze in that quarter. * * * The whole of the light 
brigade, forming into one extended line, advanced to 
the attack. In the rear of a high paling the enemy's 
first line presented itself. I have stood under many 
heavy fires of musketry in my day ; but I really do not 
recollect to have witnessed any more heavy than that 
which they instantly opened upon us. Had we been 
a numerous body, and in compact array, our loss must 
have been terrible * * * * our order was that of skir- 
mishers. * * * The American line began to waver as 
soon as we arrived within twenty or thirty paces of 
their front, and the shouting preliminary to a charge 
had hardly been uttered, when they broke, and fled. 
Our men were too much fatigued to follow with any 
celerity, but we pursued as quickly as we could, and 
bayonetting some seamen, who pertinaciously clung to 
their guns, took possession of two, out of the five 
pieces of cannon, which had so severely galled us. 

216 



Our work was, however, but beginning. In five min- 
utes we found ourselves in front of a second line, more 
numerous and more steady than that which we had 
defeated. It was composed wholly of regular troops,* 
who received us, as we came on, with a murderous 
fire, and instantly advanced to the charge. * * * The 
battle became now little else than an uninterrupted 
exchange of tremendous volleys. Neither party gained 
or lost ground, but, for a full half hour, stood still, 
loading and firing as quickly as these operations could 
be performed. Whilst this was proceeding, Colonel 
Thornton received a ball in the thigh, and fell. The 
Americans raised a shout at the event, pressed on, and 
our people, a little disheartened, retired. General Ross 
himself coming up at this instant, with the better 
part of the 4th regiment, the fortune of the day was 
speedily decided. * * * To do them justice, however, 
their regulars** were not unmindful of the lessons 
wdiich they had learned upon the parade. They cov- 
ered their rear with a cloud of riflemen * * * and the 
riflemen very deliberately, and very judiciously took 
up positions from time to time. Nor was their fire 
harmless. * * * 1 found the brigade gathering togeth- 
er the shattered remains, upon the summit of the high 
ground, which the enemy's reserve had occupied in 
the morning. I say shattered remains, for out of the 

*A mistake, of course. There were only 380 f-egulars on 
the field. This was certainly a real compliment to the militia. 

**Nearly all militia. 

217 



twelve hundred men who bore the brunt of the battle, 
nearly one-half had fallen." 

Little more need be said of the battle. But espe- 
cial mention should be made of Commodore Barney 
and his force of marines and sailors. No better fight- 
ing has ever been done than was done by this force. 
Barney always claimed that none of his force was bay- 
onetted. In his account of the battle he spoke first of 
"the crippled condition of his men from the severe 
marches they had experienced the days before, many 
of them being without shoes, and the hurried manner 
in which he had been compelled to take a position," 
and continued : 

"A second and a third attempt was made by the 
enemy to come forward, but all were destroyed. They 
then crossed over into an open field, and attempted to 
flank our right; he was * * * * again totally cut up. 
* * * * The enemy from this period never appeared 
in force in front of us. * * * * The enemy, who had 
been kept in check by our fire for nearly half an hour, 
now began to outflank us on the right. Our guns were 
turned that way. * * * * In this situation we had the 
whole army to contend with. Our ammunition was 
expended." In another statement he said: "So far 
from using the bayonet, they fled before our men, who 
pursued them, the sailors crying out to 'board' them. 
Nor did the enemy rally until they got into a ravine 
covered with woods, leaving their officers in our pow- 

218 



er.* Then our men returned to their station. General 
Ross, in person, was obliged to take command, but 
dared not lead them on in front, but pushed out on our 
flank. Our ammunition being expended, we were nec- 
essitated to retire." 

The persistent and shameful disposition of many 
of our own writers to belittle the achievements of the 
land forces ; in fact, to rob them, living and dead, of 
the honors they had won by gallant conduct in deadly 
struggle — a disposition given the treatment it merits 
in The Battle of Plattsburg — was exceedingly appar- 
ent in what was written about the battle of Bladens- 
burg. Coupled with that disposition was the other 
one to glorify the deeds of the navy — a disposition to 
be commended, for the navy, as well as the army, 
fought well indeed ; and being generally better offi- 
cered, was oftener victorious, although this difference 
in favor of the navy was not near so great as our 
! writers, especially those of New England, made it to 
: appear. Because of the disposition just referred to, 
it yet actually appears in a good many of our histories 
: and encyclopedias that the only good fighting done at 
I Bladensburg was done by the men of the navy under 
i Commodore Barney! And that shameful lie and libel 
is taught in our schools and is supposed to be truth by 
many of our people to this day! 



♦Colonel Thornton, dangerously wounded; Lieutenant 
Stevely, of the "King's Own;" and others. Captain Hamil- 
ton and Lieutenant Codd were killed in front of Barney's 
position. 

219 



As a matter of fact, all of the so-called second 
line ; or, as Williams would have it, the second arm} 
in the second battle, fought well. Peter's batter) 
fought as well as Barney's ; and the infantry, especialH 
Magruder's regiment, fought as well as the batteries' 
Williams states the facts, and conservatively, when hr 
says: 

"The light brigade of the enemy, in advancing 
through the defile near the bridge over the ravine, 
came within range of Peter's battery, which opened } 
cross fire upon them with considerable effect. After 
the first discharge from Barney's battery, the British 
eighty-fifth regiment was thrown out on its right witl 
a view to carry the left flank of that battery; and hav ; 
ing advanced within range of Magruder's regiment 
met a reception which caused it to retrograde; an<, 
crossing the road in open order,* it united with tlV 
fourth, which had deployed on the left on the margil 
of the ravine, coming in conflict there with Kramer' 
command, which, after a spirited resistance, fell bad, 
to the right of the line. The Subaltern in Americ. 
speaks particularly of the severity of the tire fron 
every part of the American line commanding the denT 
until the right of the line was flanked. The loss sus 
tained here by the British, as well from the murderou 
discharge of grape from Barney's battery, as from th 

*One must admire the tactics of the British in this ba 
tie — open order, flank attacks, taking cover, etc. On tb 
British side it was the best fought battle of the War. Rot; 
was a great general. 

220 



cross fire of Peter's battery and the discharge of mus- 
ketry, exceeded, according to the accounts of the Brit- 
ish officers who were present, that of any battle in 
which they had ever been engaged, considering the 
numbers of the contending forces." 

Yet more than one history of the United States, 
used in our schools, slates that the soldiers in this 
battle fled without firing a shot! By questioning a 
rather large number of people, the author has found 
that ninety per cent of our citizens believe that those 
brave soldiers were arrant cowards ; that instead of 
standing their ground, though outnumbered, they 
turnedand ran on the approach of the British without 
firing a shot ! This ignorance and misinformation, 
this injustice to our brave soldiers of a century ago, is 
our shame and disgrace. 

Further, this second line, or, according to Wil- 
liams, this second army, did not retire until ordered to 
do so by General Winder. To quote again from the 
careful, just, accurate Williams, writing dispassionate- 
ly forty years after the event, and, having been all his 
life a regular army man, certainly not biased in favor 
of the militia: 

"At this crisis, General Winder * * * *arrived 
upon the ground, and perceiving his right flank in the 
act of being turned, and his left nearly in the same 
predicament, gave orders for the line to retreat. The 
manner in which the order was executed by General 
Smith we shall state in his own words : 

221 



' 'The order to retreat was executed by regiments 
and corps as they had been formed, and with as much 
order as the nature of the case would permit. The 
first and second regiments halted and formed, after 
retreating five or six hundred paces, but were again 
ordered by General Winder to retire.' * * * * 

"The retreat of the troops was in consequence of 
orders from the commanding general, which it was 
sometimes found necessary to reiterate, from the re- 
luctance of the troops to obey them * * * * 

"The repeated orders to retire given to the ad- 
vanced troops between the Wood Yard and Notting- 
ham were, according to Major Peter's statement and 
our own personal knowledge, very unwillingly obeyed. 
At the Old Fields, the 23rd of August, the troops 
showed no signs of unwillingness for the encounter, 
great as they supposed the numerical superiority of 
the enemy to be. At Bladensburg, it was with the 
utmost reluctance that General Smith's troops obeyed 
the order to retreat. 

"With respect to the regular troops * * * while 
the troops were in the act of returning the fire, General 
Winder rode up to them and gave the order to retreat 
to Washington. On being asked if the troops might 
not be allowed to return the fire of the enemy, General 
Winder demanded to know who commanded the 
regiment. The adjutant pointed to Lieutenant-Col- 
onel Scott, who was then on foot, his horse having 



222 






been killed, when General Winder repeated the order, 
directing him to retire immediately."* 

As for the militia under Colonel Beall, whose con- 
duct has already been noted — the troops of the second 
army on whom was put the most discredit — it is very 
certain that Commodore Barney — doubtless honestly 
enough — did them a grave injustice. After the battle 
it was proved by the bearer of the orders himself and 
by others, that the troops under Colonel Beall did not 
retreat until they had the orders of General Winder 
to retreat, and when the order to retreat was received 
Colonel Beall and his men protested. Further, Colonel 
Beall formed his men in regular order before they be- 
gan the march toward Washington — the retreat. 

Commenting on this, and the conduct of the other 
militia, Williams says : 

"The most that can be expected of raw troops, or 

indeed of any troops, is, that they will obey orders, 

and not retreat until ordered to do so. If they satisfy 

these requirements, all the blame attending their 

movements must fall elsewhere. It is preposterous to 

expect that any troops, in their anxiety to fight, would 

mutinously disobey an order to retreat, and yet not a 

few of the Bladensburg troops were on the point of 

doing this." 

*The orders to retire were more than warranted — the 
Americans were outnumbered and outflanked. If they had 
not retired a considerable number would have been captured. 
General Winder gave the orders to retire, not because he 
was a coward, but because here, at least, he "was a capable 
commander, as he was at all times a brave man. 

223 



When one considers carefully all the conditions 
and circumstances of the battle of Bladensburg he 
marvels, not that the Americans fought well — which 
they did— but that they fought at all. It would not be 
easy to speak in words of too great praise of the forti- 
tude, patience, bravery and patriotism of the men and 
officers — except the three superfluous commanding 
officers. 

That they fought well is proved, also, by the loss- 
es they inflicted. A Subaltern in America, who cer- 
tainly would not exaggerate the British losses, wrote, 
as quoted in this chapter, that of the 1,200 British 
troops that were in the hottest fighting, nearly one- ■ 
half fell. In his official dispatch, General Ross put his 
loss at 56 killed and 185 wounded. It is well known, 
however, that his loss was fully twice this. Dr. Catlett 
testified that the British surgeons left with the wound- 
ed at Bladensburg, told him that they had buried about 
one hundred of their men on the field. Nearly as many 
more were buried by our own people after the retreat 
of the British. Dr. Catlett estimated the wounded left 
at Bladensburg at "three or four hundred," and "forty 
or fifty" taken to Washington. Something of the Brit- 
ish loss was given in a previous chapter. 

The American loss was reported to be 26 killed 
and 51 wounded— almost certainly too low, but differ- 
ent figures were never produced. 

For the loss and disgrace to the people of the 
United States because of the events at Bladensburg 

224 



and in Washington, a very heavy load of blame must 
be laid on some one, but certainly not on the soldiers 
and sailors or their rightful commanders — not the 
least on them. The full weight of that blame must 
rest on a national administration so narrowly partisan 
that it would rather have loss and disaster come to the 
American people than to avail itself of the services of 
able men of the opposing political party — so narrowly 
and pitiably partisan that at times it thought appar- 
ently that its first duty was to make places for hungry 
hordes of party followers — so unwisely partisan 
and political that in the selection of a commanding 
general political affiliation and the fortunes of candi- 
dates for office were put above the fitness of the gen- 
eral for the place. Even worse and more to be con- 
demned, if that be possible, a national administration 
so complacently, so smugly wise in its own conceit, so 
ignorant, that it would not and could not be taught by 
failure ; so incapable that it could not and would not 
see how inefficient and hurtful it was ; so puffed up by 
its natural characteristics supplemented by the flattery 
of lackeys and claquers that it had in superabundance 
the stubborn egotism that regards wise and honest 
criticism as an impertinence to be coarsely character- 
ized as untruthful ; that finds easier than reform the 
suppression, by lawless procedures, of that same wise 
and honest criticism ; that actually comes to believe 
that it and the government are one and that wise and 
honest criticism of ignorance, laziness, untruthfulness 

225 



and dishonesty in the administration is "sedition" and 
"treason!" Such an administration is the most dan- 
gerous as it is the most offensive form of that kingly, 
tyrannical egotism, "The state : it is I."* The national 
administration in 1814 was guilty, also, of that which 
some might consider not altogether removed from in- 
famy — by methods with which the American peoph 
have been kept only too familiar, high public officials 
kept the blame for disaster and disgrace from theii 
heads, where it all belonged, and put it on the heads oi 
the "common soldiers" — a feat as cowardly as it was 
disreputable. For all this such men as Madison ard 
Monroe are to be leniently judged because of not only 
their great public services, their patriotic work for the 
new republic, and their many very high and excellent 
qualities, but even more because of the inevitable par- 
tisan prejudices coupled with academic discussions 
and real doubts about the new form of government, 
and also the accepted standards of public service of 
that period — conditions that make the course of the 
Madison administration much less blameworthy than 
would be the similar course of a national administra- 
tion at this time. 



*The author, though not altogether ignorant of French, 
prefers, when in the United States, the language of this 
countrv, 

226 



14. 



THE BURNING OF THE CAPITOL. 

A few moments after General Winder gave the 
order to retreat at the battle of Bladensburg, he di- 
rected General Smith to "collect the troops and pre- 
pare to make a stand on the heights westward of the 
turnpike gate. This was done as fast as the troops 
came up. A front was again presented toward the 
enemy. * * * While the line was yet forming," said 
General Smith, "I received orders from General Win- 
der to fall back to the Capital, and there form for bat- 
tle. * * * * Approaching the capital, I halted the 
troops, and requested his orders as to the formation 
of the line. We found no auxiliaries there. He (Gen- 
eral Winder) then conferred for a few moments with 
General Armstrong, who was a short distance from 
us, and then gave orders that the whole should retreat 
through Washington and Georgetown." 

General Smith speaks of the indignation and 
anguish of his troops when this order for further re- 
treat was communicated to them, Williams says : 

227 



"We can add our own testimony, as an eye witness, to 
General Smith's statement of the effect which the 
final order of retreat had upon the troops under his 
command. Some shed tears, others uttered impreca- 
tions, and all evinced the utmost astonishment and 
indignation ; for it was impossible for them to compre- 
hend why troops who were willing to risk an encoun- 
ter with the enemy should be denied the opportunity." 

If there was any cowardice in the American force 
to defend Washington, it certainly was not in the 
ranks. Nor was Winder a coward — even those not 
friendly to him testified to his "personal gallantry, 
zeal and energy which he displayed on the field of 
battle." 

Why, then, these various retreats? General Arm- 
strong was responsible, by his order, for the last. Was 
he, or some other official above Winder, really respon- 
sible for the others? We have seen that the national 
administration was indirectly responsible for them by 
being directly responsible for the shameful condition 
of military unpreparedness. In addition, there is much 
evidence that General Armstrong was not the only 
high official directly responsible for an order to retreat. 
Certain high officials were not cowards, but they had 
been panicky for several days. Williams unequivocally 
accuses "the principal officers of the government" of 
being "the first to set the example" of the panic "which 
they almost created, and did nothing to allay." 

It seems proper that we here learn something of 

228 



the military activities of Monroe and Madison before 
we go with the British soldiers into the city of Wash- 
ington. We will begin with a long quotation from 
Wilkinson. His statements are corroborated by reli- 
able persons : 

"About the 12th or 14th of July, Admiral Warren 
entered the Potowmack with a considerable armament 
* * * * and this being interpreted into a meditated at- 
tack on the metropolis, strong excitements were pro- 
duced at Washington, at a time when Congress hap- 
pened to be in session. The idea of a Lieutenant- 
general had just been started, and the rival candidates 
for appointment entered into competition for public 
distinction, in which the advantages were greatly on 
the side of the war minister, who had the President in 
subordination, and of consequence possessed the ex- 
clusive authority to dispose of the military force, and 
the implements and engines of war were subject to his 
discretion also. He accordingly repaired to a narrow 
pass of the river, about fourteen miles below the city, 
defended by a wretched work called Fort Washing- 
ton, and ordered the diminutive force assembled for 
the defense of the capital to the vicinity of the same 
place. The Secretary of State, also a soldier of the 
Revolution, although his office did not give him mili- 
tary command, determined not to be outdone in dem- 
onstrations of zeal ; he therefore assembled a select 
suite, and resolved to take the lead of his competitor, 
by throwing himself immediately on the right flank 

229 



of the enemy; and whilst his rival awaited the «'.;* 
proach of danger, within the walls of Fort Washing- 
ton, he determined to seek it on the left bank of the 
Potowmack ; and having drawn around him a party ot 
yeomanry, I have understood, a skirmish ensued, 
blood was spilt, and a meditated attack of Blackstone's 
Island, for the purpose of capturing Admiral Warren, 
was marred by the jealousy or invidious spirit of the 
war minister, who refused to the Secretary of State 
a small detachment requested for the purpose." 

But at a later date Monroe was more fortunate in 
getting the desired military force. When, on another 
occasion, the same war minister took the field, leaving 
his office in Washington, which was his proper place, 
Monroe again surpassed him by obtaining "twenty- 
five or thirty dragoons" and engaging in a much her- 
alded reconnoitering expedition to Benedict, when the 
British had just landed there. This expedition result- 
ed in only an exaggerated estimate of the numbers of 
the British, although we have Mr. Monroe's own 
statement that he arrived at ten A. M. on the 20th of 
August "in sight of the enemy's squadron lying before 
Benedict." It appears to have occurred to Mr. Mon- 
roe about this time that it would be a tall feather in 
the British cap to take the Secretary of State prisoner, 
and he discreetly retired. 

However, he informs us that from this hour of 10 
A. M. the 20th of August he "continued to be a spec- 
tator of their (the British) movements until after the 

230 



action at Bladensburg on the 24th." The most irru 
portant result of this up to the time that he broke up 
Stansbury's line of battle at Bladensburg is apparent- 
ly a hurried dispatch to the President. The exact date 
of this dateless dispatch can not be determined, but 
General Armstrong said that it was transmitted to him 
by the President during the night of the 23rd. It read 
as follows : 

"The enemy are advanced six miles on the road 
to the Wood Yard, and our troops are retiring. Our 
troops were on the march to meet them, but in too 
small a body to engage. General Winder proposes to 
retire until he can collect them in a body. The enemy 
are in full march for Washington. Have the materials 
prepared to destroy the bridges. J. MONROE. 

'.'You had better remove the records." 

It has been well observed that "the tone of this 
dispatch was certainly well calculated to create a pan- 
ic." It had that effect, aided by other circumstances. 
The panic was, as we have already seen, confined to 
the high officials, but was none the less effective. 

It will be recalled that Colonel Monroe came on 
horseback to General Stansbury late at night the 23rd 
and urged him to be vigilant, and then rode away in 
the darkness ; and he was at General Winder's head- 
quarters the morning of the 24th when the intelligence 
was received that the British were on their way to 
Bladensburg. Both the President and General Win- 
der expressed a wish that he should join General 

231 



Stansbury and he "lost not a moment in complying 
with their desire." He reached General Stansbury be- 
tween 11 and 12 o'clock — and the result we know. He 
was soon followed by General Winder, and he by the 
Secretary of War, and he by the President and the 
Attorney-General. The last named stated that before 
he and the President "could reach the town, the forces 
of the enemy had possession of it." 

Wilkinson says, and in italics, that at the battle 
of Bladensburg President Madison "run away at the 
very first shot." Doubtless he would not have risked 
such an assertion unless there were good grounds for 
it. And certainly Madison, who, it appears, was on 
horseback near the advanced line when the battle be- 
gan, would have been unwise to remain where he 
might easily have been killed. The only valid criti- 
cism is that he should not have put himself where he 
was in such danger that it was advisable for him to 
retire, for his doing this — and the evidence is that he 
did it rather precipitately — may have had a bad effect 
on the troops. General Wilkinson said that "when 
General Winder saw the first line so easily routed, 
without adverting to the primary cause, the example 
of the President," etc. Wilkinson was unfriendly to 
the President, was much prejudiced; yet what has just 
been quoted appears to have been approved by Wil- 
liams. One thing is certain — -the President and the 
Attorney-General left the field as soon as the battle 
began, or almost immediately thereafter, and took no 

232 



further part in the battle ; and that Monroe and Arm- 
strong remained until near the close of the battle, and 
then retired in advance of the troops. It does not ap- 
pear that the President gave any commands the 24th. 
The activities of Monroe have already been set forth, 
and it will be recalled that Armstrong advised the re- 
tirement of the second line, or second army. 

The British first entered the City of Washington, 
the evening of August 24th, with only about 200 men. 
This party withdrew for the night and encamped 
about two miles distant ; and during the night the cen- 
tral part of the city was held by a lone British senti- 
nel, who had been stationed near the office of the lead- 
ing newspaper and was forgotten when the others 
withdrew ! 

The Americans saved the British the trouble of de- 
stroying the Navy Yard at Washington. We will let 
Ross give his own account of the British work done 
iu the capital : 

"1 determined to march upon Washington, and 
reached that city at eight o'clock. Judging it of con- 
sequence to complete the destruction of the public 
buildings with the least possible delay, so that the 
army might retire without loss of time, the following- 
buildings -were set fire to and consumed: the Capitol, 
including the Senate-House and House of Representa- 
tives, the arsenal, the dock-yard (navy-yard), treas- 
ury, war office, President's palace, rope-walk, and the 
great bridge across the Potomac. In the dock-yard, a 

233 



frigate nearly ready to be launched, and a sloop of war, 
were consumed. The two bridges leading to Wash- 
ington over the Eastern Branch had been destroyed 
by the enemy, who apprehended an attack from that 
quarter. The object of the expedition being accom- 
plished, I determined, before any great force of the 
enemy could be assembled, to withdraw the troops, 
and accordingly commenced retiring on the night of 
the 25th." 

Ross claims to have burned more than he did. T< 
take from him any of this glory ( ?) claimed by him 
is doubly unpleasant, for doing it adds that much more 
to the disgrace of the national administration. A guard 
of American troops posted on the Virginia end of "the 
great bridge across the Potomac" saw some British 
soldiers at the other end, and the British soldiers saw 
them ; each burned their end of the bridge to protect 
themselves from the others ! The Americans accom- 
plished the most damage, for they not only burned 
one-half of the bridge, but also a quantity of military 
stores at their end of the structure. Ross states th it 
he burned the navy-yard : it was burned by our own 
men, on the order of the Secretary of the Navy, given 
under the direction of the President! The order v/as 
the result of the panic that had possessed the Presi- 
dent and his cabinet for some time. Both Commodore 
Tingly, the commandant of the yard, and Captain 
Creighton, his principal officer, believed that it was 
unnecessary to burn the yard and so far disobeyed the 

234 



order as not to fire "the new schooner Lynx/' and it 
was saved. 

The "rope-walk" which Ross burned was not 
public property, but the private property of two firms. 
If Ross claimed credit (?) for burning what he 
did not burn, he also neglected to take credit for all 
that he did burn. He failed to mention the "Congress 
Library." Williams says that "it was not a very valu- 
able collection; but Ross and Cockburn wanted only 
the opportunity to render themselves even more infa- 
mously renowned than the barbarian calif who burned 
the Alexandrian library, for he had at least the excuse 
of not knowing the value of what he destroyed. Their 
hostility to literature was shown also in another way, 
by the destruction of the types and furniture of the 
office of the National Intelligencer." 

The committee of congress appointed to investi- 
gate the invasion of Washington reported, after very 
careful investigation, that the value of the public prop- 
erty destroyed was as follows : 
"The capitol, from its foundation to its 

destruction, including original cost, 

alterations, repairs, etc $ 787,163.28 

"The President's house, including all 

costs 334,334.00 

"Public offices, treasury, state, war and 

navy • 93,613.82 

$1,215,111.10 

235 



"The buildings have been examined by 
order of a committee of the senate. 
The walls of the capitol and presi- 
dent's house are good, and require 
repairs only. The walls of the public 
offices are not sufficient. It is sup- 
posed that the sum of $460,000 will be 
sufficient to place the buildings in the 
situation they were in previous to 

their destruction $ 460,000.00 

"Loss sustained at the navy yard — 

In movable property 417,745.51 

In buildings and fixtures 91,425.53 

$ 969,171.04 
"To this sum must be added the public 

library, estimated at 

"An estimate of the expense of rebuilding, 
in a plain and substantial manner, 
the navy yard, so as to carry on all 
the public works with as much ad- 
vantage and convenience as previous 

to its destruction $ 62,370.00" 

As for the loss of the navy-yard, Williams ob- 
serves that it was one-half of the total loss, and con- 
tinues : 

"The sloop-of-war Argus, if manned by Barney's 
seamen, might have been saved, or even used as a bat- 
tery to protect the yard; but the panic which prevailed 

236 



appeared to have destroyed all powers of reasoning 
or forethought." 

It is well to remember that the panic was not 
among the "common soldiers," but among the highest 
officials. 

The British government did what was to be ex- 
pected of it — when the news of the capture of Wash- 
ington was received in London "the park and Tower 
guns were fired three days successively." But, as has 
been previously pointed out (and especially in The 
Battle of Plattsburg) there was a difference between 
the governing class and the British masses at that 
time. The London Statesman said, "Willingly would 
we throw a veil of oblivion over our transactions a1 
Washington. The Cossacks spared Paris, but we 
spared not the capital of America." The Liverpool 
Mercury said: "We shall add nothing at present to 
the sentiments which we have frequently and recently 
expressed on the justice and policy of such warfare. 
We will content ourselves with asking the most earn- 
est friends of the conflagratory system what purpose 
will be served by the flames of the Senate House at 
Washington? If the people of the United States re- 
tain any portion of that spirit with which they suc- 
cessfully contended for their independence, the effect 
of those flames will not easily be extinguished." The 
British Annual Register for 1814 termed the warfare 
of Ross and Cockburn as a return to "the times of bar- 
barism" and said, "It can not be concealed that the 

237 



extent of devastation practiced by the victors brought 
a heavy censure upon the British character, not only 
in America, but on the Continent of Europe." 

The British, in addition to their other achieve- 
ments, captured considerable quantities, for that time, 
of the munitions of war. This gave them a double sat- 
isfaction — the munitions were valuable to and needed 
by themselves ; and the munitions were valuable to and 
needed by the Americans. The loss of the munitions 
was a severe blow to the righting capacity of the Unit- 
ed States. Williams and Michell, artillery command- 
ers of the British army, made the following official re- 
port of the munitions captured, "between the 19th and 
25th of August, 1814:" 

"August 19 — 1 24-pound carronade. 

"August 22 — 1 6-pound field gun, with carriage 
complete; 156 stand of arms, with cartouches, etc., etc. 

"August 24, at Bladensburg — 2 18-pounders, 5 12- 
pounders, 3 6-pounders, with field carriages; a quan- 
tity of ammunition for the above ; 220 stands of arms. 

"Aug. 25, at Washington— Brass : 6 18-pounders, 
mounted on traversing platforms; 5 12-pounders, 4 4- 
pounders, 1 5^-inch howitzer, 1 5^-inch mortar. Iron: 
26 32-pounders, 36 24-pounders, 34 18-pounders, 27 12- 
pounders, 2 18-pounders, mounted on traversing plat- 
forms ; 19 12-pounders, on ship-carriages; 3 13-inch 
mortars, 2 8-inch howitzers, 1 24-pound gun, 5 32- 
pound carronades, 5 18-pound carronades, 13 12- 
pound guns, 2 9-pound guns, 2 6-pound guns. 

238 



"Total amount of cannon taken — 206; 500 barrels 
of powder; 100,000 rounds of musket-ball cartridges; 
40 barrels of line grained powder; a large quantity o f . 
ammunition of different natures made up. 

"The navy-yard and arsenal having been set on 
nre by the enemy before they retired, an immense 
quantity of stores of every description was destroyed ; 
of which no account could be taken. Seven or eight 
very heavy explosions during the night denoted that 
there had been large magazines of powder. 

"N. B. The remains of near 2,000 stands of arms 
were discovered which had been dstroyed by the en- 
emy/"' 

The public buildings burned were not the greatest 
material loss of the Americans, and their material loss- 
es were not their most serious losses. 

The munitions of war lost, not at Bladensburg, 
but by the invasion of the City of Washington, show 
what a very serious blow that invasion was to the 
Americans. 

That invasion may have been an afterthought of 
the Irishman — and a true Irishman — Ross, and the 
humiliation of the American people may have been 
foremost in his thought ; but it is certain that General 
Ross showed real military talent and generalship, and 
kept strictly within the rules of war, when he de- 
stroyed or caused the destruction of so many cannon, 
so much powder, etc., by his "violation of the metrop- 
olis." 

239 



But while Ross was justified in destroying the 
munitions of war, the destruction of the capitol of a 
hostile nation has never been a part of the warfare 
of what have been known as civilized nations. In his 
letter of September 6, 1814, to Commodore Cochrane, I 
Secretary Monroe said : 

"The late destruction of the houses of government 
in this city, is another act which comes necessarily 
into view. In the wars of modern Europe, no exam- 
ples of the kind, even among nations the most hostile 
to each other, can be traced. In the course of ten 
years past, the capitals of the principal powers of the 
continent of Europe have been conquered, and occu- 
pied alternately by the victorious armies of each other, 
and no instance of such wanton and unjustifiable de- 
struction has been seen. We must go back to distant 
and barbarous ages to find a parallel for the acts of 
which I complain." 

As was frequently pointed out at the time, the 
Russians were not considered to be highly civilized. 
Yet when their victorious army had, with its allies, en- 
tered Paris a few years before, no public or private 
property was wantonly destroyed. 

There was never any claim by the British govern- 
ment that the burning of the buildings in Washington 
was a military necessity, or that they were being used 
for military purposes. President Madison could not 
be successfully contradicted when he said, in his pub- 
lic proclamation of September 1, 1814, that the British 

240 



"wantonly destroyed the public edifices, having no re- 
lation in their structure to the operations of war, nor 
used at the time for military annoyance." In his not- 
able letter of September 6, 1814, to Admiral Cochrane, 
Mr. Monroe, yet Secretary of State, speaks of the 
"system of devastation which has been practiced by the 
British forces, so manifestly contrary to the usages of 
civilized warfare." This system had then been prac- 
ticed for two years. Mr. Monroe continues in the let- 
ter named : 

"No sooner were the United States compelled to 
'resort to war against Great Britain, than they resolved 
to wage it in a manner most consonant to the prim i- 
ples of humanity. * * * * They perceived, however, 
with the deepest regret, that a spirit alike just and 
humane was neither cherished nor acted on by your 
government. Such an assertion would not be hazard- 
ed, if it were not supported by facts, the proof of which 
has perhaps already carried the same conviction to 
other nations that it has to these States. Without 
dwelling upon the deplorable cruelties committed by 
the savages in the British ranks, and in British pay, 
on American prisoners, at the river Raisin, which to 
this day have never been disavowed, or atoned, I refer, 
as ., more immediately connected with the subject of 
[your letter, to the wanton desolation that was com- 
mitted at Havre-de-Grace, and at Georgetown, early 
in the spring of 1813. These villages were burnt and 
ravished by the naval forces of Great Britain, to the 

241 



ruin ot their unarmed inhabitants, who saw with as- 
tonishment that they derived no protection to their 
property from the laws of war. During the same 
season, scenes of invasion and pillage, carried on un- 
der the same authority, were witnessed all along the 
waters of the Chesapeake, to an extent inflicting the 
most serious private distress, and under circumstances 
that justified the suspicion that revenge and cupidity, 
rather than the manly motives that should dictate the 
hostility of a high-minded foe, led to their perpetra- 
tion." 

The national administration was well informed of 
all the events of this warfare of 1813 and 1814 along 
the waters of the Chesapeake, and that both violated 
not only the laws of war, but the sentiments of civ- 
ilized nations, and gave ample warning of the charac- 
ter of the events that would make up the continuance 
of that warfare. It had no excuse for its failure to pro- 
tect the capital. 

The action of President Madison when he had re- 
covered from his bewilderment and panic because of 
the destruction of the capitol, was strikingly charac- 
teristic. As soon as he could terminate his wander- 
ings and return to the city, he — did not make vigorous 
efforts to assemble as soon as possible a sufficient 
force of well equipped and munitioned soldiers to cap- 
ture the British army, if it again attempted invasion 
and depredations, but — issued a proclamation! and of 

242 



course it employed faultless rhetoric in expressing 
lofty sentiments. In it he said : 

"Whereas, these proceedings and declared pur- 
poses, which exhibit a deliberate disregard of the prin- 
ciples of humanity, and the rules of civilized warfare, 
and which must give to the existing war a character 
of extended devastation and barbarism, at the very 
moment of negotiation for peace, invited by the enemy 
himself, leave no prospect of safety to anything with- 
in the reach of his predatory and incendiary opera- 
tions, but in a manly and universal determination to 
chastise and expel the invader. 

"Now, therefore, I, James Madison, President of 
the United States, do issue this my proclamation, ex- 
horting all the good people, therefore, to unite their 
hearts and hands in giving effect to the ample means 
possessed for that purpose. I enjoin it on all, officers, 
civil and military, to exert themselves in executing the 
duties with which they are respectively charged. And, 
more especially, I require the officers, commanding the 
respective military districts, to be vigilant and alert 
in providing for the defense thereof; for the more ef- 
fectual accomplishment of which they are authorized 
to call to the defense of exposed and threatened places, 
proportions of the militia, most convenient thereto, 
whether they be, or be not, parts of the quotas de- 
tached for the service of the United States, under 
requisitions of the general government. 

"On an occasion which appeals so forcibly to the 
243 



proud feelings and patriotic devotion of the American 
people, none will forget what they owe to themselves; 
what they owe to their country; and the high desti- 
nies which await it; what to the glory acquired now, 
and to be maintained by their sons, with the augment- 
ed strength and resources with which time and 
Heaven have blessed them." 

Beautiful! Beautiful! But nothing that would 
certainly produce a company of good soldiers or equip 
them with even one cannon. One thinks of Don 
Quixote. Not even The Invasion of the City of Wash- 
ington could change the ideas and methods of the na- 
tional administration. 



244 



15. 



AFTER THE INVASION. 

As quoted in the preceding chapter, Ross was of 
opinion that he should "complete the destruction of 
the buildings with the least possible delay, so that the 
army might retire without loss of time." Williams 
surmised that it would not have required much to com- 
municate something like panic to Ross. As a matter 
of fact, Ross undoubtedly was apprehensive — not be- 
cause of any cowardly feeling on his part, but because 
it was reasonable for him to expect an attack by the 
Americans. Undoubtedly there would have been such 
an attack, and a successful one, if the three superfluous 
commanders had been as good soldiers as the "com- 
mon soldiers" and their rightful commanders. At any 
rate, Ross retreated the night of the 25th in this fash- 
ion, as told by one of his officers, A Subaltern in Amer- 
ica — a retreat that must be considered good evidence 
that the British were more beaten than the Americans : 

"The destruction of Washington, or rather of the 
stores or public buildings of Washington, had already 

245 



begun. * * * * At the arsenal, public rope-walks, ar- 
mory, bridge and palace, we accordingly saw nothing 
except the smoke and flame which marked their de- 
struction. Neither was the opportunity offered of 
making ourselves very intimately acquainted with the 
general appearance of the ruin. Having procured a 
horse, I rode indeed through a few of what were called 
streets ; that is to say, along extensive lanes, paved 
only in part, and boasting, in numerous instances, of 
no more than five or six houses on each side of the 
way, planted at the distance of some eighth part of a 
mile from one another." 

Noon of the day after the battle at Bladensburg 
and the burning of the public buildings had passed, 
when, to continue the narrative of this fair-minded and 
entertaining British historian and soldier, an Ameri- 
can army appeared "and pushed forward a patrol of 
cavalry as far as the suburbs of Georgetown. * * * * 
But the elements interfered to frustrate the design of 
the enemy * * * * for just at this moment the heav- 
ens became black with clouds and a hurricane, such 
as I never witnessed before, and shall probably never 
witness again, began. * * * * Its force was such as to 
throw down houses, tear up trees, and carry stones, 
beams of timber, and whole masses of brickwork, like 
feathers into the air. Both armies were scattered by 
it, as if a great battle had been fought and won ; and as 
it lasted without any intermission for upwards of three 
hours, neither party, at its close, was in a fit condition 

246 



to offer the slightest annoyance to its adversary. For 
our part, it was not without some difficulty that we 
succeeded in bringing our stragglers together, whilst 
daylight lasted. * * * * In the meanwhile the officers 
of the different corps had directed in a whisper to 
make ready for falling back as soon as darkness should 
set in. From the men, however, the thing was kept 
profoundly secret. They were given, indeed, to under- 
stand that an important maneuvre would be effected 
before tomorrow morning; but the hints thrown out 
tended to induce the expectation of a further advance 
rather than of retreat. A similar rumor was permitted 
quietly to circulate among the inhabitants, with the 
view, doubtless, of its making its own way into the 
American camp ; while all persons were required, on 
pain of death, to keep within doors from sunset to sun- 
rise. This done, as many horses as could be got to- 
gether were put in requisition for the transport of the 
artillery. Even the few wounded officers who had ac- 
companied the column were required to resign theirs, 
and mine, among the number, was taken away. But 
the precaution was a very just and proper one. Not 
only were the guns, by this means, rendered more 
portable, but the danger of a betrayal from a neigh, 
or the trampling of horses along the paved street, was 
provided against. * * * * 

"It was about eight o'clock at night when a staff 
officer, arriving upon the ground, gave direction for 
the corps to form in marching order. Preparatory to 

247 



this step, large quantities of fresh fuel were heaped 
upon the fires, while from every company a few men 
were selected who should remain beside them till the 
pickets withdrew, and from time to time to move 
about, so as that their figures might be seen by the 
light of the blaze. After this, the troops stole to the 
rear of the fires by twos and threes ; when far enough 
removed to avoid observation, they took their places, 
and, in profound silence began their march. The night 
was very dark. Stars there were, indeed, in the sky, 
but, for sometime after quitting the light of the 
bivouac, their influence was wholly unfelt. W e moved 
on, however, in good order. No man spoke above his 
breath, our very steps were planted lightly, and we 
cleared the town without exciting observation. * * * 
"I stepped to the hospital and paid a hasty visit 
to the poor fellows who occupied it. It was a morti- 
fying reflection, that, in spite of our success, the to- 
tal absence of all adequate means of conveyance laid 
us under the necessity of leaving very many of them 
behind ; nor could the noncommissioned officers and 
private soldiers conceal their chagrin on the occasion. 
One of these, a sergeant of my own company, actually 
shed tears as he wished me farewell. It was in vain 
that I reminded him that he was not singular; that 
Colonel Thornton, Colonel Wood, and Major Brown, 
besides others of less note, were doomed to be his 
companions in captivity * * * * *yet no apprehen- 
sions could be more unfounded than those of that 

248 



man; for however unlike civilized nations they may be 
in other respects, in the humanity of their conduct to- 
wards such English soldiers as fell into their hands the 
Americans can be surpassed by no people whatever. 
** * * * To this the wounded whom we were com- 
pelled to abandon bore, after their release, ample tes- 
timony; and they told a tale which hundreds besides 
have corroborated." 

Dr. Catlett said of the British retreat ; 

"They appeared to be preparing to move ; had 
about forty miserable-looking horses haltered up, ten 
or twelve carts and wagons, one ox-cart, one coachee, 
and several gigs, which the officers were industriously 
assisting to tackle up, and which were immediate!) 
sent on to Bladensburg to move their wounded. A 
drove of sixty or seventy cattle preceded this caval- 
cade. On our arrival at Bladensburg, the surgeons 
were ordered to select all the wounded who could 
walk (those with broken arms and the like), and send 
them off immediately. The forty horses were mount- 
ed with such as could ride, the carts and wagons load- 
ed, and ninety odd wounded left behind." 

The National Intelligencer stated that "the ene- 
my did not bury their dead, except those in the imme- 
diate vicinity of the camp. The rest, in number near 
two hundred, were buried by a committee of our own 
citizens sent out for the purpose. * * * * The loss of 
the enemy, before he regained his ships, probably ex- 
ceeded a thousand men. lie lost at least two hundred 

249 



killed in the battle and by explosion, and three or four 
hundred wounded. Many died of fatigue, numbers 
were taken prisoners by the cavalry hanging on his 
rear, and not a few deserted." 

Interesting testimony was given in a letter in 
1855, by Mr. Rush, at that time the only surviving 
member of President Madison's cabinet. He wrote: 

"I have, indeed, to this hour, the vivid impression 
upon my eyes of columns of flame and smoke ascend- 
ing through the night of the 24th of August from the 
Capitol, President's house, and other public edifices, 
as the whole were on fire, some burning slowly, others 
with bursts of flame and sparks mounting high up in 
the dark horizon. This never can be forgotten by me, 
as I accompanied out of the city on that memorable 
night in 1814, President Madison, Mr. Jones, then 
Secretary of the Navy * * * * 

"If at intervals the dismal sight was lost to our 
view, we got it again from some hill-top or eminence, 
where we paused to look at it. We were on horse- 
back, attended by servants,* proceeding on the Virgi- 
nia side of the Potomac, which we crossed at the Little 
Falls, intending to recross at the Great Falls that night 
or the next morning, so as to be again on the Maryland 
side, and return to Washington as the movements of 

*It is a significant fact that in those days the President 
and other high public officials were careful always to be at- 
tended by servants, but never by secret service men or de- 
tectives or anyone of that character — "common" labor, but 
not the assassin, was feared. 

250 



the enemy and our own strength might prompt. 

"Mr. Monroe, Secretary of State, was active in 
his steps that night and next day, in rousing, by suit- 
able appeals, the people of the surrounding country 
* * * * * cut orr - hjg re treat. This, it was believed, 
could be done. * * * * Its execution was prevented 
by the whole invading force hurrying off on the night 
of the 25th of August, leaving a good portion of their 
slain for us to bury, and of their wounded to our care. 

"Those duties were performed as humanity dic- 
tated, notwithstanding our fresh memory of the whole- 
sale burning of our public edifices of costly and noble 
structure, containing the national archives, libraries, 
historical memorials — some not to be replaced — mod- 
els of ingenuity and art — for even the Patent Office 
was not spared — and when not a single article of a 
warlike nature was to be seen or found in any of these 
edifices. 

"Our infant metropolis at that time had the as- 
pect of merely a straggling village but for the size and 
beauty of its public buildings. Its scattered popula- 
tion numbered scarcely eight thousand; it had no 
fortresses or sign of any ; not a cannon was mounted." 

In 1814, Pennsylvania Avenue "was the only reg- 
ular or used street or road from one part of the city to 
the other." The other streets were frequently impas- 
sable to vehicles or even horsemen, because of the 
mud in them. 

Let it be said to the great credit of Ross that he 

251 



never claimed that his retreat was a "strategic retreat" 
or "retirement to previously prepared positions." He 
took four days for his retreat to Benedict. He was not 
molested. The British "army remained the whole day 
of the 28th at Nottingham, while the crews of their 
boats were engaged in removing the plunder." On 
August 30th the army re-embarked. 

For rather a long period after August 24th, 1814, 
gossipy, interesting tales, some weird, the greater 
number clearly much exaggerated, were told about the 
hurried flights of President Madison from the battle- 
field at Bladensburg to Washington and from Wash- 
ington. Making due allowance for the popular feel- 
ing and for the personal prejudice of some narrators, 
it yet appears certain that the Presidential household 
and nearly all of the most prominent public officials 
certainly believed firmly in "Safety First" and, if they 
acted vigorously on nothing else, they acted with ex- 
treme vigor and promptness on that belief. But this 
was clearly an instance of discretion being the better 
part of valor and certainly the President would have 
been only foolish to take any chances of being cap- 
tured. 

Among the very most discreditable and contempt- 
ible features of "The Invasion of the City of Washing- 
ton" was the concerted, adroit and able, and all too 
successful, effort of the public characters concerned to 
put all the blame on the "common soldiers." If the 
executive and the legislative branches of the national 

252 



government had shown one-fourth as much earnest- 
ness, ability and energy in repelling the British as 
they showed in shifting the blame for the burning of 
the capitol, there would not have been that blame to 
be avoided by public officials, who should have borne 
it, and to be put on the ''common soldiers," who mer- 
ited none of it. 

In his narrative, A Subaltern in America says: 

"On the morning of the 7th (of October) the 
anchors were raised and w r e stood in magnificent array 
towards the Chesapeake. * * * * A beautiful schoon- 
er, carrying a white flag at her main-topmast head, 
shot after us from the Patuxent; she overtook us just 
as we were preparing to bring up for the night, and 
great was the joy of every man on board when it ap- 
peared that she was the bearer of the majority of the 
men and officers who had been left behind wounded 
at Bladensburg. Among the individuals thus restored 
to the army were Colonels Thornton and Wood. (Ma- 
jor Brown's hurts were too serious to admit of his re- 
moval.)" 

Those that have read The Battle of Plattsburg 
will recall the care that Macomb and MacDonough 
gave the British wounded that fell into their hands and 
the honors they paid to the British dead. 

The feelings and sentiments of our brave soldiers 
and sailors in 1812-14 toward their British foes of 
those years of war would certainly shame us beyond 
words if any citizen of the United States should, more 

253 



than a hundred years later, remember any occurrence 
of our Second War of Independence with any ill will 
or ill feeling towards the British of a hundred years 
ago; and certainly we would be shamed yet more if 
because of any event of that War, we had any ill will 
or any ill feeling toward any of the British people of 
today. 

To give a complete, just and accurate account of 
"The Invasion of the City of Washington" and to con- 
vey a just and accurate understanding of the events 
of that invasion, it has been necessary to recite some 
unpleasant facts; it has been necessary to reveal the 
ignoble, discreditable and regrettable. The facts must 
be known and considered. But it would be equally 
ignoble and discreditable to remember those facts now 
to harbor any ill will. The British people of today are 
to be judged by what they themselves do. They are 
now, not our enemies, but our allies. They are fight- 
ing, and valiantly, now, not against our old friend, but 
with her. A thousand events are now a thousand 
compelling reasons for the bonds of friendship and 
respect between the American people and the British 
people being a thousand times stronger than any feel- 
ings that have ever separated them. If we read aright 
the history of the War of 1812 we will admire none 
the less the people of our Mother Country that speak 
the language every person in the United States should 
speak, while our admiration for our soldiers and sail- 
ors in that War will be deepened into reverence and 

254 



our love of our country will be sanctified into a deeper 
devotion — a devotion that our soldiers and sailors of 
today will show forth in deeds worthy of those that 
before them have fought to make our country The 
Land of the Free and The Home of the Brave. 

The one concern of the author has been always to 
state the truth, all the truth, and nothing but the 
truth, fearlessly, without prejudice, shielding no one, 
but, above all, doing injustice to no one. He hopes 
that his readers will remember, as he has remembered, 
that certain things were done when passions had been 
aroused by war and when ideas and standards were 
different from what they are today. 

Let it be said, also, in justice to Madison and 
Monroe that they were always honest with the Amer- 
ican people. Always they desired the prosperity and 
perpetuity of the new Republic. 

Nor were they deaf to criticism, though nearly al- 
ways they ignored it. They — and especially Madison 
— were always fair and gentlemanly, and, if it must 
be said that too often they paid no attention to their 
honest and intelligent critics, also they did not reply 
by saying the critic was untruthful — when future reve- 
lations would have shown that it was not he that had 
— doubtless honestly enough — misstated the facts. 
The little respect shown at that time for the national 
government, especially by state officials, should al- 
ways be remembered for that made the war task of the 
national administration at least twice as difficult as it 

255 



would have been had the national government been re- 
garded as it is today. 

Let it be said in justice to Armstrong that he, too, 
never deceived the American people by stating that 
our forces had cannon when they had not, or by exag- 
gerating the forces actually in service. Let it be said 
also that the executive branch of the government was 
above, in ability and purpose, the subservient, medi- 
ocre congress — their representatives that the people 
had elected. After all, the greater part of the blame 
for the misfortunes and humiliations of the War of 1812 
must rest on a congress too weak, too lazy, too cow- 
ardly to assert its share in the conduct of public 
affairs. 

One very beautiful, very creditable element of the 
War of 1812 was our friendship for the French. It was 
freely asserted and as freely acknowledged that one 
reason for that War was that Great Britain was at war 
with France and by fighting Great Britain we would 
indirectly aid France. Monroe was accused, because 
he favored the War, of being "the tool of France," of 
being "subservient to France." That he was the ac- 
tive, loyal friend of France was true ; he never denied 
it; and he was doubtless proud-of it, as he should have 
been. It was clear that if France had not aided us we 
would have been beaten in our first War of Independ- 
ence. If it had not been for France we would have 
been the colonies of the Kingdom of Great Britain 
and not an independent people having a republican 

256 



form of government. It was not to our credit that at 
an earlier date we had not shown in the most substan- 
tial way our appreciation of the friendship and aid of 
France. It is none to our credit now that we did not 
earlier begin our preparations to fight with France in 
this present war. If there is one people on the globe 
that we should admire and love, if there is one nation 
that we should stand beside as we would stand beside 
our best friend, with all our strength and to the ut- 
most, it is France. Our hearts should be full of proud 
emotion that now the people of this Republic that 
France made possible, are not so cowardly as to refuse 
to show their friendship, gratitude and love for their 
ally of old. God grant that on the fields of France 
the two tri-color flags may go together to glorious 
victory for Opportunity and Freedom. 
(The End.) 



2S7 



FRANCE. 

To France one must ever say, "All glory to you !" 
Whatever may happen, whatever the result of this war 
may be — and I have no doubt as to what the result will 
be — France and Belgium will be enshrined in the 
hearts of all liberty loving people. France's deeds will 
be sung, and laurel wreaths will ever be placed upon 
the brows of that great republic. — Lord Reading, 
April 11, 1918. 



258 



A LITTLE GIRL'S VISION. 

(Odette Gastinel, a 13 year old child in France, a pupil in 
the Lysee Victor Duray, was asked by her teacher to 
write a theme on the subject of the coming of the Amer- 
icans to assist in driving out the German invaders. Here 
is a translation of what she wrote.) 
It was only a little river, almost a brook; it was 

called the Yser. One could talk from one side to the 
other without raising one's voice, and the birds could 
fly over it with one sweep of their wings. And on the 
two banks there were millions of men, the one turned 
toward the other, eye to eye. But the distance which 
separated them was greater than the stars in the sky; 
it was the distance which separated right from in- 
justice. 

The ocean is so great that the seagulls do not dare 
to cross it. During seven days and seven nights the 
great steamships of America, going at full speed, drive 
through the deep waters, before the lighthouses of 
France come into view ; but from one side to another 
the hearts are touching. 

ODETTE GASTINEL. 



259 



FRANCE. 

Finish'd the days, the clouds dispell'd, 
The travail o'er, the long-sought extrication, 
When lo ! reborn, high o'er the European world, 
(In gladness, answering thence, as face afar to 

face, reflecting ours, Columbia,) 
Again thy star, O France — fair, lustrous star, 
In heavenly peace, clearer, more bright than 

ever, 
Shall beam immortal. — Walt Whitman. 



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